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Abstract This thesis analyzes the effect of regulatory activities on the degree of elec-
tricity and gas market liberalization. Empirical findings hint at a positive relationship
between regulatory independence and reform efforts. Furthermore, a liberalization-
enhancing effect of regulatory authorities pursuing their statutory objective to promote
consumer interests is suggested by theoretical results. However, as soon as regulators
rather focus on business-oriented (as, e.g., high profits) or government-oriented goals
(as, e.g., high tax yields), regulatory interferences might hamper the process of reform
to the detriment of consumers, as both empirical and theoretical findings indicate.
Keywords: Independent regulatory authorities, energy market liberalization, unbund-
ling.
Kurzzusammenfassung Diese Dissertation untersucht den Einfluss von Regulierungsak-
tivitäten auf den Grad der Liberalisierung von Strom- und Gasmärkten. Empirische
Ergebnisse deuten auf einen positiven Zusammenhang zwischen Unabhängigkeit der
Regulierungsbehörde und Reformbemühungen hin. Zudem legen theoretische Resultate
einen liberalisierungsfördernden Effekt von Regulierungsbehörden nahe, wenn diese ihr
satzungsmäßiges Ziel verfolgen, die Konsumenteninteressen zu fördern. Sobald Regu-
lierer ihr Augenmerk jedoch eher auf Ziele richten, die Unternehmen (wie z.B. hohe
Gewinne) oder den Staat begünstigen (wie z.B. hohe Steuereinnahmen), könnten reg-
ulatorische Eingriffe den Reformprozess zum Nachteil der Konsumenten hemmen, wie
empirische und theoretische Ergebnisse signalisieren.
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Since around 1990, electricity (OECD/IEA, 2005; Newbery, 2009) and gas markets
(Conway and Nicoletti, 2006) in OECD countries have been liberalized. The key objec-
tive of these reforms has been the creation of competitive energy markets that ensure
low electricity and gas prices to the benefit of consumers (OECD/IEA, 2005; European
Commission, 2007a; Newbery, 2009).
The liberalization process has been accompanied by the establishment of indepen-
dent regulatory authorities (Smith, 1997; OECD/IEA, 2001). One of the major tasks of
these agencies is to foster reform by protecting end-users from the market power of the
energy sector’s natural monopolists (Kay and Vickers, 1990; Small, 1999; OECD/IEA,
2001) active in electricity and gas transmission and distribution as well as in gas stor-
age. Equipped with often broad competencies (Johannsen et al., 2004) to realize this
goal, autonomous regulatory agencies are rated as being a crucial factor for the success
of energy market reform (OECD/IEA, 2001; European Commission, 2007a).
This thesis analyzes to what extent regulators have fulfilled their official mission to
benefit consumers by promoting liberalization. Beyond that and even more important,
it also discusses whether regulatory decision makers might have thwarted reform to
achieve personal goals.
In particular, this thesis studies whether regulators pursuing self-serving objectives
might have refrained from implementing reform measures that increase the level of
vertical separation between the natural monopolies and the (potentially) competitive
activities in the electricity and gas sector (i.e., generation/production, wholesale and
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retail). Such regulatory interventions, referred to as unbundling, have been identified
as being indispensable for achieving full competition in the energy industry (European
Commission, 2001, 2004; OECD/IEA, 2005; Newbery, 2009): they (help to) eliminate
anti-competitive behavior of monopolists integrated with non-network activities (as,
e.g., cross-subsidies or a discriminatory grid access for rivals) that hampers both the
development and the functioning of the market (European Commission, 2001, 2004).
Various forms of unbundling (separation of accounts, of information, of staff, creation
of separate entities) that differ in their intensity exist (OECD, 2001; European Com-
mission, 2004); the only measure that is rated as being a truly effective remedy for
the monopolists’ incentives to impede competition, though, is unbundling by ownership
(OECD, 2001; European Commission, 2007a).
Chapter 2 examines whether European electricity and gas market regulators have
affected the level of vertical separation implemented in both sectors and, furthermore,
the design of entry regulation and the market structure. More precisely, we estimate the
effect of the authorities’ formal (i.e., statutory) independence on these three indicators
for the progress of reform. Authority autonomy is seen as a vital prerequisite for an
effective regulation as it prevents undue interferences from both regulatees and politi-
cians into the regulatory process (Smith, 1997; OECD/IEA, 2001). Our key finding of
a positive relationship between formal independence and liberalization efforts suggested
by instrumental variable estimations is hence in line with expectations and corroborates
the picture of regulators being ”advocates of consumers”.
Chapters 3 and 4 then challenge this perception. They indicate that also ministry
or authority employees in charge of regulation might hamper reform by taking deci-
sions that, instead of promoting the interests of end-users, rather benefit the regulators
themselves or market participants other than consumers. The model in Chapter 3 an-
alyzes why despite the benefits Ownership Unbundling has for competition (OECD,
2001; Mulder and Shestalova, 2006; Buchan, 2007; European Commission, 2007a; Pol-
litt, 2008) several EU member states still unbundle their power transmission grids only
legally, i.e., they require network and non-network activities to be separated into dif-
ferent entities, but not into entirely independent companies. Distinguishing between
different objectives a regulator might pursue, we find that only agencies that act in the
interest of consumers favor the implementation of Ownership Unbundling. Regulators
2
1. INTRODUCTION
that strive for high industry profits since, e.g., they are captured (Stigler, 1971; Laf-
font and Tirole, 1991; Che, 1995; Agrell and Gautier, 2010, 2012a) or for high agency
budgets to, e.g., satisfy personal needs (Niskanen, 1968, 1975; Noll, 1989; Train, 1991,
ch. I.1), by contrast, are indifferent between separating the grid legally or by owner-
ship. Possible drawbacks for the authority or the companies resulting from Ownership
Unbundling that are, however, rated as minor compared to the benefits for consumers
(Pollitt, 2008) might then induce regulators to mandate only legally separated networks,
thus preventing a welfare-enhancing step of reform.
Chapter 4 takes up the notion that authority members focusing on high agency
budgets instead of on consumer interests might refrain from implementing unbundling
measures in the power sector. It empirically analyzes the effect of tax yields on the
degree of vertical separation in OECD electricity markets. Tax revenues are proxied by
the rates of the corporate income tax and the VAT on electricity and we argue as follows:
regulatory decision makers striving for high appropriations for their institution favor
high tax yields since higher tax revenues are associated with increases in the funding
of ministries and agencies; consequently, these regulators refrain from implementing
[foster] unbundling measures that reduce [raise] the base of a tax and therefore its
revenues. Since the potential loss [increase] in tax yields is higher, the higher the tax
rate, the regulatory actors’ incentive to delay [promote] reform increases in the tax rate.
Estimation results for the corporate income tax rate are in line with these considerations:
with vertical separation reducing the base of the tax, a negative relationship between
tax rate and unbundling intensity is suggested. For the VAT on electricity estimates
hint at a liberalization-enhancing effect of high tax rates, further substantiating our
reasoning in cases of high price elasticities of power demand. The theoretical results
from Chapter 3 indicating that regulators pursuing objectives other than the promotion




Does Regulatory Independence Translate into a Higher Degree of
Liberalization? - Evidence from EU Energy Regulators1
2.1 Introduction
The liberalization process initiated by the European Union in electricity and gas
markets in the mid-1990s has aimed at achieving a single internal energy market (Euro-
pean Communities 1996, 1998). It was accompanied by the establishment of national in-
dependent regulatory authorities (IRAs) which foster reform by fulfilling three different
tasks: first, they allow protection of investors from arbitrary government interferences
with regulation that would otherwise occur due to short-term political pressures. Sec-
ond, they monitor the natural monopolies that exist in both industries (i.e., transmission
and distribution in both sectors as well as gas storage) to avoid competition-hampering
impacts on the liberalized activities (i.e., generation/production, wholesale and retail);
this prevents the monopolists from abusing their market power at the expense of con-
sumers. Finally, IRAs are commissioned to enhance economic efficiency (Smith, 1997;
OECD/IEA, 2001), which especially implies the enforcement of prices for monopoly
services that eliminate excess profits, but still both ensure costs coverage and provide
1This chapter was presented at the 1st Annual Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructure Indus-
tries in Florence, the 35th IAEE International Conference in Perth (AUS), the 10th EEM International
Conference in Stockholm, the 32nd USAEE/IAEE North American Conference in Anchorage, the 13th
IAEE European Conference in Düsseldorf, the 2nd Lower Saxon Workshop in Applied Economics in
Hannover and the Workshop on Public Economics in Kassel.
An earlier version of this chapter was published as ”Does Regulatory Independence Translate into a
Higher Degree of Liberalization? - Evidence from EU Energy Regulators”, Conference Proceedings of
the 10th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2013), Paper No. 130.
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Figure 2.1: Regulatory independence and electricity market liberalization
incentives for cost reductions and adequate, timely investments (Small, 1999; Joskow, 2007).
A proper fulfillment of these tasks requires that neither politicians nor regulatees
are able to affect agency decisions in any way. An authority’s independence from both
politics and stakeholders backed by an adequate endowment with financial and per-
sonnel resources is therefore rated as essential for an effective regulation (Smith, 1997;
OECD/IEA, 2001). This notion, however, is challenged by the scatterplots shown in
Figures 2.1 and 2.2: the diagrams contrast the degree of regulatory independence with
the liberalization level realized in European energy markets; they include three (for elec-
tricity) and two (for gas) years, respectively, of the early 2000s as well as 16 countries
Figure 2.2: Regulatory independence and gas market liberalization
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(EU-15 plus Norway). The regulators’ autonomy is measured by an index developed
by Gilardi (2002) that ranges from 0 to 1 and increases with higher degrees of formal
(i.e., statutory) independence. Liberalization is operationalized by averaging OECD
measures that evaluate market entry regulation, vertical separation provisions (in both
sectors) and market structure (only in the gas sector) by assigning values between 6
(precluding competition) and 0 (fostering competition) (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006;
OECD, 2011a)2. Contrary to what is expected, the fitted regression lines in the plots
suggest lower reform efforts in energy markets supervised by more autonomous author-
ities; the higher slope in Figure 2.2 indicates that the negative relationship seems to be
even more pronounced in the gas sector.
These observations are at odds with the conventional wisdom of competition-enhancing
independent regulators. They rather emphasize the relevance of the warning to be found
repeatedly in research on IRAs (Thatcher, 2002a; Maggetti, 2007; Gilardi and Maggetti,
2011): despite the substantial role that regulatory authorities (are supposed to) play
during reform processes, a comprehensive analysis of their functioning and particularly
their actual impact on liberalization is still missing.
Our paper now aims at narrowing this research gap: it empirically analyzes the
effect of regulatory formal independence on the intensity of electricty and gas market
reforms in Europe. At the same time, this study takes the first steps to overcome an
issue identified as significantly impeding the empirical assessment of IRAs: the problem
of lacking long-term data on the agencies’ degree of statutory autonomy (Gilardi and
Maggetti, 2011) is tackled by the construction of a small panel sample that captures
the formal independence of the same European energy regulators in different years.
An agreed-upon measure of statutory agency autonomy does not exist in economics.
Autonomy data for the first sample year are therefore borrowed from Gilardi’s (2002)
index of regulatory formal independence which was originally developed to verify two
explanations for diverging degrees of agency autonomy prevailing in political science:
the credibility and the uncertainty hypothesis.
The credibility hypothesis states that governments delegate decision-making powers
in the area of market regulation to agencies detached from cabinets so as to be able to
2Methods and data sources used to construct both the independence and the liberalization index
are described in detail in Section 2.2.1.
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credibly display the ruling parties’ commitment to regulatory provisions (Gatsios and
Seabright, 1989). The giving up of power on the part of politicians is seen as necessary
due to the governments’ ongoing propensity to optimally adapt their policies to actual
circumstances and their political discretion empowering them to do so (Kydland and
Prescott, 1977): only an institutional arrangement eliminating decisional leeway allows
cabinets to credibly rule out future changes in regulations (Shepsle, 1991). Agencies fully
independent from government are expected to fulfill this requirement most effectively
(Majone, 1997a, 1997b).
The uncertainty hypothesis claims that ruling politicians set up autonomous author-
ities to shield their political beliefs from opposing successors in case they lose major-
ity: established with objectives that reflect the government’s ends, their institutional
structures durably resistant against any interference secure an adamant policy in the
agencies’ jurisdictions (Moe, 1989).
The employment of Gilardi’s (2002) index requires a closer consideration of two
of its properties, though. First and as mentioned above, the measure merely depicts
”a snapshot of the formal independence of regulatory agencies” (Gilardi and Maggetti,
2011: 206): it covers only a single observation point in time, the first panel year. This
makes the intended analysis of the long-term effects of agency autonomy on electricity
and gas market liberalization impossible, so we extend the sample period: we use two
surveys on European energy regulators (Johannsen et al., 2004; CEER, 2005) along with
Gilardi’s (2002) method of calculation to compute comparable values of the autonomy
index for further years.
Second, Gilardi’s (2002) measure only considers how ”prescriptions, enshrined in
the constitutions of agencies, [...] guarantee their independence from elected politi-
cians” (Gilardi and Maggetti, 2011: 202); the results of regulatory capture theory are
hence neglected. Based on Stigler’s (1971) seminal paper claiming that politically influ-
ential industries are able to abuse state institutions to maximize the incumbents’ profits,
different strands of the capture approach solely blame the regulatees for welfare detri-
mental regulations: agency members are assumed to act in the interest of firms due to
bribes (Laffont and Tirole, 1991), post-tenure job prospects in the industry (Che, 1995)
or by intentionally applying biased information provided by the regulatees as a basis for
regulatory decisions (Agrell and Gautier, 2010, 2012a, 2012b), while governments are
7
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expected to strive for welfare maximization only. However, despite the definite source
of adverse regulations suggested by capture theory, focusing on political instead of in-
dustry interference by applying Gilardi’s (2002) index should provide reliable results:
at variance with the theoretical predictions, Wilks and Bartle (2002) argue that espe-
cially the prevention of political influence is crucial for obtaining effective regulators;
regulatees try to interfere with authorities mostly only indirectly via politicians who
are prone to yield to political pressures and are therefore exploited by suppliers as well
as industrial lobbyists.
We start our empirical analysis by running OLS regressions that control for several
factors that might affect the degree of energy market liberalization besides regulatory
formal independence (including those that have been identified to influence a country’s
reform efforts in previous studies). In these estimations, the sign of the coefficients
on statutory agency autonomy turns out to be in line with the negative relationship
between regulatory independence and liberalization suggested by the scatterplots, but
the estimates cannot reach statistical significance.
However, the common notion that authority independence fosters liberalization
might induce a government facing a poor reform progress in the energy sector to extend
the responsible regulator’s autonomy; in this case, our OLS estimates would be biased
because of reverse causality. We cope with this problem by re-running our regressions,
using 2SLS IV as the estimation method. To select the instrumental variables, we draw
on the research on the determinants of formal regulatory independence: proxies for
political uncertainty and for political credibility are employed. The instruments should
accordingly be correlated with statutory agency autonomy and fulfill the first require-
ment to be valid. We furthermore argue that also the second condition for instrument
validity, a lacking direct effect on liberalization, is met by the credibility and the un-
certainty measure: in particular due to the high level of expertise needed for today’s
utility regulation, we expect that solely IRAs (are able to) determine the scope of en-
ergy market reforms. Their regulatory decisions, in turn, should be unaffected by both
a feature of a country’s polity (as a government’s risk of losing office to a successor with
a different ideology, captured by the uncertainty proxy) and the degree of an economy’s
globalization (applied as credibility proxy).
In line with the uncertainty hypothesis, first stage IV results reveal the formal reg-
8
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ulatory independence to increase with a higher risk for governments to be replaced
by warring politicians. Moreover, higher levels of statutory autonomy are suggested
for less globalized economies. This contradicts expectations, though: an outstanding
importance for cabinets to credibly commit to regulations is conjectured to exist espe-
cially in open countries where foreign investors have to be attracted and retained. We
provide the following possible explanation for this inconsistent finding: evidence from
EU member states indicates that, due the energy sector’s importance for an economy,
governments favor national energy suppliers to be controlled by domestic shareholders.
The European Union, though, counteracts this tendency by all means to enforce the
EC Treaty rules on the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment.
The only remaining possibility for politicians to influence the energy sector in their
interest is therefore to interfere with the regulator; higher foreign investments should
then induce governments to keep a foot in the authority’s door, reflected by a limi-
tation of formal regulatory independence. In the second stage of the IV regression,
a considerable liberalization-enhancing effect of an authority’s formal independence is
suggested by the respective estimate. Supporting conventional wisdom in contrast to
its OLS counterpart, it indicates that an interaction between the scope of reform and the
statutory level of regulatory autonomy (and hence an endogeneity problem) indeed exists.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section illustrates
the data used to test the hypothesis of a liberalization-enhancing effect of IRAs empir-
ically and elaborates on our controls. Section 2.3 reports and discusses OLS regression
results. Section 2.4 takes account of potential reverse causality problems. It introduces
appropriate instruments for regulatory independence and substantiates their selection;
then, the section presents and discusses IV regression results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and Variables
2.2.1 Liberalization and Regulatory Independence
To capture the degree of liberalization in national electricity and gas markets, we
draw on the OECD’s ETCR (Energy, T ransport and C ommunications Regulation) in-
dex (OECD, 2011a). It provides a comparative measure for the overall liberalization
9
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level in seven non-manufacturing sectors (electricity, gas, airlines, railways, road trans-
port, post, telecommunications) by assessing how regulatory provisions impede compe-
tition in the (potentially) competitive stages of the industries’ value chains. The com-
prehensive measure is composed of (equally weighted) sector indicator values. These,
in turn, are the averaged scores of two to four sub-indicators, capturing the regula-
tory design in areas that are crucial for realizing a competitive market in the industry
considered. They are chosen from the following: barriers to entry, public ownership,
market structure, vertical integration, and price controls. Two or three main aspects
of the structural arrangements in each selected field are then evaluated on the basis of
data included in OECD and other institutions’ official publications as well as on infor-
mation on policy settings and regulatory rules gathered from OECD member states by
a questionnaire (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006).
Since we are interested in a possible relationship between regulatory independence
and liberalization in the energy sector, we concentrate on the indicators for the elec-
tricity and the gas sector. The sub-indicators originally included are entry regulation,
public ownership and vertical integration (both sectors) as well as the market structure
(only for the gas sector) (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). Due to concerns about reverse
causality, however, we disregard the ownership situation: according to Majone (1996a),
the market power of natural monopolies existing in European energy markets has been
curbed for a long time by nationalization. The nationalization of natural monopolies
aimed at ensuring an appropriate consideration of the public interest in the companies’
production and pricing decisions, but was increasingly perceived as failing to meet this
objective: apart from the insufficient supervision of the firms’ leaders due to a lack of
specialist knowledge and information on the side of politicians, both vague responsi-
bilities and managerial objectives prevented clear-cut performance ratings and enabled
executives either to excessively expand corporate activities or to preserve convenient
conditions. In the recent past, independent authorities have therefore taken over the
regulatory function from public ownership.
To measure the liberalization levels in gas and electricity markets, we calculate the
respective mean of the sub-indicators for each sector. The following major aspects
are evaluated: the electricity entry regulation sub-indicator captures the conditions of
third party access, the existence of a wholesale market and restrictions in the consumers’
10
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choice of supplier; the vertical integration sub-indicator considers the level of vertical
separation between transmission and generation as well as the overall degree of vertical
integration in the sector. The gas entry regulation sub-indicator analyzes the terms
of third party access, the extent of consumer choice and provisions curtailing market
entry in the production/import stage; the vertical integration sub-indicator assesses
the degree of vertical seperation between production/import and all residual stages,
between supply and all residual stages and separately between supply and distribution.
The sub-indicator for the market structure in the gas sector additionally evaluates the
largest companies’ market shares in the production/import, in the transmission and in
the supply stage. Evaluation scores assigned to each of these issues range from 0 to 6
and increase with the anticompetitiveness of regulatory provisions. A weighting scheme
adding up to 100 percent is then applied to all scores belonging to one sub-indicator,
yielding index values between 0 and 6 for both the latter (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006)
and our liberalization measure.
To measure the autonomy of energy regulators, an index of formal independence
developed by Gilardi (2002) is applied as a benchmark. An authority’s formal inde-
pendence determines the degree of autonomy conceded to an IRA by statutes and laws
that prohibit political interventions (Gilardi, 2002). It has to be distinguished from
an agency’s de facto independence (Gilardi and Maggetti, 2011) which captures the
non-interference in an authority’s day-to-day operations and is conceptualized and op-
erationalized in Maggetti (2007). Unlike the formal independence concept, the de facto
approach considers autonomy from both politicians and regulatees. Gilardi’s (2002) in-
dex comprises five dimensions determining a regulator’s formal autonomy: the agency
head’s status, the management board members’ status, the authority’s relationship with
government and parliament, the regulator’s financial and organizational autonomy and
the regulatory competencies. The degree of independence in these areas is assessed by
a questionnaire answered by regulators (Gilardi, 2002, 2005a, 2008, ch. 8). It assigns
values between 0 and 1 to predefined answering possibilities to questions that capture
the statutory provisions governing the respective aspect surveyed. The values increase
when political interference is impeded by the relevant laws. The dimension indices are
the average values of all questions composing a dimension; the overall autonomy values
used in our paper are calculated as the means of the dimensions. Figures for the total
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formal independence of electricity regulators are reported in detail in Gilardi (2008,
ch. 8) and reflect the situation in one year of the 2001-2003 period that differs for the
agencies included in the sample.
Since we are particularly interested in possible effects of regulatory independence
on liberalization over time, we draw on the surveys by Johannsen et al. (2004) and
the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) (2005) to add observations from
additional years. Both reports use similar questionnaires as Gilardi (2002) to picture the
formal autonomy of IRAs, so that constructing a small sample that captures the formal
independence of energy regulators in 16 European countries (EU-15 plus Norway) in
the recent past becomes possible: all answers were coded according to Gilardi’s (2002)
scale, so as to generate a comparable measure for the independence dimensions and
the overall IRA autonomy. Unlike Gilardi (2002, 2005a, 2008, ch. 8), who explicitly
refers to electricity regulators, both Johannsen et al. (2004) and CEER (2005) sent
their questions to the CEER member authorities responsible for energy regulation. For
the periods covered by these two studies (Johannsen et al. (2004): 2003/2004 and
CEER (2005): 2005) we therefore consider both the electricity and the gas sector. As
the regulator in Norway is not responsible for governing the gas market (International
Energy Regulation Network, 2012), only the Norwegian electricity sector is included in
our analysis3.
2.2.2 Control Variables
Next to the impact independent regulators are expected to have on energy market
liberalization, several other explanations for diverging reform efforts exist. We outline
the associated theoretical approaches as well as related empirical evidence in the follow-
ing and add appropriate control variables to our estimations. Furthermore, this section
introduces additional covariates we include in the regressions and briefly substantiates
3Lacking data on regulatory independence further reduce the number of observations: the survey
by Johannsen et al. (2004) does not include information about the Belgian and the German electricity
and gas regulators, while Gilardi (2008, ch. 8) does not provide an index value for the Luxembourgian
electricity agency. In addition, Gilardi (2008, ch. 8) assigns an index value of 0 to the German elec-
tricity authority for our first year of observation: an energy sector regulator autonomous from the
government had not yet existed there in 2002. Since we want to assess the relationship between the
formal independence of IRAs and the scope of energy market reform, we exclude this observation from
our sample.
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their selection. Detailed descriptions of the controls as well as summary statistics for
all variables can be found in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 in the Appendix, respectively.
First, we distinguish between regulatory activities in the electricity and the gas
industry. Compared to electricity markets, reform efforts in the gas branch were smaller
in the early years of liberalization (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006), so we take account
of the distinct initial situations newly established regulators had to face in both these
sectors when they started their work.
Furthermore, the duration of a regulator’s activity most likely plays an important
role for the fulfillment of its (economic) task to eliminate anti-competitive behavior: de-
termination, implementation and enforcement of reform measures as well as potentially
necessary adjustments to improve their efficiency require a long time period. Besides,
authorities organized in networks (as, e.g., the Council of European Energy Regulators)
might, over time, benefit from a transfer of knowledge and best practices between mem-
ber agencies (Maggetti, 2007) that facilitates their mission. We therefore control for
the number of years that have passed by since an authority has started its operation.
Moreover, the so-called ”crisis hypothesis” asserts that a (severely) deteriorating
economy is a prerequisite for reform: only the distress occurring in such a situation
can induce politicians to implement necessary changes and, above all, enable them to
force through these adjustments against the resistance of the losing group every reform
inevitably creates (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Krueger, 1993; Rodrik, 1996; Drazen and
Easterly, 2001); at this point, the costs of the crisis unacceptably exceed the advantages
of its few, albeit often well-organized, beneficiaries (who, beyond that, are expected to
reduce opposition as they get negatively affected by the pervasive economic problems
as well (Rodrik, 1996)). The hypothesis is substantiated with respect to high inflation
by Drazen and Grilli (1993) theoretically as well as by Drazen and Easterly (2001)
and Pitlik and Wirth (2003) empirically. With regard to growth crises, Pitlik (2008),
examining the joint effect of a country’s economic performance and its political regime
type, provides empirical evidence for negative growth to foster reforms in democracies,
but not in autocratic polities. Pitlik and Wirth (2003) find that - compared to a
situation without a crisis - liberalization efforts are higher in countries suffering from
a deep growth crisis, whereas a medium crisis delays steps of reform4. Drazen and
4Pitlik and Wirth (2003) define the two types of crisis as follows: They assign a value of 1 to every
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Easterly’s (2001) and Pitlik’s (2007) results point in the direction of a growth crisis
effect as well, but are (mostly) not statistically significant. To check for a possible
relationship between the state of an economy and its degree of liberalization, we include
a control for potential economic downturns in the previous year. Based on Pitlik and
Wirth’s (2003) findings, rather a reform-hampering effect of a crisis should show up,
since in the period considered a deep recession did not emerge in European states.
Pitlik’s (2008) (and, within limits, also Drazen and Easterly’s (2001) and Pitlik’s (2007))
results, however, suggest exactly the opposite. We refrain from additionally controlling
for currency devaluation, since the inflation rates identified as inducing reform are way
beyond those observable in Europe during our sample period5.
We also account for a country’s energy efficiency in production. Since the desire
for cheap energy is stronger in economies with energy-intense manufacturing processes,
a high energy intensity probably fosters competitive market structures in the national
electricity and gas industry. Far-reaching reforms should thus mainly take place in
countries where the total amount of primary energy necessary to produce one thousand
US$ of GDP - a common proxy for energy efficiency (OECD, 2010a) - was high in the
preceding year.
The intensity of liberalization might likewise be affected by the government’s ide-
ology: typically, left-wing parties are expected to favor state interventions and, thus,
rather comprehensive regulatory regimes, while right-wing policies are associated with
an unobtrusive state, trusting the market and fostering deregulation (Benoit and Laver,
2006, ch. 6). The propensity to liberalize the energy sector should hence be lower in
year with a non-positive growth rate being higher than -1%; years with a rate equal to or smaller
than -1% recieve a value of 2. Then, a five year period with a sum between 3 and 5 is classified as
a medium growth crisis, a five year period with a total value greater than 5 constitutes a deep crisis.
Their finding that at least medium crises hamper liberalization is in line with Bean’s (1998) conjecture:
contradicting the ”crisis hypothesis”, he argues that policy changes are more likely in times of growth,
since a good economic performance allows to better alleviate the disadvantages of the losers of reform.
5As in the case of growth (compare footnote 4), Pitlik and Wirth (2003) differentiate between
medium and deep crises also for inflation: a year with an inflation rate higher than or equal to 10%
and smaller than 40% scores with a value of 1, a year with an inflation rate equal to 40% or smaller
than 100% with a value of 2 and a year with an inflation rate exceeding 100% with a value of 3. Values
are then added for five year periods. A period with an aggregated score between 2 and 10 is classified
as a medium inflation crisis, while a period with a total value greater than 10 constitutes a deep crisis.
Drazen and Easterly (2001), dividing their sample into percentiles subject to the inflation rate, find a
positive effect on reform only for the groups with a median annual rate of 68% or more. When they
use another classification method, even an annual inflation of at least 100% was necessary for countries
to benefit.
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countries governed by left-wing parties, which would also be in line with Pitlik’s (2007)
and Potrafke’s (2010) empirical studies: both find general reform efforts to be higher
in countries with right-wing governments. The revealed relationship, however, might
not only be caused by direct governmental decisions and actions, as suggested by the
plain theory; given the key role assigned to regulators in the liberalization process, it
might also reflect the political orientation prevaling in authorities not (yet) fully politi-
cally independent: Gilardi (2005b) argues that ”IRAs need not be ideologically neutral”
(Gilardi, 2005b: 92), and his view is in line with Thatcher’s (2002b) remarks on the es-
tablishment process of agencies, indicating the consideration of all influencial (political)
interests during their creation. Finally - although with reference to general competition
authorities - also a comment in Wilks and Bartle (2002) points into the same direction:
such agencies are suggested to allow for the ruling politicians’ views and objectives
when taking decisions and to adjust to potential shifts therein. Descriptive statistics
from Thatcher (2002a) substantiate the conjecture of ideological influences on regula-
tory decisions: for a sample of IRAs active in four EU countries and eight domains6,
the paper shows that 73 (ITA), 46 (FRA) and 36 (GER) percent of the authorities’
senior members have been affiliated to a political party7, and that 32 (ITA), 15 (GER),
9 (FRA) and 3 (UK) percent of them have even held or run for a political office at the
local, national or European level before or after their agency job. The control for the
ruling parties’ orientation hence captures ideologically-tinged changes in the regulatory
environment induced by either the government or politically sympathetic regulators.
Finally, we take account of the level of corruption prevailing in the sample countries.
Venal public servants are expected to use the various actions at their disposal - as,
e.g., the implementation of different regulatory measures - to their own benefit by
affecting the bribers’ ability and inclination to pay kickbacks (Tanzi, 1994; Ades and
Di Tella, 1997a; Treisman, 2000): rents enjoyed by firms due to malfeasance enable
officials to extract part of these illegitimate profits via bribes (Ades and Di Tella, 1997a,
1997b, 1999; Treisman, 2000). Since such rents emerge in particular in non-competitive
environments (Mauro, 1996; Ades and Di Tella, 1997a, 1999), corruption is seen as a
6The domains are: general competition, telecommunications, energy, water, railways, postal ser-
vices, media and stock exchange/shares; in some of the countries surveyed independent regulators did
not exist in all of these areas. See Thatcher (2002a) for details.
7The corresponding percentage in the UK has been zero.
15
CHAPTER 2. REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE AND EU ENERGY LIBERALIZATION
serious obstacle to the removal of market imperfections (Tanzi, 1994): civil servants
aiming at high kickbacks are suspected to curb competition in their own interest (Ades
and Di Tella, 1997a; Treisman, 2000). Consequently, we expect a negative relationship
between the degree of liberalization and the perceived susceptibility to bribery of a
country’s public sector, captured by the last control we add. This would also be in line
with previous theoretical and empirical findings: Emerson (2006), employing a Cournot
model with a competitive fringe, shows that a low number of Cournot competitors
corresponds to large kickbacks and is hence optimal from a venal official’s point of
view. Attached estimations furthermore reveal a strong negative effect of corruption on
a country’s overall level of competition. Van Koten and Ortmann’s (2008) study shows
that in the EU-15 the degree of vertical separation between electricity transmission
and generation - an essential condition to realize fully liberalized markets (European
Commission, 2007a) - is higher in less corrupt member states8.
However, it might also be possible that the direction of effect runs exactly opposite
and a low level of competition induced by only modest previous liberalization efforts
increases corruption: the excessive rents firms generate in a strictly regulated, non-
competitive market constitute a strong temptation for agency employees to demand
bribes from the companies that are interested in maintaining their profitable situation
(Mauro, 1996; Ades and Di Tella, 1999); a higher degree of state interference might
therefore be associated with officials becoming more corrupt (Tanzi, 1994; Mauro, 1996;
Treisman, 2000). A general negative effect of non-competitive rents on the officials’
integrity is suggested both theoretically and empirically: Ades and Di Tella’s (1997a)
model shows that the proportion of corrupt bureaucrats increases in the profits of
the regulated firms. And Ades and Di Tella’s (1997a, 1997b, 1999) and Treisman’s
(2000) estimations reveal a higher susceptibility to bribery in countries where domestic
companies enjoy higher rents due to the following reasons: a low trade openness (Ades
and Di Tella, 1997a, 1997b, 1999; Treisman, 2000), a market dominance of few firms
(Ades and Di Tella, 1999), regulatory interventions (Treisman, 2000), subsidies, fiscal
discrimination or the exclusion of foreign firms from public procurement procedures
8Although not linked to bribery by the author, also Duso’s (2002) results for the mobile telecom-
munications sector seem to further substantiate the above considerations: he finds that the higher the




(Ades and Di Tella, 1997b); Ades and Di Tella’s (1999) and Treisman’s (2000) results,
however, are not statistically significant throughout. In our case, it would probably be
reasonable to argue that the non-competitive profits companies earn in the partially
still regulated energy markets do not crucially affect the measure of overall perceived
public sector corruption employed as a control; but to entirely rule out results biased
by endogeneity, we re-estimate all regressions by lagging the corruption proxy by one
year. We briefly address the outcomes of these robustness checks after the findings of
our main estimations are discussed.
2.3 OLS Estimations
To test for the relationship between an IRA’s formal autonomy and the degree of
energy market liberalization, we start with estimating the equation
libit = α + β · formindit + γ ·Xit + εit.
The dependent variable libit denotes the liberalization level of electricity and gas
markets. Our main explanatory variable is the regulator’s formal independence formindit.
The vector Xit includes all factors that might also affect reform efforts, outlined in Sec-
tion 2.2.2. Finally, εit describes the usual error term.
Table 2.1 reports the results from a fixed-effects OLS regression with robust stan-
dard errors being clustered at the country level. Basically, the estimation outcome
suggests the relationship already revealed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2: the coefficient of the
independence measure has a positive sign, indicating less competitive energy sectors in
countries with thoroughly independent regulatory authorities; statistical significance,
however, is lacking. The widespread notion of a liberalization-enhancing effect of au-
tonomous regulators is hence further challenged at this point; findings are rather in
line with the accusation that IRAs have not been able to overcome the often industry-
friendly climate prevaling in regulation prior to their establishment (Thatcher, 2002a).
The statistically significant coefficients of the control variables reveal a slower liber-
alization pace in gas compared to electricity markets as well as a positive relationship
between long-lasting IRA activities and the intensity of competition in energy sectors.
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gas dum 2.1625∗∗∗ .2935
IRA age -.2458∗∗∗ .0581
lag GDPcap crisis dum .4492 .3360






Note: Table 2.1 shows estimation results of a
fixed-effects OLS regression. Dependent variable
is the mean of the electricity and gas sector sub-
indicators, respectively, apart from public owner-
ship, as described in Conway and Nicoletti (2006).
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country
level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%
level.
According to their size, the modest reform efforts in the gas sector earlier in time entail
a liberalization divergence which is equivalent to approximately two OECD index units.
Furthermore, about every four years of regulatory surveillance reduce the liberalization
measure by one unit.
The other controls show the expected signs as well. Our conjecture of a more
competitive energy sector in case of an energy-intense economy seems to be reasonable,
but the relationship is not statistically significant. Besides, the findings hint at more
comprehensive reform processes in countries with a good economic performance, right-
wing governments and a low corruption level. However, unlike in the studies explaining
diverging reform efforts by these three aspects, their coefficients do not reach statistical
significance in our estimations.
Lagging the corruption proxy by one period leaves the regression outcome almost
unaffected (see Table 2.6 in the Appendix for detailed results): the estimate on regula-
tory formal independence takes a value of 0.2848 and remains statistically insignificant.
The coefficients on the gas dummy and the regulator’s age reach statistical significance
at the 1% level again and change their size by less than 0.005 units compared to the
estimates reported in Table 2.1. And the regression outcome still indicates a lacking
effect of a country’s energy intensity, the government’s ideology and the level of per-
ceived corruption (even if lagged by one year this time) on liberalization. The only
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deviation in the findings worth mentioning is that the lagged crisis dummy reaches
statistical significance at the 10% level and suggests reform efforts to be lower after an
economic downturn: in case of a negative GDP per capita growth rate in the previous
year, liberalization measures corresponding to an index reduction of about 0.5 units are
postponed. Pitlik and Wirth’s (2003) finding of the reform-hampering effect of medium
growth crises might explain this result.
2.4 IV Estimations
2.4.1 The Endogeneity Problem
The estimations in the previous section are based on the assumption of an unam-
biguous direction of effect: the degree of formal independence (co-)determines the scope
of energy market reforms in Europe. This requires that a regulatory institution’s au-
tonomy is specified before the authority takes up its work; an order that also Albon
(2012) states when he describes what he calls the regulatory supply chain. According to
this sequence, the definition of the regulator’s independence level from regulatees and
politicians stands at the beginning (together with setting the objectives), whereas reg-
ulatory activities are located at the end of the chain, only followed by potential appeals
of the authority’s decisions. The power autonomous agencies established in such an en-
vironment furthermore need to alter the sectoral structures according to their intentions
obviously exists as well: they are identified as ”powerful participants in policy making”
(Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 15 et seq.) that ”are proactive and involved in mar-
ket design” (Levi-Faur, 2004: 9). Since, after all, the advancement of market-oriented
reforms is one of the broad goals of independent regulators and the establishment of
the latter is perceived to be vital for the development and preservation of competitive
energy makets (OECD/IEA, 2001), assuming that liberalization efforts are influenced
by the degree of institutional autonomy seems to be reasonable. This conjecture is sub-
stantiated by Thatcher and Stone Sweet, pointing out that ”regulatory agencies have
vigorously promoted liberalisation”(Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 17) in the recent past.
However, some statements in OECD/IEA (2001) also allow for a different conclusion,
suggesting an opposite direction of effect: they postulate that institutions responsible
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for market regulation are modified over time so as to enable them to meet the changing
challenges that arise when liberalization measures continually alter the structure of the
regulated industry. The establishment of independent regulatory bodies is accordingly
seen as a necessity in the course of reform: due to the associated increase in competi-
tion, an impartial decision-maker not discriminating against any of the market players is
considered to be essential for the functioning of the market. Thatcher (2002b) argues in
quite the same direction: he rates autonomous utility regulators only as a concomitant
feature of the sectors’ liberalization process. Finally, one of the reasons adduced at the
beginnings of the Third Electricity (European Union, 2009a) and the Third Gas Direc-
tive (European Union, 2009b) for repealing the preceding rulings creates the impression
that insufficient progress of liberalization triggers increases in regulatory independence:
”Directive 2003/54/EC [2003/55/EC] introduced a requirement for Member States to
establish regulators with specific competences. However, experience shows that the
effectiveness of regulation is frequently hampered through a lack of independence of
regulators from government, and insufficient powers and discretion. For that reason,
[...] the European Council invited the Commission to develop legislative proposals
providing for further harmonisation of the powers and strengthening of the indepen-
dence of national energy regulators. [...]” (European Union, 2009a: 58, No. 33, 2009b:
97, No. 29 (with reference to Directive 2003/55/EC))
According to this argument, the EU’s main reason for demanding more autonomous
energy regulators was their inefficient functioning, probably manifesting itself in only
modest market reforms. One could thus also argue that growing liberalization efforts
induce an increasing autonomy of energy regulators rather than vice versa.
Consequently, we cannot rule out that our OLS results suffer seriously from en-
dogeneity caused by reverse causality. One can tackle this problem by applying an
instrumental variable approach which, however, generates estimates being significantly
less precise than their OLS counterparts; the conjecture of endogeneity should thus
be verified (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, chs. 4.9 and 8.4.3). To this end, we run a
robustified Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1974; Hausman, 1978) that
analyzes whether the debatable explanatory variable is indeed endogenous, making the
use of instrumental variables necessary. The null hypothesis is that our regressor of the
regulators’ formal independence is exogenous (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, chs. 8.3.2
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and 8.4.3). For our sample, it is rejected at the 1%-level (p = 0.0093), fully justifying an
application of the IV approach at this point. Consequently, we estimate the following
equations:
formindit = ν +ρ ·Zit +µ ·Xit + ηit (2.1.1)
libit = α + β · formindit + γ ·Xit + εit (2.1.2)
Equation (2.1.1) describes the first-stage estimation, where the formal independence
of regulators is regressed on the instruments, Zit. Equation (2.1.2) captures the second
stage, estimating the effect of formal independence on the degree of liberalization. The
vector of covariates, Xit, includes all controls already used in Section 2.3.
We will discuss the instrumental variables included in Zit as well as to what extent
they fulfill the standard statistical requirements for instrument validity in the following
section. Section 2.4.3 then elaborates on two of the covariates (the agency’s age and
government ideology) that might, besides the instruments, have an effect on the regu-
lator’s formal independence in the first stage, before Section 2.4.4 reports and discusses
the regression results.
2.4.2 Instrumental Variables
For instrumental variables to be valid, they have to fulfill two statistical requirements
(Wooldridge, ch. 5.1.1): first, they need to be correlated with the endogenous regressor,
i.e., the variables we choose as instruments have to have an effect on formal regulatory
independence. Second, the only channel through which valid instruments are allowed
to affect the (second-stage) dependent variable is their influence on the instrumented
regressor; put simply, this means that our instrumental variables need to be uncorrelated
with the degree of liberalization (and, precisely, that they have to be uncorrelated
with the second-stage error term). The remainder of this section provides arguments
substantiating that our instruments meet both these conditions; the discussions are
preceded by a brief introduction of the respective instrumental variable and a description
of the data that are taken over one-to-one as an instrument or employed to construct
one, respectively.
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2.4.2.1 Political Uncertainty
The first instrument we employ to tackle the endogeneity problem between formal
regulatory independence and liberalization is a proxy measuring the degree of political
uncertainty, uncert. It captures two aspects that basically determine whether a gov-
erning cabinet will be able to pursue its agenda in the same (or at least a similar) way
also after the next election or whether different political ideas will then be dominant,
instead: both a government’s hazard of losing office and the ruling party’s ideological
deviation from its successor are considered by the measure.
To create the proxy, we draw on three variables (gov new, elec and gov gap) from the
Comparative Political Data Set I from Armingeon et al. (2011, 2012); the calculation of
annual values is carried out as follows: first, a cabinet’s probability of having a successor
with a different political agenda is computed. To this end, the number of ideology
changes in government induced by variations in the parties holding office (gov new) in
the last 25 years (i.e., 24 years back) is divided by the total number of elections (addition
of all entries for elec) in the same period of time. Ideology changes are identified on
the basis of an index that assigns integral values according to the political orientation
of governing parties: a value of 1 is assigned when only right-wing or centre politicians
are in the government, a value of 2 when less than 33% of the cabinet members are
from left-wing parties, and a value of 3 when the left-wing share further increases up
to less than 66%; values of 4 and 5 describe the opposite to values of 2 and 1 with an
analogous dominance of left-wing parties. Whenever the index value switches compared
to the previous year, an ideology change has occured. The second step, then, captures
the overall scope of the ruling governments’ ideology changes in the last 25 years by
summing up the absolute values of gov gap; gov gap draws on the outlined ideology
index as well and calculates the governments’ ideology difference by subtracting the
pre- from the post-replacement index value. Eventually, the sum of the moduli is
multiplied by the fraction generated in the first step to obtain our political uncertainty
proxy. Since the values of both components of the uncert index increase with higher
threats of an ideological turnaround, also the overall measure used as an instrument in
the following does so.
The calculation of our uncert proxy basically resembles the method Gilardi (2005a)
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applies to construct an indicator of political uncertainty: both a cabinet’s replacement
risk and the extent of post-election ideology shifts are combined also in his measure9. In
line with the uncertainty hypothesis, different studies employing his indicator reveal a
higher regulatory formal independence when the level of political uncertainty increases
(Gilardi, 2005a; Hanretty and Koop, 2012) (and, moreover, a higher basic inclination
of governments to install autonomous authorities at all (Gilardi, 2005b)). These results
together with the similarities between Gilardi’s (2005a) and our uncertainty measure
should hence allow us to assume a correlation to exist also between uncert and the
statutory independence of regulatory agencies; the first condition for valid instruments
would then be fulfilled by our uncertainty proxy.
Based on the following reasoning, we furthermore expect our uncertainty measure
to meet also the second requirement for valid instruments. The liberalization of en-
ergy markets has been characterized by a growing complexity of regulatory challenges:
to solve arising issues, a profound technical and scientific knowledge has become in-
creasingly essential (Thatcher, 2002b). As a consequence, (ignorant) political decision
makers responsible for the legal implementation of intended steps of reform have drawn
extensively on the regulators’ expertise (Moe, 1989; Majone, 1999; Maggetti, 2009).
The authorities’ specific capabilities to level information asymmetries between legisla-
tor and industry and to employ the internal specialist knowledge to ensure the provision
of an efficient regulation (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002) have thus turned regulators
into central actors in the regulatory environment (Maggetti, 2009).
This gain in importance has become increasingly apparent also in the political pro-
cess: certainly favored by the additional powers assigned to regulators in the last few
9Drawing on a calculation method originally introduced by Franzese (2002, ch. 3.2.8), Gilardi
(2005a) constructs his indicator as follows: a government’s hazard of losing office is captured by
the reciprocal of the number of years that passed between the respective cabinet’s inauguration and
the date it was voted out of office again. The changes in the ruling parties’ political orientation
are operationalized by the standard deviation of yearly values rating the overall ideology of both
government and parliament. The annual values are scores assigned to each party represented in these
two political institutions according to their political orientation (ranging from 1 for right-wingers to
5 for left-wingers) weighted by their share of total seats; the period to which the standard deviation
relates ranges from five years before the year of observation to one year after. In the end, both values
are multiplied (Gilardi, 2005a, 2005b; see Gilardi (2008, ch. 8) for further details).
Two major differences exist between Gilardi’s (2005a) measure and the uncertainty proxy we con-
struct for this paper: first, we refrain from including future years, since we query that governments
really have perfect foresight; twelve month before voting, election results are often entirely ambiguous.
Second, we use a rather lengthy observation period of 25 years. This is mainly due to our simpler
measure of a government’s replacement risk that requires a longer time span to reveal variations.
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years (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002), independent authorities have developed own
targets and liberalization concepts increasingly affecting regulatory policies and reforms
(Thatcher, 2002b). Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002) even argue that European au-
tonomous agencies have taken over the function of rule-making in the domain they
regulate, declaring them to be a potential ”fourth branch of government” (Thatcher
and Stone Sweet, 2002: 16).
Consequently, we expect the degree of liberalization in electricity and gas markets
to be determined by the regulators responsible for monitoring both these sectors. A
facet of the polity like a government’s risk of losing office to a successor adhering to a
different ideology, on the contrary, should not have an effect on the intensity of reforms,
which is why we conjecture our uncertainty proxy to fulfill also the second condition
for valid instruments.
Our assumption is substantiated by Maggetti’s (2009) empirical results on the in-
fluence of regulators during the legislative procedure of regulatory laws (briefly labeled
as ”centrality”), albeit his sample does not include any energy agencies: on the one
hand, his results suggest that five out of six surveyed financial market and general
competition authorities are either the only or one out of two central actor(s) during
political decision-making; in particular, they are found to be important not just in
the enforcement, surveillance and penalization phases (as inherent in their monitoring
task), but also in the early stages of legislation, where they can be key players during
agenda-setting, preparatory inquiries and even draft formulation. On the other hand,
his survey reveals that a regulator’s ”centrality” increases with a lower level of ”profes-
sionalization”, specifying a legislator’s proficiency and means to develop an expedient
regulation; the high expertise vital to regulate the energy sector should then, as con-
jectured, result in an exceptional role of the responsible independent agencies in the
liberalization process of electricity and gas markets.
2.4.2.2 Economic Flows from and to Foreign Countries
The second instrument we apply is a measure that captures the intensity of eco-
nomic flows from and to foreign countries, econflows. It is a sub-index forming part of
the 2012 version of the KOF (Konjunkturforschungsstelle) index of globalization (Kon-
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junkturforschungsstelle, 2012a), which, in turn, is an update of the globalization proxy
originally introduced in Dreher (2006) and further developed and discussed in Dreher
et al. (2008). The econflows sub-indicator takes account of four main items that affect
the level of a country’s economic interdependencies with foreign states: the trade (i.e.,
exports and imports) of goods and services; the scope of inward and outward foreign
direct investment (FDI) stocks; the amount of portfolio investment asset and liabil-
ities stocks; and the income payments to foreign nationals, i.e., the remuneration of
both workers and investors residing abroad. The sub-index can take values between 1
and 100, with increasing values indicating higher levels of economic globalization (see
Konjunkturforschungsstelle (2012b, 2012c) for further details on both the data and the
calculation method).
One can draw on the credibility hypothesis to substantiate this choice: Majone
(1997a) argues that political credibility is of particular significance in open economies,
since with many of the market-dominating actors being located outside the power hold-
ers’ sphere of influence, it is impossible for them to reach objectives by simply using
their authority; Gilardi (2002), trying to operationalize the hypothesis, refers to this
reasoning and tests a measure quite similar to our instrument. Since empirical findings
in general support the credibility hypothesis (Gilardi 2002, 2005a; Hanretty and Koop,
2012)10, expecting that economic flows have an effect on regulatory formal indepen-
dence seems reasonable; in this case, also econflows would meet the first requirement
for valid instruments.
The reasoning for why we conjecture cross-border economic flows to fulfill also the
10The regressions substantiating the credibility hypothesis, though, do not operationalize it with
a proxy that captures the scope of a country’s economic relations with foreign economies. Spiller
(1993) argues that employing independent regulators to signal a government’s commitment credibly is
especially important in industries where large investments in sector-specific assets and thus considerable
sunk costs are indispensable for business activities. Consequently, dummy variables dividing the sample
authorities into groups of economic and social (Gilardi, 2002) and of utility, competition/financial and
social regulators (Gilardi, 2005a; Hanretty and Koop, 2012), respectively, are used to test the validity
of the hypothesis in these estimations.
However, a major issue that would arise if we adopted this approach for our analysis make us draw
on cross-border economic flows as an instrument, instead: the pooling criteria applied by Gilardi (2002,
2005a) and Hanretty and Koop (2012) would imply the authority monitoring the electricity sector and
that regulating the gas market to be aggregated in the same category. But modifying the original,
rather rough classification and using the gas market dummy as an instrument instead of as a covariate
would neglect the conjectured lower liberalization pace in this industry (suggested by the OLS results in
Section 2.3); the requirement for an instrument to have no direct effect on the second-stage dependent
variable would thus probably be violated, resulting in the gas sector dummy to be invalid.
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second condition for valid instruments is basically the same as in the case of political
uncertainty: we expect the regulator to decide on the degree of liberalization fully
autonomously and without being affected by outside influences - as, in this instance, a
country’s level of globalization - at all.
However, albeit this would imply that a state’s economic relations with foreign coun-
tries do not have an effect on reform efforts, it does not mean that econflows and lib
are uncorrelated, as empirical surveys indicate: a case study on the effects of the UK
electricity market reform on foreign investment (Energy Information Administration,
1997) reveals that within the course of liberalization both the takeovers of British elec-
tricity firms by external investors and the cross-border acquisitions by UK companies
have increased considerably; reform measures are hence suggested to raise the num-
ber of takeovers by and of foreign firms in the power industry, which would affect the
indicator of economic flows. Such transactions might furthermore go along with the
secondment of, e.g., management personnel into the acquired firms, raising the value of
the proxy’s payment component when the executives from abroad are remunerated by
the new affiliation.
Electricity market reforms that induce (more) acquisitions of power companies by
firms from abroad will probably increase cross-border remunerations also for another
reason: Alesina et al. (2005) find investments to be higher in more liberalized indus-
tries; returns from investments undertaken by companies with foreign owners would
accordingly accrue to investors from abroad.
Finally, liberalization might affect the globalization proxy regardless of whether
takeovers by and of foreign firms take place: the European Commission has identified
insufficiently unbundled national incumbents to defer the construction of cross-border
transmission infrastructure in their efforts to foreclose rival power and gas suppliers from
abroad from domestic energy markets (European Commission, 2007a). As the reform
process includes the implementation of (often increasingly stricter) rules on vertical
separation (OECD, 2001; OECD/IEA, 2005; Newbery, 2009), liberalization alleviates
or even entirely solves this issue; cross-border flows of electricity and gas should hence
increase. This would, in turn, positively affect the transnational trade of goods and
services.
The different economic flows included in the index might hence be affected by a
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country’s degree of liberalization in various ways; a correlation between our proxy for
governmental credibility and reform efforts implying econflows to be an invalid in-
strument thus cannot be ruled out. For this reason, we lag our instrument by one
year: regulatory provisions adopted at some day in the future most probably do not
affect today’s foreign trade and investment and payments to external production fac-
tors. Rather, it is reasonable to expect a delayed effect, as the results of Alesina et
al. (2005) suggest: regarding investments, they find that adjustments are primarily
caused by regulations implemented two years earlier. Employing lag econflows in the
IV regression should accordingly avoid potential correlation issues induced by an effect
of liberalization measures on cross-border economic flows; since the regulator’s decision-
making power probably eliminates, as outlined, any reverse influences, we expect the
lagged index to meet also the second requirement for valid instruments.
We finally want to supplement our considerations on the lacking correlation between
our instruments and the degree of energy market liberalization by reporting the result of
Hansen’s (1982) J statistic chi-squared test. In case of an overidentified model (i.e., when
the number of instrumental variables exceeds the number of endogenous regressors, as
in our estimation), this tests allows to assess whether the second validity requirement
is met by the instruments employed: its null hypothesis claims that all instrumental
variables are uncorrelated with the residual (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, ch. 8.4.4).
Yielding a p-value of 0.1978, the test does not reject the null and suggests that neither
political uncertainty nor a government’s need to credibly commit affects reform efforts
through channels other than its effect on regulatory formal independence.
2.4.3 Potential First-Stage Effects of Covariates
Before we describe the IV estimation results, we briefly want to discuss the covariates
that might affect a regulator’s statutory autonomy besides the features of a country’s
political process and its economy, respectively, we employ as instruments.
First, the literature on agency independence suggests the authority’s age to have
an influence on its autonomy: Bernstein’s (1955) theory on the life cycle of regulatory
commissions divides the regulator’s duration in four phases (gestation, youth, matu-
rity and old age) and describes the agency’s decline from a publicly desired, ambitious
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institution to a useless, self-perpetuating social burden just aiming at defending its
status quo. The growing failure to fulfill its regulatory task associated with this devel-
opment is assumed to entail an incremental evaporation of the political succor initially
existing and, consequently, an increasing lack of both content-related leadership and
financial support; interests and resources of the industry are expected to gradually fill
the emerging gaps, instead. Martimort’s (1999) theoretical analysis of the life cycle
approach substantiates the unfavorable picture drawn of long-established regulatory
agencies: he shows that a government’s sole possibility to prevent collusion between
the authority and a regulatee is the curtailment of the rents this malfeasance produces;
an interventionist solution the regulator’s principal is forced to adopt that implies the
realization of suboptimal production levels. Furthermore, Maggetti’s (2007) empirical
results are at least partly in line with the theory (but are, in contrast to the analysis
at hand, related to an agency’s de facto independence): for his sample of banking,
competition and telecommunications authorities, he finds a regulator’s age to reduce
political interferences in its day-to-day operations; other than predicted by the life cycle
approach, however, his results also suggest that if the authority’s duration of existence
has an effect on the relation with regulatees at all, it leads to less industrial influence.
This deviation from the original considerations notwithstanding, theory and empiricism
coincide with respect to the regulator’s increasing alienation from politics over time; it
would therefore be reasonable to expect also the formal independence from politicians
to be higher when agencies are long-established, implying a positive IRA age coefficient
in our first stage estimation.
Second, also the ruling party’s ideology might influence the energy authorities’ statu-
tory autonomy: expecting that compared to left-wing governments right-wing cabinets
are more strongly inclined to install IRAs in the course of liberalization due to the close
proximity between the conservatives’ market orientation and the agencies’ conventional
mission, Gilardi (2005b) finds the exact opposite. The explanation for this surprising
result draws on Laver and Shepsle (1990) and Shepsle (1991) who argue that a party
professing to aim at a situation conflicting with its political preferences lacks credibility:
since a left-wing government’s will to liberalize might be challenged, it more urgently
needs to establish an autonomous institution promoting reforms to signal serious in-
tentions than a right-wing counterpart (Gilardi, 2008, ch. 6). Adapted to existing
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lag econflows -.0304∗∗∗ .0069
gas dum .0148∗∗∗ .0054
IRA age -.0228∗∗∗ .0053
lag GDPcap crisis dum .1261∗∗∗ .0382




country dummies yes yes
N 72
R2 .8705
Note: Table 2.2 shows first-stage estimation results from a 2SLS IV
regression. Dependent variable is the autonomy level of electricity
and gas regulators, respectively, as measured on the basis of Gi-
lardi’s (2002) formal independence index. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the country level. *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level.
authorities, in turn, this would imply that left-wing cabinets have to provide regulators
with a higher level of formal independence to credibly commit; we therefore expect a
positive sign on the ideology index coefficient in the first stage.
2.4.4 Estimation Results
2.4.4.1 First-Stage Results
Table 2.2 shows the first-stage results with robust standard errors being clustered
at the country level. As most of the significant coefficients call for further discussion
(in part because they suggest that the respective regressor affects formal independence
opposite to what was expected), we will proceed as follows: first, we will briefly report
the regression results. Afterwards, we will elaborate on our findings and provide possible
explanations for the effects the first stage estimates suggest; the remarks on the impact
of economic flows on regulatory autonomy are rather comprehensive and are therefore
placed in a separate section.
As expected, estimation results hint at a greater formal regulatory independence
from politics when the office holders’ risk of being voted out of government is high.
The size of this effect, though, seems rather minor: if we assume elections to take place
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every four years (i.e., six polls are included in the measure, neglecting years immedi-
ately after votings in the following) as well as governments to change from left-wing
to right-wing dominated cabinets and back after every second election, the indepen-
dence value just increases by slightly more than 0.04. Contrary to the expectations,
regression results furthermore reveal a negative relationship between the previous year’s
economic flows from and to foreign countries and a regulator’s formal autonomy: the
corresponding coefficient suggests a 0.3-unit decrease in the independence index in case
of a ten-unit increase of our globalization proxy. Both estimates are statistically highly
significant, suggesting that our instrumental variables meet the validity requirement of
a high correlation with the endogenous regressor. The first stage F-value of the ex-
cluded instruments is equal to 35.26, likewise indicating that we do not have a weak
instrument problem11.
In additon, also some covariates reach statistical significance. The gas dummy is sig-
nificant at the 1% level, but hints at an only small independence gap between electricity
and gas regulators: according to the coefficient, the statutory autonomy of gas mar-
ket authorities exceeds that of their electricity counterparts by less than 0.015 units of
Gilardi’s (2002) index. At variance with our considerations, the highly significant esti-
mate on the regulator’s age furthermore suggests an agency’s independence to decrease
throughout its life cycle; it indicates that a fully independent regulatory authority has
forfeited all of its autonomy after not quite 44 years. The crisis dummy coefficient, also
significant at the 1% level, suggests a regulator’s independence to increase by slightly
more than 0.1 index units after a year of negative GDP per capita growth. And finally,
the estimate on our energy efficiency proxy hints at a considerable effect of energy-
intensive production processes on an authority’s statutory autonomy: it indicates that
a regulator’s independence value on Gilardi’s (2002) scale rises by nearly 0.6 units if
the total primary energy supply needed to generate 1000 US$ of GDP grows by 0.1
tonnes of oil equivalent. The controls on government ideology and corruption do not
11Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb demands an F-value of at least 10. Furthermore, for
regressions with one endogenous regressor and two instrumental variables, Stock and Yogo (2005)
report the critical value to be 19.93 when strong instruments are defined in a way that the size
distortion of a nominal 5% Wald test of the hypothesis that the estimated and the actual coefficient of
the endogenous regressor are identical is limited to 5 percentage points. However, since this threshold
is calculated under the assumption of homoskedastic errors, a comparison with our F-value can only




The first-stage results are robust to the use of the lagged corruption index (see
Table 2.7 in the Appendix for detailed regression outcomes): the coefficients on our
uncertainty proxy and the lagged globalization measure continue to be statistically
highly significant and take values of 0.0154 and -0.0360, respectively, indicating effect
sizes very similar to those suggested by the estimates in Table 2.2; the high significance
of both estimates together with a first stage F-value of the excluded instruments equal
to 25.78 furthermore again suggests that no weak instruments are applied. Except for
the gas dummy that reaches only the 5% significance level when the corruption proxy
is lagged, also all significant control variables from Table 2.2 remain significant at the
1% level. Moreover, the change in their size is rather negligible: while the estimate on
the lagged crisis dummy is reduced by slightly more than 0.02 units compared to its
counterpart reported in Table 2.2, the coefficients on the gas dummy, the agency’s age
and the energy efficiency indicator are altered by only 0.002 units or less. The estimates
on ideology and (lagged) corruption do not reach statistical significance again.
Our findings might be explained as follows: the increase in regulatory formal inde-
pendence suggested as a consequence of a higher threat of being replaced in government
by warring parties reflects the essence of the uncertainty hypothesis; with this threat
to be growing, ruling politicians are willing to grant more and more autonomy to the
regulatory authority. The notion that independent regulators serve as bulwarks against
policy turnarounds induced by opponent successors expressed in the hypothesis is thus
further substantiated by our results (albeit the size of the effect seems, as discussed,
rather small).
To provide a possible explanation for the difference in the statutory autonomy of
electricity and gas market authorities, one might argue on the basis of Spiller’s (1993)
interpretation of the credibility hypothesis that postulates the existence of more in-
dependent regulators in industries that employ large amounts of sector-specific assets
(see also footnote 10): compared to electricity investments, various gas infrastructure
projects are considerably larger because of the huge distances between production and
consumption sites; a particularly high demand for a secure rate of return and invest-
ment protection should hence prevail in this industry. This, in turn, could be met by
the establishment of a more independent regulator. However, given the negligible size of
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the gas dummy estimate, the divergence between the credibility requirements prevailing
for investments in the electricity and in the gas market should not be expected to be
overly high.
The surprisingly negative relationship between an agency’s age and its formal inde-
pendence suggested by the first stage outcome might result from the exceptional role
the energy sector plays in industrialized countries: providing all production processes
with electricity and gas, it is seen as a crucial factor for a nation’s economic develop-
ment (Schneider and Jäger, 2003; Domanico, 2007; Karan and Kazdağli, 2011). Since
the economic situation, in turn, considerably affects a ruling party’s reelection chances,
one might expect a government to try to counteract the alienation between regula-
tor and politics as well as the associated growing neglect of the assigned tasks by the
authority described in the life cycle approach: by gradually broadening the cabinet’s
influence on the regulator again, ruling politicians should be better able to make also
a long-established agency properly fulfill its mission, thus ensuring a continuous effec-
tive monitoring of electricity and gas markets; the resulting protection of competition
in the energy sector then does not only benefit the economy, but indirectly also the
government aiming for votes.
Our finding that formal independence is increased in the wake of an economic down-
turn is in line with the credibility hypothesis and Pitlik’s (2008) (as well as Drazen and
Easterly’s (2001) and Pitlik’s (2007) statistically significant) results substantiating it:
granting a higher autonomy to the authority responsible for market supervision sepa-
rates decisions on the implementation of a non-discriminatory and hence competition-
enhancing regulation from the struggles in the political arena; steps of reform acceler-
ating the liberalization process are therefore facilitated.
The positive relationship between energy intensity and statutory autonomy finally
suggested by the estimation results is consistent with our expectation that a high energy
use during production is associated with an interest in cheap electricity and gas supplies:
highly independent regulators deemed to foster competition (and thus to reduce prices)
are primarily established in economies that provide energy-intensive goods.
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2.4.4.2 The Negative Effect of Cross-Border Economic Flows on Formal
Independence
This section now completes the discussion of our first stage results by providing a
possible explanation for the negative relationship between the scope of economic flows
from and to foreign countries and the level of statutory autonomy that is, contrary to
our expectations, suggested by the regression outcome.
The above-mentioned relevance of the energy sector for a country’s economic de-
velopment serves as a starting point for our considerations: due to its importance,
politicians try to keep the sector under national control to the greatest possible extent
(Domanico, 2007; Belkin, 2008); some EU member states’ recent efforts to save domestic
energy companies from foreign takeovers are significant examples for this eagerness to
protect national interests (Ahearn, 2006; Barysch et al., 2007). In France, the govern-
ment initiated a merger between Suez, a domestic electricity, gas and water company,
and Gaz de France (GDF), a national gas and power utility (European Commission,
2006a), to prevent a takeover of Suez by Enel, an Italian electricity supplier (Domanico,
2007; Barysch et al., 2007).
In Spain, the government fought tooth and nail against the aquisition of the elec-
tricity and gas supplier Endesa by the German energy company e.on (European Com-
mission, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d), ignoring an existing Commission approval for this trans-
action (2006e). To hamper e.on’s takeover attempt, an urgent law was passed that was
deemed to be in violation of the EU Treaty principles of free movement of capital and
freedom of establishment (European Commission, 2006b) and (presumably as intended
by the Spanish legislator) expected to scare off investors from other member states (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2006f); the conditions imposed on e.on by the Spanish regulator
on the basis of the law were furthermore judged as breaching EU merger regulation (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2006c). Modified conditions stipulated by the competent Spanish
minister in response to objections of the Commission were not only seen as obstacles
to the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment, but additionally as
a violation of the principle of free movement of goods (European Commission, 2006d).
The interventions of both the French and the Spanish government triggered the
suspicion that these nations place their own concerns over Community ends (Ahearn,
33
CHAPTER 2. REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE AND EU ENERGY LIBERALIZATION
2006) and culminated in the accusation that they pursue an (informal) target deviating
from those determined by the Union’s energy policy12: the creation and maintenance
of national champions in the European energy market (Domanico, 2007). The detailed
reasons advanced for the pursuit of this aim range from politicians favoring lobbying
groups (Domanico, 2007) via concerns about foreign shareholders spying for their home-
countries (The Economist, 2006a) (probably getting even more solid with the expected
increase in the number of Russian and Chinese takeover attempts (The Economist,
2006b)) to less awkward ones like the fear of layoffs (Ahearn, 2006) and assumed ad-
vantages in securing a country’s energy supply (Barysch et al., 2007).
The Commission’s reactions to the governments’ interferences in the energy market,
however, did not fail to appear: In the French case, it rated the merger as a severe
obstacle to competition in the Belgian gas and electricity market as well as in the
French gas and district heating market (European Commission, 2006a, 2006h, 2006i),
making comprehensive remedies a condition for approval under merger regulation (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2006h): the most important requirements were the divestiture of
the French district heating operator, of the holdings in the Belgian gas incumbent and
in the second biggest Belgian electricity and gas supplier as well as the ceding of con-
trol over the Belgian gas infrastructure operator and the obligation to invest in the gas
infrastructure of Belgium and France (European Commission, 2006i, 2006j).
In the Spanish case, the Commission launched infringement proceedings over both
the additional authorities the regulator was vested with during the attempt to prevent
the takeover (European Commission, 2006b, 2006f) and over the original as well as
the modified conditions imposed on e.on (European Commission, 2006c, 2006d, 2006k,
2007b, 2007c) due to the provisions’ violation of the above-mentioned EU Treaty prin-
ciples. In consequence of the nonabrogation of the unlawful conditions, Spain was even
taken to the European Court of Justice (European Commission, 2007d) which found in
favor of the Commission (European Commission, 2008).
The Commission’s rigorous course of action (backed, when necessary, by the Court
of Justice) in both cases underlines its unbending will to eliminate any anticompetitive
behavior jeopardizing the functioning of the European energy market. With this stee-









gas dum 2.2150∗∗∗ .2754
IRA age -.3030∗∗∗ .0485
lag GDPcap crisis dum .9411∗∗∗ .3131




country dummies yes yes
N 72
R2 .7959
Note: Table 2.3 shows second-stage estimation results from a 2SLS
IV regression. Dependent variable is the mean of the electricity and
gas sector sub-indicators, respectively, apart from public ownership, as
described in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the country level. *** denotes statistical significance at
the 1% level.
liness, the Commission also deprives European politicians of the possibility to support
the achievement of their national aims by shielding domestic energy companies from
foreign influences. Assuming that governments were principally aware of the uncom-
promising attitude already in the early 2000s prior to the outlined events (and thus in
the period of time covered by our sample), one might explain the lower level of regula-
tory autonomy in more globalized countries as follows: expecting considerable foreign
investments wresting domestic energy companies from national control, ruling parties
might have tried to retain a certain degree of influence on these firms by limiting the
authority’s independence from politicians, keeping up the possibility to interfere at least
in parts with regulation.
2.4.4.3 Second-Stage Results
Second-stage results are reported in Table 2.3; standard errors are again robust and
clustered at the country level. The coefficient of the instrumented formal independence
of energy regulators is negative and statistically highly significant, suggesting a strong
effect of a higher statutory autonomy from politicians on the degree of liberalization:
the establishment of a fully autonomous authority reduces the liberalization measure by
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about 2.5, i.e. by approximately 40 percent of its maximum value13. For existing regu-
lators this means that if the aspects covered by one of the five independence dimensions
(see Section 2.2.1) are still under complete control of the government, the ruling parties
can initiate steps of reform efforts corresponding to half an index unit by granting total
autonomy to the authority in this domain.
All three highly significant covariates show the expected sign: the gas dummy co-
efficient is positive and of about the same size as in the OLS regression; the reform
gap in gas markets approximates two units of the liberalization measure. Moreover, the
positive relationship between experienced regulators and the degree of competition sug-
gested by the regression results in Table 2.1 persists. However, different from its OLS
counterpart, the second-stage estimate adumbrates that only about three years and four
months periods of regulatory monitoring are necessary to lower the liberalization index
by one unit. The coefficient of the lagged crisis dummy finally suggests a limitation of
reform efforts to be induced by negative GDP per capita growth rates in the previous
year; compared to periods with a positive economic development, every year of down-
turn prevents the OECD index to be reduced by nearly one unit. The estimates on the
lagged energy intensity proxy, the government’s ideology and the corruption measure
do not reach statistical significance.
Lagging the corruption measure has hardly any influence on the results (Table 2.9
in the Appendix provides detailed regressions outcomes): the second-stage estimate
on formal independence takes a value of -2.4940 and is hence almost identical to its
counterpart in Table 2.3, even though its statistical significance reaches only the 5%
level14. The coefficients on the gas dummy, the agency’s age and the crisis dummy
remain statistically highly significant and hint at effect sizes basically equal to those in-
13As an additional test for the strength of the instrumental variables employed in an overidentified
regression, Angrist and Pischke (2009, ch. 4.6.4) advise to compare the second-stage 2SLS estimates
with their LIML counterparts: large deviations hint at the presence of weak instruments. The LIML
coefficient of the instrumented formal independence is statistically highly significant and takes a value
of -2.6066, revealing only a minor difference from the 2SLS estimate; considering our instruments to
be strong is thus further substantiated. Second-stage LIML results are reported in detail in Table 2.8
in the Appendix.
14As in the original regression with the corruption index not being lagged, second-stage 2SLS and
LIML coefficients on the instrumented formal independence do not differ much when the corruption
measure is included with a lag of one period: the LIML coefficient takes a value of -2.5833 and is
statistically significant at the 5% level, again suggesting our instruments not to be weak. Detailed
second-stage LIML results for this estimation are reported in Table 2.10 in the Appendix.
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dicated by the estimates obtained with a non-lagged corruption proxy (changes amount
to marginally more than 0.005 units at the maximum). The energy efficiency of pro-
duction processes in the previous year, the ruling parties’ political orientation and the
previous year’s perceived corruption are again suggested not to affect an authority’s
statutory independence.
2.5 Conclusion
Contradicting the first impression created by the scatterplots and OLS regressions
neglecting the reverse causality problem, the IV estimation corroborates the conven-
tional wisdom on the effect of regulatory independence: for our sample of EU energy
regulators, a higher statutory autonomy from politics entails a higher liberalization
level of electricity and gas markets. The European legislator’s demand for an enhanced
protection of regulatory authorities from government interferences is thus both justified
and reasonable.
However, although our study can be seen as a helpful contribution to the under-
standing of long-term effects of independent regulatory authorities on energy market
liberalization, it is obviously just a first step: in particular, a more comprehensive data
set comprising information on the agencies’ formal autonomy in additional years would
be desirable. Likewise, panel data on the authorities’ level of de facto independence
from both politicians and regulatees would be useful; only the inclusion of these two
dimensions of autonomy would allow for a complete and profound analysis of the impact
of IRAs on the intensity of reform.
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2.6 Appendix
Table 2.4: Control Variable Description
Variable Description Source
gas sector dum Indicator variable, takes a value of 1 if the regula-
tory authority monitors the national gas market.
International Energy Reg-
ulation Network (2012)
IRA age Number of years past since the national energy
regulator has been introduced. Own calculations






Indicator variable, takes a value of 1 if the GDP
per capita growth rate in the previous year was
negative. Growth rates are calculated on the basis
of GDP per capita values (constant 2000 US$).
World Bank (2011) (GDP
per capita data.)
lag ensupGDPunit Total primary energy supply (measured in tonnes
of oil equivalent) per million US$ of GDP (con-
stant 2000 PPP US$), included with a lag of one
year. Original ratios (total primary energy sup-
ply per thousand US$ of GDP) were rescaled by
multiplying by 1000.
OECD (2010a)
ideopotr Ideology index capturing the political orientation
of governments in office. It takes integral values
between 1 and 5 and is reduced with the share of
cabinet and parliament seats right-wing parties
hold: a value of 1 is assigned if more than 2/3 of
all positions are staffed by right-wing partisans, a
value of 2 if this share lies between 1/3 and 2/3.
The measure takes a value of 3 when centre party
members fill half of the positions or a balanced
coalition of right- and left-wing parties governs.
Values of 4 and 5 correspond to the situations de-
scribed for 2 and 1 with left-wing parties holding
the respective shares.
Potrafke (2009)
corruption Perceived susceptibility to bribery of a country’s
public sector as measured by Transpacency In-
ternational’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
The indicator is based on answers to polls con-
ducted by various proficient institutions and cap-
tures opinions about briberies, irregularities in
public procurement, misappropriation of public
funds as well as anti-corruption measures. The
questions relate to public officials, civil servants
and politicians. CPI values range from 0 (highly
corrupt) to 10 (very clean).
Transparency Interna-
tional (2012)
*For Sweden the IERN homepage quotes the year of establishment of the Energy Market Inspectorate (EI),
2008, which is later than the execution of all three surveys analyzing the regulator’s formal independence.
We thus deviate from the source in this case and use the year in which the Swedish Energy Agency (STEM)




Table 2.5: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Main Variables
lib 72 1.797 1.426 0 5.333
formind 72 .6210 .1154 .4400 .8600
Instruments
lag econflows 72 77.45 14.04 52.47 99.44
uncert 72 11.28 12.26 1.333 47.67
Controls
gas sector dum 72 .3889 .4909 0 1
IRA age 72 4.889 2.614 1 14
lag GDPcap crisis dum 72 .0556 .2307 0 1
lag ensupGDPunit 72 153.5 35.55 110 250
ideopotr 72 2.792 .9132 2 4
corruption 72 7.707 1.563 4.200 9.767
lag corruption 72 7.672 1.609 4.200 9.867




gas dum 2.1667∗∗∗ .2924
IRA age -.2415∗∗∗ .0600
lag GDPcap crisis dum .4798∗ .2648
lag ensupGDPunit -.0145 .0120
ideopotr .1604 .1812




Note: Table 2.6 shows estimation results of a
fixed-effects OLS regression. Dependent variable
is the mean of the electricity and gas sector sub-
indicators, respectively, apart from public owner-
ship, as described in Conway and Nicoletti (2006).
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country
level. ***/* denotes statistical significance at the
1%/10% level.
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lag econflows -.0360∗∗∗ .0075
gas dum .0133∗∗ .0053
IRA age -.0248∗∗∗ .0057
lag GDPcap crisis dum .1046∗∗∗ .0316
lag ensupGDPunit .0062∗∗∗ .0019
ideopotr -.0078 .0142
lag corruption .0490 .0409
constant 2.3998∗∗∗ .7306
country dummies yes yes
N 72
R2 .8769
Note: Table 2.7 shows first-stage estimation results from a 2SLS IV
regression. Dependent variable is the autonomy level of electricity
and gas regulators, respectively, as measured on the basis of Gilardi’s
(2002) formal independence index. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered at the country level. ***/** denotes statistical significance at
the 1%/5% level.





gas dum 2.2172∗∗∗ .2758
IRA age -.3053∗∗∗ .0483
lag GDPcap crisis dum .9617∗∗∗ .3139




country dummies yes yes
N 72
R2 .7949
Note: Table 2.8 shows second-stage estimation results from a LIML
IV regression. Dependent variable is the mean of the electricity and
gas sector sub-indicators, respectively, apart from public ownership, as
described in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Robust standard errors are









gas dum 2.2201∗∗∗ .2756
IRA age -.3066∗∗∗ .0484
lag GDPcap crisis dum .9406∗∗∗ .2854
lag ensupGDPunit -.0005 .0150
ideopotr .1416 .1342
lag corruption -.3318 .3405
constant 5.0936∗ 2.9067
country dummies yes yes
N 72
R2 .7964
Note: Table 2.9 shows second-stage estimation results from a 2SLS
IV regression. Dependent variable is the mean of the electricity and
gas sector sub-indicators, respectively, apart from public ownership, as
described in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the country level. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance
at the 1%/5%/10% level.





gas dum 2.2219∗∗∗ .2760
IRA age -.3087∗∗∗ .0481
lag GDPcap crisis dum .9555∗∗∗ .2865
lag ensupGDPunit -.0001 .0152
ideopotr .1410 .1337
lag corruption -.3340 .3456
constant 5.1122∗ 2.9625
country dummies yes yes
N 72
R2 .7956
Note: Table 2.10 shows second-stage estimation results from a LIML
IV regression. Dependent variable is the mean of the electricity and
gas sector sub-indicators, respectively, apart from public ownership, as
described in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the country level. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance
at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Chapter 3
Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in
Electricity Markets1
3.1 Introduction
In its endeavor to create a single internal energy market, the European Union has
gradually increased the degree of unbundling vertically integrated electricity utilities
within member states had to realize over the years. The growing separation of monop-
olistic transmission and distribution grids from (potentially) competitive generation,
wholesale and retail operations was intended to eliminate anti-competitive practices
integrated companies were suspected to use to undermine the development and the
functioning of the market: discriminations in the network access or cross-subsidies, for
example, hamper the utility’s competitors in power production and supply and might
even completely deter them from providing their services; if, on the contrary, the net-
work activities’ interests in generation and retail profits are removed due to unbundling,
competition can thrive and benefit consumers (European Commission, 2001, 2004; Eu-
ropean Union, 2003).
The positive welfare effects associated with fully competitive markets should hence
induce governments or authorities in charge of regulation to seek the complete elimi-
1This chapter was presented at the 8th EEM International Conference in Zagreb, the 34th IAEE
International Conference in Stockholm and Workshops on Public Economics in Paderborn and Dort-
mund.
An earlier version of this chapter was published as ”The Influence of Regulatory Objectives on
the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets”, Conference Proceedings of the 8th International




Ownership Unbundling BEL, CZE, DNK, EST, ESP, FIN, GBR***, ITA,
LTU, NLD, POL*, PRT*, SVK, SVN*, SWE
both AUT, DEU
Legal Unbundling/ITO BGR*, CYP**, FRA, GRC, HUN, LUX**
Notes: Data stem from the Commission’s information on its certification of
European TSOs (European Commission, 2014a) that is required by the Third
Electricity Directive (European Union, 2009a); they reflect the state of facts as
of February 2014. * In these countries, the certification process is still pending;
data are obtained from European Commission (2014c) (BGR), URE (2013)
(POL), ERSE (2013) (POR) and JARSE (2013) (SVN). ** Both the Cypriot
and the Luxembourgian TSO are exempted from the new, stricter rules on
unbundling (European Union, 2009a; de Hauteclocque and Ahner, 2012), but
are obliged to be separated legally (European Commission, 2014d, 2014e).
*** In the UK, Ownership Unbundling is only implemented in England and
Wales. The TSOs in Scotland and Northern Ireland are certified under a
vertical structure deviating from the three unbundling models provided for in
the Third Directive; see footnote 2 for further details.
Table 3.1: Legal and Ownership Unbundling in EU member states
nation of discrimination incentives potentially persisting when utilities are not entirely
unbundled: a thorough separation of the monopolistic and continuously regulated grid
activities from generation and supply by means of a mandatory divestiture of all net-
work assets - generally referred to as Ownership Unbundling - would be the logical
(since most effective) consequence (OECD, 2001; Mulder and Shestalova, 2006; Buchan,
2007; European Commission, 2007a, 2007e, 2007f, 2007g; Pollitt, 2008). But when the
Third Electricity Directive3 (European Union, 2009a) required member states to im-
plement one of three possible models further tightening the previous unbundling rules
for transmission lines, several countries surprisingly refrained from choosing Ownership
Unbundling, although it was one of the legal alternatives. Instead, these states mainly
opted for the Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) model (see Table 3.1), which
basically just amounts to a stricter enforcement of the Legal Unbundling provisions al-
2Apart from the countries listed, Latvia and Romania opted for the third model provided for
by the Third Electricity Directive, the Independent System Operator (ISO) (European Commission,
2014a): under this regulatory regime, the ownership of the transmission system remains with the
integrated utility, but an organization fully detached from the (legally separated) affiliated group is
responsible for the system’s operation, maintainance and development (European Union, 2009a). Due
to its minor relevance in Europe, the ISO is neglected in the following. On Malta no transmission
grid exists (European Commission, 2014b). Moreover, derogations from the unbundling provisions
were granted to the Irish (European Commission, 2013a), the Northern Irish (European Commission,
2013b) and the Scottish (European Commission, 2012) transmission system operators (TSOs), since
the Commission rated the models implemented in these countries as guaranteeing a higher degree of
TSO independence than the least strict regime provided for by the Third Electricity Directive, the
ITO: in each case, transmission system operation is shared between a legally unbundled entity owning
the grid and another, entirely separated company.
3This is the commonly used shortening of the directive’s official name, ”Directive 2009/72/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal
market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC”.
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ready mandatory before4; Legal Unbundling requires vertically integrated companies to
spin off their grid monopolies into separate entities (European Union, 2003; European
Commission, 2004).
Our paper provides a possible explanation for the rather puzzling choice of some
member states to keep their power utilities integrated to the highest degree that Eu-
ropean legislation permits: based on a theoretical analysis, we argue that the decision
to either implement Ownership Unbundling or adhere to Legal Unbundling depends on
the objective the authority determining the level of vertical separation pursues.
By considering the relationship between regulatory goals and the type of unbundling
this paper aims at contributing to the discussion about one of the recent core topics
in the area of EU energy regulation. Especially after the results of an Energy Sec-
tor Inquiry (European Commission, 2007a) had been published in 2007, the European
Commission vigorously called for transmission lines unexceptionally separated by own-
ership; the Inquiry, launched in 2005 to monitor the efficacy of regulations already
implemented by this time (European Commission, 2005), revealed significant deficien-
cies in the functioning of national electricity markets and serious delays in the real-
ization of the intended single European market. Consequently, the Commission made
clear that it rated the then-valid combination of Accounting, Functional and Legal Un-
bundling5 as insufficient, judging Ownership Unbundling as the only way to once and
for all terminate any undue preference of associated non-network activities by trans-
mission monopolies (European Commission, 2007a, 2007e, 2007f, 2007g). Research on
unbundling supported the Commission’s view and identified even further substantial
advantages of entirely separated networks: a facilitation of regulation and privatization
as well as a stronger focus of the different activities on their own business that, inter alia,
enhances the security of supply. Potential disadvantages such as a possible increases
4Authors classifying the ITO model just as a (strict) form of Legal Unbundling are, e.g., Geldhof
and Vandendriessche (2008), Höffler and Kranz (2011a), Meyer (2012) and Brunekreeft et al. (2014).
5In addition to Legal Unbundling, the immediate predecessor of the Third Electricity Directive de-
manded separate accounts for transmission and distribution activities (a measure denoted as ”Account-
ing Unbundling”) as well as the realization of several provisions subsumed under the term ”Functional
Unbundling”: the preservation of a strict confidentiality with respect to comercially sensitive informa-
tion gathered in the line businesses; the absence of any interference from the associated generation,
wholesale or retail activities in decisions regarding the networks (like construction or maintenance);
the endowment of distribution and transmission businesses with separate and sufficient funding and
personnel; and decision-makers in the grid activities not affected by potential financial or occupational
interests in any non-network business (European Union, 2003; European Commission, 2004).
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in capital cost for separated firms, a facilitation of foreign takeovers and transaction
costs due to contract renegotiations and necessary in-house reorganizations were seen
as rather less serious ones (Pollitt, 2008; see also Mulder and Shestalova (2006) for most
of the pros and cons mentioned). However, in general, solely the market participants
benefiting from persisting linkages between network and non-network activities were
blamed for delays in the realization of Ownership Unbundling: the just legally sepa-
rated incumbents (European Commission, 2007a). Other actors that might potentially
be interested in hampering liberalization as well, on the contrary, were rather ignored:
for example, captured regulators acting in the interest of integrated companies due to
bribes (Laffont and Tirole, 1991), posttenure job prospects in the industry (Che, 1995)
or by intentionally applying biased information provided by the regulatees as a basis
for regulatory decisions (Agrell and Gautier, 2010, 2012a, 2012b). By shedding light on
the role agencies play in the process of network separation, this paper might hence add
an important aspect to the discussion that has been neglected up to now.
By explicitly analyzing the decisions of the regulatory authority, the paper further-
more aims at contributing to the existing theoretical literature on Legal and Ownership
Unbundling. In a nutshell, model results up to now are, rather surprisingly, far from
being supportive of the consumer-benefiting effect ascribed to a full separation of mo-
nopolistic from (potentially) competitive stages of the value chain. But what is at least
as surprising is that in all theoretical analyses questioning the benefits of Ownership
Unbundling both the regulators and their rulings play, at best, a minor role.
The paper of Cremer and De Donder (2013) is a typical example of both these
unexpected features of current research: their findings suggest that both the network
capacity and the output of the final good are lower and the price of the end-product
is higher when an upstream monopolist providing the network as an essential input for
downstream suppliers is separated by ownership instead of just legally. However, at the
same time, an authority does not really come into the picture at all: the network access
fee is not determined by a regulator, but by the monopolistic grid firm itself.
That an abandonment of Ownership Unbundling can be beneficial for electricity
consumers is also Bolle and Breitmoser’s (2006) conclusion when they draw on figures
from the EU power sector to interpret their model results. Their general findings inter
alia show that Legal Unbundling is the suboptimal type of separation (i.e., leads to
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lower quantities and higher prices of the final product) when the regulatory inefficiency
supposed to be associated with an only legally separated utility is high; the assump-
tion that regulatory surveillance under Legal, but not under Ownership Unbundling is
poor and entails a network usage charge always exceeding the upstream firm’s costs of
provision is a key feature of the theoretical framework. That is, the model does not
allow for the licensing of the optimal usage charge by the authority under one of the
two regimes of interest; this, in turn, prevents a proper comparison of both types of
vertical separation.
Also Höffler and Kranz (2011a) assume a deficient regulation to prevail: independent
of the regime, the monopolist in their model is able to subtly sabotage its downstream
demanders to increase their costs. Operationalizing Legal Unbundling as a parent com-
pany that maximizes joint profits of both its own and the separated division’s activity
while the legally unbundled affiliate solely considers its own profits (as first introduced
by Sibley and Weisman (1989)), their main finding then reveals that it matters whether
the upstream or the downstream activity of a formerly integrated utility is separated:
while a legally unbundled downstream firm together with a monopolistic parent com-
pany results in a (weakly) lower final good output than that obtained under Ownership
Unbundling, a downstream parent company with a legally separated affiliate active in
the industry’s monopoly area results in a (weakly) higher one. Throughout the analysis,
identical usage charges for Legal and Ownership Unbundling are assumed, although it is
at least briefly shown in the end that the outlined result also holds when the respective
optimal fee is set under both regulatory regimes. The identification and the comparison
of these optimal choices, though, is lacking in the paper as well.
Finally, Höffler and Kranz (2011b) study what they call ”imperfect” Legal Un-
bundling for the scenario where the downstream supplier is the parent of a separated
upstream monopolist which is again able to subtly sabotage; however, unlike as in Höf-
fler and Kranz (2011a), the downstream firm no longer has to be the single shareholder.
What makes the regulatory measure ”imperfect” is that not only the parent company
takes account of the unbundled division’s profits in its decision-making, but that this
also happens the other way round (in a different extent, depending on the level of ”im-
perfection”). Differentiating between a situation where the downstream firm’s share
affects the upstream monopolist’s objective to allow for its parent’s profits and another
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one where this is not the case, the following insights are of interest: without any influ-
ence of the share, the output of the final good weakly increases with a higher share as
long as the upstream firm’s weight on downstream income is not overly high; this con-
tradicts a full ownership separation at least for (mid and) low levels of ”imperfection”.
When, on the contrary, an influence exists, maximum production is not realized with
a stand-alone monopolist when generic cases are considered; requiring full Ownership
Unbundling would hence be suboptimal, again. Once more, however, all results are
obtained without attaching great importance to authority decisions: a determination
of optimal grid charges for different share sizes and ”imperfection” levels does not take
place at all; instead, the charge is assumed not to vary.
Besides the disregard of regulatory decisions on optimal access fees the narrow choice
of the criteria the two unbundling regimes are evaluated against in the four mentioned
papers stands out. Without exception, the assessment is solely carried out on the
basis of classical textbook objectives of consumer-friendly authorities: a large network
capacity as well as both a high output and a low price of the consumption good. That
is, regulations possibly implemented by authorities acting in their own interest or to
the benefit of market participants other than consumers are entirely neglected.
This paper extends the two-stage models common in theoretical analyses on Legal
and Ownership Unbundling to figure out how empowering the regulatory agency to set
the grid charge and the goal the agency aims for affect the optimal choice on the type
of vertical separation. Before the upstream monopolist decides on the grid capacity and
the generators, requiring the network to dispatch electricity and modelled as a Cournot
duopoly, subsequently realize their production, the regulator included in our theoretical
framework implements its rulings: it demands the monopolistic network to be separated
either legally (what makes the grid firm become the parent company, taking account
of the affiliate’s profits) or by ownership and licenses the access fee optimal under the
respective type of unbundling chosen before. In particular, all decisions the agency
takes in the stages added in our model depend on the objective the authority pursues:
we differentiate between ”traditional” consumer-oriented goals (a high output, a low
price or a high consumer surplus) and targets benefiting the government (high tax
yields) or the industry (high company profits); we argue that especially the advantages
associated with a departure from ”traditional” objectives such as potential increases in
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state appropriations in the course of growing public revenues or bribes and posttenure
job prospects for captured regulators issuing producer-friendly provisions might induce
the authority to ignore its official mission of end-user protection.
The results reveal that, regardless of the regulator’s goal, the optimality of one or
the other type of vertical separation depends on the level of the network charge if this is
set identically under both regulatory regimes. When, according to the agency objective,
the optimal access fee is licensed for both degrees of separation, the model shows that
a grid unbundled by ownership is unambiguously superior to a legally separated one
solely when the authority strictly acts in the interests of consumers (i.e., pursues the
”traditional” aims of regulation); if, on the contrary, only the benefits of the industry or
the government (and hence indirectly its own interests) are relevant for the regulator,
Legal and Ownership Unbundling are equivalent in virtually all cases. Minor disad-
vantages and costs associated with a change in the ownership structure of just legally
unbundled utilities could then result in the status quo to be preferable to full verti-
cal separation, letting authorities focusing on business-oriented or government-oriented
goals be a possible explanation for the adherence of several European countries to Legal
Unbundling.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section justifies the
choice of the different objectives attributed to the authority and discusses the regula-
tory goals in more detail. Section 3.3 sets outs our four-stage model and analyzes the
optimal decisions of the downstream duopoly and the monopolistic upstream network;
this allows us to derive the market outcome for every possible access fee. Based on these
results, Section 3.4 then studies the agency’s optimal choices of the grid charge and the
unbundling regime for each of the objectives the regulator might pursue; possible expla-
nations for the differences in the degree of vertical separation across EU member states
as well as potential measures enhancing the focus of agencies on consumer-oriented






We start our account of potential regulatory objectives with an illustration of the
goals that are in line with the essential function typically assigned to regulators: the
representation and promotion of consumer interests (Newbery, 1999, ch. 4.1; Small,
1999; Decker, 2010; Albon, 2012). The related literature and the mission descriptions
of energy regulators active in EU member states indicate that three such targets can
be discerned:
Maximizing the electricity dispatch: One of the basic objectives of regulatory inter-
ference is the prevention of anti-competitive behavior of dominant market players (as,
e.g., incumbents) supplemented with a persistent promotion of competition in all those
production stages where more than one firm can survive (Kay and Vickers, 1990; Small,
1999; Albon, 2012; see also the goals declared by the European Agency for the Cooper-
ation of Energy Regulators (ACER, 2014), the Council of European Energy Regulators
(CEER, 2014) and the German Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA, 2014)). By this means, it
shall (inter alia) be ensured that the consumers’ demand for the product traded on the
regulated market is fully satisfied (Newbery, 1999, ch. 4.1.1; Joskow, 2007; MIT, 2011,
ch. 8.1). However, due to the power suppliers’ need for grid capacity, realizing this
aim in case of electricity implies that the authorities’ interventions are not restricted
to just monitoring both producers and sellers of the final good; instead, it addition-
ally requires the surveillance of the monopolistic grid activities. Without regulation,
network companies would restrain capacity to the profit-maximizing monopoly amount
only (Demsetz, 1968; Kay and Vickers, 1990; Breyer, 1998; Ogus, 2004, ch. 3.2), which
would of course lead to an undersupply of electricity as well.
Minimizing the power price: The outlined objective of maximizing output is closely
related to another fundamental target of regulatory authorities: ensuring low commod-
ity prices to protect consumers from excessive mark-ups otherwise claimed by firms
with market power (Kay and Vickers, 1990; Small, 1999; Newbery, 1999, ch. 4.1.1).
Related to electricity markets, the importance of this aim becomes obvious in the mis-
sion descriptions of European energy regulators: they, inter alia, require the authori-
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ties to guarantee power prices that are ”fair” (ACER, 2014; CER, 2014 (IRL); URSO,
2014 (SVK)), ”cost-reflective” (ACER, 2014), ”competitive” (Energiemyndigheten, 2014
(SWE)) and ”on an affordable level” (MEKH, 2014 (HUN)), to ensure a ”low-priced [...]
supply of electricity” (BNetzA, 2014) or to ”protect the interests of consumers [...] with
respect to prices” (ERSE, 2014 (POR)). With the costs of network access being passed
on to final customers by power suppliers, a core remit of electricity price regulation
is the stringent control of the usage fee demanded by bottleneck owners: this is the
only way to prevent that monopoly prices are claimed for granting capacity (Demsetz,
1968; Trebing, 1977; Kay and Vickers, 1990; Breyer, 1998; Newbery, 1999, ch. 4.1;
Ogus, 2004, ch. 3.2; Joskow, 2007) while, at the same time, providing network compa-
nies with the financial means they need to construct and maintain all necessary assets
(Breyer, 1998; Newbery, 1999, ch. 4.1; Small, 1999; Joskow, 2007; MIT, 2011, ch. 8.1).
Maximizing consumer surplus: The third possible goal finally combines the first
two: the consumer surplus increases with higher amounts of output and lower end-user
prices. Taking the surplus as the item to maximize in our theoretical anaysis allows for
an appropriate operationalization of the above-mentioned target of promoting consumer
interests prevalent in the literature as regulatory core objective (Newbery, 1999, ch. 4.1;
Small, 1999; Decker, 2010; Albon, 2012). The exceptional significance this task actually
has also in electricity market regulation is reflected in the frequency its fulfillment is
named as a central aim of the European agencies’ activities: numerous authorities
emphasize their endeavors to protect, fortify and benefit end-users by their monitoring
operations (ACER, 2014; AEEG, 2014 (ITA); BNetzA, 2014; CER, 2014; CNMC, 2014
(ESP); Energiemyndigheten, 2014; Energitilsynet, 2014 (DEN); ERSE, 2014; ERÚ, 2014
(CZE); JARSE, 2014 (SVN); MEKH, 2014; Ofgem, 2014 (GBR); RAE, 2014 (GRC);
URSO, 2014).
3.2.2 Business-Oriented Objectives
Maximizing industry profits: Although responsible for serving the consumers in the
first instance, regulatory authorities might take account of industry profits as well:
in several cases, an agency’s mission is expected to require welfare or total surplus
maximization (Train, 1991, chs. I.1 and I.3; Small, 1999; Joskow, 2007) or - which
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basically amounts to the same thing - the maximum possible reduction of dead-weight
losses induced by market failures (Noll, 1989; Kay and Vickers, 1990); under both
mandates, not only consumer surplus but also producer surplus is crucial. An authority
will likewise consider company earnings in its decision when regulatory statutes demand
to act in the ”public interest” (Mitnick, 1980, chs. I.1.2 and V.1.0; Noll, 1989; Kay and
Vickers, 1990): in general, scholars rate this provision as being an equivalent to welfare
or total surplus maximization (Mitnick, 1980, ch. V.3.0; Noll, 1989; Train, 1991, ch.
I.1; Newbery, 1999, ch. 4.1).
But not only the fulfillment of an official mission demanding welfare maximization
might cause an authority to strive for high industry profits. Agency employees might
also pursue own interests and objectives that are at odds with the statutory mandate of
their employer (Noll, 1989; Kay and Vickers, 1990; Train, 1991, ch. I.1) and therefore
focus on maximizing the power producers’ and the network monopolist’s profits. This
might, for example, happen when the companies in the electricity sector succeed in
using the authority for their own ends and induce the regulatory decision-makers to
act and rule only in the firms’ interests (Stigler (1971) was the first one addressing
this potential abuse of regulation; see also Mitnick, 1980, chs. I.2.0, V.1.0 and V.2.0;
Rourke, 1984, ch. 7; Kay and Vickers, 1990).
The reasons for such a regulatory capture can, as already indicated in the introduc-
tion, be rather diverse: in Laffont and Tirole (1991), the regulatee bribes the authority
to achieve a more profitable regulation (Kay and Vickers (1990), maybe somewhat less
precarious, just mention an employment of company resources by supervised firms to
advantageously affect regulatory decisions). Che’s (1995) model, including a ”revolving
door” (i.e. a regulator’s posttenure opportunity to work in the sector under surveil-
lance), suggests a less intense monitoring when the official’s control efforts reduce the
time and resources available to acquire skills valuable for the industry (and thereby
the regulator’s chance of getting hired); likewise, a laxer regulation occurs in case of
an exogenous and unobservable posttenure competence as long as the negative rela-
tionship between the regulator’s industry qualification and the intensity of supervision
prevails6. (For a short non-theoretical discussion of the issues arising with a potential
6However, the existence of a revolving door can also lead to a stricter supervision: this is the
case whenever posttenure competence also increases monitoring efficiency (independent of whether
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industry employment of retired regulators see also Noll (1989).) And finally, Agrell and
Gautier (2010, 2012a, 2012b) assume the authority to make use of biased information
provided by the regulatee for free in order to save agency resources and working time,
simultaneously accepting a suboptimal regulation derived from these noisy data.
However, unlike in the different strands of the capture literature, bribes, wage pay-
ments from postagency industry employment or (biased) information flows between
regulated firms and regulator are not included in our model; instead, we simply op-
erationalize regulatory capture by imputing an interest in high industry profits to the
authority, implicitly assuming that the regulatees will benefit the regulator in return
for decisions taken to favor the companies. For analytical convenience, upstream and
downstream profits are discussed separately in the model section.
3.2.3 Government-Oriented Objectives
Maximizing revenues from electricity taxation: Finally, it might also be possible that
the regulator focuses on the maximization of revenues generated from taxing electricity.
The surveys of Johannsen et al. (2004), the CEER (2005) and Gilardi (2008, ch. 8)
show that many European energy regulators are fully or at least partially funded by the
government, and the OECD/IEA (2001) argues that the state’s income from general
taxation is an important source for this funding. As an increase in the national budget
(which, in turn, is usually raised in times of high tax yields) is furthermore expected
to be associated with an increase in agency budgets (or, at least, a lower probability
that their requests for additional resources are denied) (Downs, 1967, ch. IX; Blais
and Dion, 1990; Bowling et al., 2004; Wildavsky and Caiden, 2004, ch. 3), higher tax
revenues might imply a better financial endowment of the regulatory authority, too.
The authority’s intention behind its striving for higher means can be twofold: on the
one hand, it might inherently be driven by the regulator’s public mission. In this case,
higher appropriations (are perceived as being necessary to) raise the agency’s capability
industry knowledge has to be acquired or is given exogenously); and also in a setting without any
postagency qualification where the door’s porosity corresponds to the probability of a successful collu-
sion between regulator and regulatee an entirely closed door is suboptimal as long as the government’s
financial means to correctly incentivize officals are limited (Che, 1995). In addition, also Salant’s
(1995) model assuming a company-funded consulting activity for retired regulators suggests a (weak)
welfare-enhancing effect of revolving doors.
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of competing with companies for specialists (Smith, 1997) indispensable in today’s util-
ity regulation due to the steadily increasing complexity of this task (Thatcher, 2002b)
and of covering the substantial information costs that arise in this field (Agrell and
Gautier, 2010). With adequate monetary and personnel resources being rated as vital
for an agency to properly fulfill its function (Rourke, 1984, ch. 4; OECD/IEA, 2001;
Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002), the regulator’s behavior might then be explained by
a pursuit of an equality of arms in the struggle against financially potent (Thatcher,
2002a) regulatees.
On the other hand, the regulator’s wish for higher appropriations might - just as the
potential interest in high industry profits - also be caused by purely self-serving motives:
agency employees are, as Ogus (2004, ch. 4.4) points out, typically bureaucrats that, in
turn, might act as suggested by Niskanen (1968, 1975) and aim at a maximized budget
to finance, e.g., higher salaries or perquisites (see also Migué and Bélanger (1974),
Rourke (1984, ch. 4) and Tullock et al. (2002, ch. 5) on that topic; Noll (1989) and
Train (1991, ch. I.1) explicitly state the possibility of regulators behaving as officials à
la Niskanen).
At least for bureaucrats in general, empirical evidence seems to support this con-
jecture in many cases: several papers reveal a striving for mostly considerable budget
increases by various American agencies (Sharkansky, 1965, 1968; LeLoup and More-
land, 1978; Lauth, 1986; Thompson, 1987; Ryu et al., 2007; ASAP, 2008). Blais and
Dion (1990) expect a bureaucratic self-interest to exist after (inter alia) reviewing the
results of Krueger (1988), showing the number of applicants for U.S. federal jobs to
increase when public compared to private wages increase, and Sigelman (1986), sug-
gesting an eagerness for higher agency means to prevail among most American senior
administrators. And finally, Bowling et al. (2004) and the American State Administra-
tors Project’s survey of 2008 (ASAP, 2008) do not only find a broad majority of U.S.
agency heads favoring higher expenditures for their own authority (which, according
to Ryu et al. (2007), strongly affects an office’s request for a rising budget), but also
that many of them likewise prefer a higher overall public spending. For Europe, Vene-
toklis and Kiander (2006) results suggest that Finnish higher-level officials especially
advocate higher appropriations for tasks fulfilled by their agency, and also Bağdigen’s
(2003) interviews with Turkish local officials reveal a desire for budget expansions for
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their own authorities. Jacobsen (2006) finds that Norwegian municipal bureaucrats fa-
vor increasing public expenditures in general and prefer these means to be allocated to
their own remit as well as to internal administration (expected to be used to increase
the bureaucracy’s slack).
The problem of self-serving regulators might be even aggravated in the near future
due to the growing number of highly skilled experts employed in utility authorities:
such specialist are, according to Moe (1989), especially inclined to pursue personal
objectives, confident that laymen outside their agency lack the knowledge to control
them.
3.3 The Model
To provide a possible explanation for the variations in regulatory regimes across
countries we analyze a multi-stage model that focuses on the differences between Le-
gal and Ownership Unbundling from the perspective of the institution prescribing the
intensity of vertical separation - the national regulatory authority. The structure of
the model, which will be solved by backward induction in this and the next section,
is illustrated in Figure 3.1 and can be described as follows: a regulator strives for the
realization of one of the objectives elucidated in the previous section (a high electricity
dispatch, a low power price, a high consumer surplus, high revenues from electricity
taxation or high industry profits). The agency takes account of this goal when it de-
termines whether Legal (LU) or Ownership Unbundling (OU) is implemented in the
national electricity market in the first stage (which is discussed in Section 3.4.2). Sub-
sequently, the authority sets the network access charge; as the type of unbundling, also
the level of the fee is chosen so as to achieve the respective regulatory objective in the
best possible way (Section 3.4.1). The licensing power assigned to the agency due to
its market surveillance task allows for the enforcement of the charge that is optimal for













Figure 3.1: The stages of the game
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faces an exogenously given fee as in Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) and Höffler and Kranz
(2011a, 2011b); the full coverage of the construction costs via the usage charge assumed
in these three papers independent of the network size, though, is no longer ensured due
to the regulator’s unconstrained second stage decision.
The third and the fourth stage, then, analyze the choices of the companies in the
electricity industry. Since these stages are also considered in the papers on vertical sep-
aration that neglect the role of regulators, several of their assumptions and approaches
of how to model different aspects of unbundling are adopted. As in Cremer and De
Donder (2013), we assume the power sector to consist of one upstream monopolist that
provides the grid and a downstream duopoly of identical generators that satisfies elec-
tricity demand and requires the network to dispatch power; with Legal Unbundling, one
of the duopolists is an affiliate of the grid company, whereas in the case of Ownership
Unbundling both generators are completely independent.
In the third stage, the upstream monopolist maximizes profits by deciding on the
network capacity. A grid company that is just legally unbundled maximizes the overall
profits of both the network and the affiliated generator (Section 3.3.2.1); a grid company
separated by ownership, on the contrary, solely maximizes its own profits (Section
3.3.2.2). In the last stage, then, the network units are purchased by the downstream
duopolists; each of them solely maximizes its own profits (Section 3.3.1), independently
of which type of unbundling is implemented (Höffler and Kranz (2011a)7; Cremer and
De Donder (2013); both papers borrow the modeling approach for Legal Unbundling
originally introduced in Sibley and Weisman (1998)). When deciding on their power
production, the generators consider that for every electricity unit they dispatch one unit
of grid capacity is required. For each network unit, the duopolists have to pay the fixed
per-unit fee (Bolle and Breitmoser, 2006; Cremer and De Donder, 2013; Höffler and
Kranz, 2011a, 2011b) set by the regulator in the second stage; it is, as in reality (see,
e.g. Sakhrani and Parsons (2010)8), assumed to be independent of the electricity price.
7To be precise, Höffler and Kranz (2011a) denote the setting equivalent to that analyzed in our paper
(i.e., with an upstream monopolist maximizing total profits of the network and the legally separated
downstream firm) as ”reverse unbundling”, while in their legal unbundling scenario the downstream
producer maximizes joint profits.
8Sakhrani and Parsons (2010) analyze the network tariffs of four OECD countries in much detail; for
both the EU member states included in their selection, Portugal and Spain, they find total access fees
to be a mark-up on the power price paid by consumers that solely consist of price-independent capacity
charges (e/kW/year, e/kW/month and e/kW/day), fixed charges (e/year, e/month and e/day) and
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In cases where insufficient capacity constrains the power production, we finally suppose
the two downstream generators to share the existing network units equally (Cremer and
De Donder, 2013).
3.3.1 The Downstream Market
In the fourth stage, the two downstream generators, i = 1, 2, produce the electricity
outputs qi that add up to a total power supply of q1 + q2 = Q. When taking their
production decisions, the duopolists face an inverse aggregate demand function P (Q)
that we assume to be decreasing and strictly convex (so that P ′(Q) < 0 and P ′′(Q) > 0).
This implies a reduction in electricity consumption after power price increases, as it is
also suggested by recent empirical findings on the price elasticity of electricity demand
for several EU member states (see below; we refer to long-run values since the decision
on a potential change in the regulatory regime as well as its eventual implementation







(with Q(P ) = P−1(P )), describes the percentage change in electricity demand in
response to a one percent increase in the power price (Varian, 2010, ch. 15.5).
For Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal (Madlener et
al., 2011), Cyprus (Zachariadis and Pashourtidou, 2007), France, the UK (Narayan et
al., 2007; Madlener et al., 2011), Greece (Hondroyiannis, 2004; Madlener et al., 2011),
Spain (Madlener et al., 2011; Blázquez et al., 2012) and Italy (Narayan et al., 2007;
Madlener et al., 2011; Dicembrino and Trovato, 2013), the long-run price elasticity of
household electricity demand is found to be negative and inelastic; results indicate the
same for the long-run price elasticity of industrial power demand in Greece (Christopou-
los, 2000; Polemis, 2007), Italy (Dicembrino and Trovato, 2013), Cyprus (Zachariadis
and Pashourtidou, 2007; restricted to the service sector) and Germany (Madlener et al.,
2011; only for food and tobacco, chemicals, pulp and paper, non-metallic minerals and
transport equipment as subsectors of manufacturing). A negative and elastic long-run
charges raised by consumption volume (e/kWh) (with their particular composition depending on both
the country and the customer category).
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price elasticity of residental electricity demand is furthermore suggested for Finland
(Madlener et al., 2011) and Germany (Narayan et al., 2007).
In our model, the per-unit price P (Q) paid by electricity consumers includes an
ad-valorem tax with a tax rate t, so that the revenue a generator earns per power unit
is equal to (1 − t) · P (Q). Each duopolist incurs generating costs C(qi), with the cost
function assumed to be strictly convex and increasing, C ′(qi) > 0, C
′′(qi) > 0 ∀ qi; this
reflects the merit order of generation, i.e. the disproportionately increasing marginal
costs of the power plants gradually connected to the grid to satisfy an increasing demand
(Sherman, 2008, ch. 18.1). Finally, for every network unit employed due to the required
one-to-one relationship between supplied electricity and grid capacity, the generators
have to pay the access charge a the upstream monopolist is entitled to raise to be able
to construct and maintain the grid.
We assume the duopolists in the downstream market to compete in quantities. Since
the generators take their decisions independently of the unbundling regime, fourth stage
results hold for both types of vertical separation. Three different cases then have to be
distinguished: in the first case, the network size exceeds the total amount of electricity
the two generators dispatch; the grid capacity, denoted by X in the following, does not
constrain power production. Consequently, the duopolists play a simple Cournot game
and solve the maximization problem
max
q∗i
πi = πi(q1, q2) = (1− t) · P (Q) · qi − a · qi − C(qi). (3.2)




a+ C ′(qi) = (1− t) · [P (Q) + P ′(Q) · qi] ∧ q1 + q2 = Q for i = 1, 2, (3.3)
so that the generators’ marginal costs equal their marginal revenues: the access
charge and the production costs for the additional electricity unit add up to the for-
mer, whereas the latter includes the net price for the marginal power unit and the
net price reduction for all inframarginal supplies resulting from the increase in gen-
eration. The duopolists’ equilibrium power supplies sum up to the total electricity
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In the second case, the network capacity exactly equals the overall power produc-
tion of both duopolists in the Cournot equilibrium; this again allows the generators to






In the third case, the grid size finally undercuts Q∗(a) and constrains the power
production. As described above, we assume the duopolists to split the existing capacity
equally in this situation, so that X
2
electricity units are supplied by each generator.
We can summarize the three cases as follows: let Q(a,X) denote the actual amount
of electricity dispatched; then,
Q(a,X) =

Q∗(a) if Q∗(a) < X





With a network size not constraining downstream generation in the first two cases,
each duopolist is able to realize its profit-maximizing production level q∗i (a), i = 1, 2;
accordingly, ∂πi
∂qi
= 0, i = 1, 2 holds in (i) and (ii). In the third case, though, a capacity
constraining the dispatch of power prevents the production of the profit-maximizing
electricity amounts and the generators can only choose (identical) outputs smaller than
q∗i (a), i = 1, 2; hence,
∂πi
∂qi
> 0, i = 1, 2 follows in (iii).
The cases are illustrated in Figure 3.2: starting from the origin (and no network),
an increase in the grid capacity enables the generators to raise their profits by ex-
panding production to a level closer to the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium output;
accordingly, all additional grid units are purchased by the power producers and the
Q(a1, X)-function has a slope of one in case (iii). When the function’s kink, represent-
ing the second case, is then reached, the enlargement of generation is stopped: in this
point, the network provided by the upstream monopolist is just equal to the aggregate
downstream output that maximizes the duopolists’ profits. Consequently, any further
increases in X do not affect the production decision of the generators; they do not
acquire more than Q∗(a1) grid units and with a non-binding capacity constraint (case















Figure 3.2: Power dispatch and grid capacity for a1 < a2
The above considerations finally allow us to derive how the actual total power supply




0 in (i)1 in (iii) (3.4)
The results for cases (i) and (iii) are straightforward. For case (ii), the derivative is
not defined since Q(a1, X) is nondifferentiable at the kink point where X = Q
∗(a1).








< 0 in (i)
0 in (iii)
(3.5)
In the first case, a higher usage fee reduces the total dispatch of electricity: the
excess capacity allows the duopolists to realize their unconstrained Cournot equilibrium
outputs. Since these decrease as soon as the generators face higher marginal costs,
production in the unconstrained equilibrium and therefore also the actual total power
supply is reduced whenever the access charge is increased (see Appendix A 3.1 for a
derivation). Accordingly, a higher a leads to a parallel downward shift of the horizontal
part of the Q(a,X)-function (as an example, see the dashed graph in Figure 3.2 that
emerges after the fee is increased from a1 to a2). In case (ii), the reaction is again not
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well-defined due to the the function’s kink. In case (iii), finally, downstream output
does not change. As in the first case, generation levels in the unconstrained Cournot
equilibrium are reduced by an increase in the usage charge; but since Q(a,X) is cut back
below Q∗(a1) before due to the capacity constraint, the reductions in the unconstrained
equilibrium outputs are not reflected in a lower network demand by the duopolists.
Instead, the generators continue to exploit the existing grid completely.
3.3.2 The Upstream Monopolist
In the third stage, the upstream monopolist installs the capacity X that maximizes
either total profits of the network and the affiliated generator (under Legal Unbundling)
or network profits alone (under Ownership Unbundling). The monopolist generates
revenues by selling capacity to the generators for the per unit price a; the costs to
construct and maintain the grid are described by the cost function G(X), which is
assumed to be strictly convex and increasing, G′(X) > 0, G′′(X) > 0. In the following,
we use the subscripts L and O to distinguish network sizes and access fees under Legal
and Ownership Unbundling, respectively.
3.3.2.1 Legal Unbundling
When statutory provisions require Legal Unbundling, the maximization of the aggre-




πv(XL) = aL ·Q(aL, XL)−G(XL)













with πv denoting the total profits of the legally unbundled utility. The first line of
(3.6) describes both revenues and costs of the grid company: for all electricity units
the generators dispatch (adding up to either XL if the network size constrains power
production or Q∗(aL) if not), the monopolist earns the access fee aL. Furthermore,
the monopolist incurs the costs for providing XL units of grid capacity, independent of
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whether the whole or only a part of the network is eventually used by the downstream
duopolists. The second and the third line of (3.6) then add both revenues and costs of
the affiliated generator and include therefore all the components that are familiar from
the duopolists’ maximization problem (see (3.2)): the affiliate earns the net price for the
electricity units it sells and has to bear both the access fees for all these units and the
associated generation costs. Due to the duopolists’ symmetry, always half of the actual
total power production Q(aL, XL) is supplied by the affiliated generator, regardless of
whether generation is constrained by the network or not.

























P (Q(aL, XL)) + P





Marginal costs comprise the monopolist’s expenses for constructing and maintaining
one more network unit and the costs the affiliated generator incurs for supplying half
an additional electricity unit (consisting of both the generating costs and the aquisition
expenditure for the grid capacity essential for dispatching). Marginal revenues include
the access fee the downstream generators pay when they purchase the incremental net-
work unit and the affiliate’s earnings (i.e., the net market price) for half an additional
electricity unit reduced by the net price decrease for its inframarginal power units. Ex-
cept for the marginal construction costs that occur as soon as the incremental capacity
is installed, all marginal costs and revenues arise only when the additional grid unit is
employed by the downstream duopolists, i.e. when ∂Q
∂XL
= 1. This is the case when the
network size prevents the generators to produce their unconstrained Cournot equilib-
rium outputs, i.e. when XL < Q
∗(aL) (see (3.4)); by applying the left derivative of the
Q(aL, XL)-function at its kink point here and in the following, we furthermore assume
the duopolists to purchase the marginal capacity also when XL = Q
∗(aL).
We complete our discussion of (3.7) by shifting attention to the price reduction
for the affiliate’s inframarginal electricity units. The lowering of the power price is an
aggregated effect that has two different origins: it results from the half-a-unit increases
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in the electricity outputs of both the affiliated and the competing generator following
the one-unit increase in the network capacity. This can be illustrated by rewriting the














P (Q) + P ′(Q) · Q
2
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(recall that q1(aL) = q2(aL) =
Q(aL,XL)
2
due to the duopolists’ identity). The second
line of (3.8) describes the marginal effect the half-a-unit increase in the affiliate’s power
production has on its profits. But as an identically sized rise in the competitor’s gen-
eration is induced by the capacity expansion, the monopolist also has to take account
of the marginal effect the competing generator’s production decision has on the affili-
ate’s profits: it further lowers the price for inframarginal electricity units (see the third
line of (3.8)). The incremental grid unit hence allows the affiliated generator to raise
downstream profits by dispatching half an additional electricity unit, but at the same
time it causes a double reduction of prices; henceforth, we will therefore refer to the
competitor-induced power price decrease as the drop-effect of the network expansion.
We now draw on (3.8) to illustrate the effect of a one-unit increase in the grid size
on the legally unbundled utility’s total profits. Differentiating between the cases where
the network size XL is greater than, equal to and smaller than the total unconstrained
Cournot output in the downstream market, Q∗(aL), we get












= aL −G′(Q∗(aL)) +
1
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P (XL) + P
′(XL) ·XL
]






When the grid capacity exceeds the aggregate unconstrained power production,
XL > Q
∗(aL), only the marginal upstream costs occur: neither generator dispatches
more electricity than its Cournot amount, so that all additional network units which
expand the grid beyond Q∗(aO) remain unused. Accordingly, the downstream affiliate
does not incur any marginal costs, nor does it generate marginal revenues. The grid
company, moreover, lacks purchasers for the overcapacity and hence gets no income
via the usage charge for all excess units; instead, these parts of the network produce
marginal losses, since the upstream monopolist is left with its marginal construction
costs. Consequently, overcapacity is never installed by the grid company; it would
unnecessarily reduce πv that the legally unbundled monopolist strives to maximize.
If the network size coincides with Q∗(aL), the duopolists in the last stage choose
their profit-maximizing production levels. The downstream marginal costs and marginal
revenues the affiliate allows for when it takes its production decision then cancel out of
the third stage first-order condition and the grid company has to compare its marginal
revenues from the access fee with the remaining marginal costs: beyond the grid con-
struction costs for the last unit, these also include the competitor-induced drop-effect.
When a low grid capacity finally prevents the generators from dispatching their
unconstrained Cournot outputs, the marginal costs and revenues factored in by the
affiliate differ from each other and become hence relevant for upstream decisions as
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well. Compared to the situation where XL = Q
∗(aL) therefore both the marginal
downstream costs beyond the drop-effect and all marginal downstream revenues enter
the third stage optimization problem.
Whether it is optimal for the legally unbundled monopolist to choose the network
size equal to or smaller than the sum of the generator’s unconstrained Cournot outputs
depends on the marginal effect the Q∗(aL)-th unit has on overall profits:
Result 1: Suppose that πv is strictly concave in XL and define Λ(aL) :=







= Q∗(aL) if Λ(aL) ≥ 0





= 0 if Λ(aL) < 0.
Two different cases exist in which it is optimal for the upstream firm to provide a
grid capacity equal to Q∗(aL): the first one occurs when the provision of the Q
∗(aL)-th
unit has a positive marginal effect on aggregated upstream and downstream profits,
i.e. when the access fee from selling one more network unit exceeds the sum of its
construction costs and the drop-effect. In this case, the grid size undercuts the capacity
that maximizes the overall profits, but the lacking downstream demand for still more
capacity prevents the legally unbundled monopolist from further expanding the network.
The second case arises when the marginal revenues and the marginal costs that remain
to be considered by the grid company when the affilated generator produces its profit-
maximizing output just cancel out. The number of grid units that lets the monopolist
reach the maximum of πv is then exactly twice as much as the amount of power the
downstream affiliate dispatches to reach its own profit function’s maximum and both
the third and the fourth stage optimality condition are simultaneously fulfilled.
As soon as providing the Q∗(aL)-th network unit affects aggregated profits neg-
atively, the legally unbundled monopolist cuts back capacity below the total of the
duopolists’ unconstrained Cournot outputs: this happens when the usage charge does
not cover both the marginal construction costs and the drop-effect. In this case, a ca-
pacity of Q∗(aL) would prevent the grid company from maximizing πv since the optimal
network size would be exceeded; to maximize aggregated profits, capacity is therfore
curtailed by the monopolist until only X∗L(aL) grid units are supplied.
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As the regulator uses the access charge (together with the type of unbundling that is
implemented) to optimally achieve its respective regulatory objective, we finally analyze
the effect of a marginal increase in the network fee on the grid capacity. Depending
on whether the network size constrains the dispatch of electricity or not, the capacity













−G′′(XL) + (1− t) ·
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for Λ(aL) < 0.
(3.9)
As long as the grid size and the sum of the generators’ unconstrained Cournot
equilibrium outputs do not differ since the capacity demanded by the duopolists is
smaller than the network size that maximizes the legally unbundled utility’s total profits
πv, the reaction of the aggregated generation to small increases in aL is decisive for the
adjustment of the grid size: in this case, the monopolist’s possibility to sell network
units depends entirely on the generators’ willingness to buy them. Since a higher access
fee (and thus an increase in the marginal production costs) results in a reduction in the
downstream demand for capacity (see (3.5) and Appendix A 3.1), the grid company will
lower the network size to avoid the provision of redundant and hence loss-generating
grid units.
When the duopolists’ aggregated profit-maximizing electricity amounts and the net-
work size maximizing the legally unbundled utility’s profits coincide (i.e. for Λ = 0),
the capacity change due to a marginal increase in the access fee cannot be determined;
the derivative is not defined at the kink point of the Q(aL, XL)-function (see Section
3.3.1).
Whenever the generators would like to dispatch more electricity than the existing
capacity allows, the monopolist will expand the grid when the usage fee is raised to
take advantage of the downstream demand for additional network units: purchasing
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them will allow the generators to produce electricity amounts closer to their profit-
maximizing outputs (which will be slightly reduced by a small increase in aL, but not
in a way that the added capacity remains unused). Satisfying the additional downstream
demand after a fee increase is the monopolist’s optimal decision, as the application of
the implicit function theorem to the legally unbundled utility’s first-order condition
shows: the denominator of the second fraction in (3.9) equals the second derivative of
the legally unbundled utility’s profit function with respect to the capacity at points
where XL < Q
∗(aL); this has to be negative to let X
∗
L denote a (local) maximum,
so that the network is expanded whenever the grid size prevents the generators from
dispatching their unconstrained Cournot outputs.
3.3.2.2 Ownership Unbundling
When Ownership instead of Legal Unbundling is implemented, the upstream mo-
nopolist does not have any incentive to influence competition in the downstream market
since an affiliated generator which might benefit from a suboptimal grid expansion no
longer exists. Accordingly, the grid company does not take account of any downstream
marginal costs or revenues and solves the maximization problem
max
X∗O
πn(XO) = aO ·Q(aO, XO)−G(XO),
where πn denotes the entirely unbundled monopolist’s profits and XO the network










at points where the network size is greater than, equal to and smaller than the
sum of the generators’ unconstrained Cournot outputs Q∗(aO) to analyze the effect
of a marginal capacity increase on the grid company’s profits. To substitute ∂Q
∂XO
, we


















= aO − G′(XO).
As in the case of Legal Unbundling, grid units exceeding the duopolists’ aggregated
unconstrained Cournot output are not installed as they reduce upstream profits: they
lead to marginal costs, but do no generate marginal revenues. When the network size
coincides with Q∗(aO) or undercuts it, respectively, the grid company earns the access
fee for supplying the marginal unit and incurs its marginal construction costs.
Whether it is optimal for the entirely separated, profit-maximizing monopolist to
provide a capacity equal to or smaller than Q∗(aO) is described in
Result 2: Define Ω(aO) := aO −G′(Q∗(aO)). Then,
X∗O(aO)

= Q∗(aO) if Ω(aO) ≥ 0





= 0 if Ω(aO) < 0.
Under Ownership Unbundling, it is hence optimal for the grid company to com-
pletely satisfy the downstream demand for capacity when the usage charge is higher
than or equal to the marginal costs for providing the Q∗(aO)-th network unit; in these
cases, the grid size that maximizes πn exceeds the aggregated power production that
maximizes the sum of π1 and π2 or coincides with it, respectively. If, on the contrary,
the Q∗(a)-th unit’s marginal effect on upstream profits is negative, the monopolist re-
duces capacity below the total of the generators’ unconstrained Cournot outputs and
chooses a network size where the marginal unit’s construction costs equal the access fee
to realize maximum profits.
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The linkage between total downstream capacity demand and optimal network size













> 0 for Ω(aO) < 0.
(3.11)
Whenever the duopolists’ demand for network units constrains the grid size, the
reaction of the generators’ aggregated unconstrained Cournot output determines the
change in network size: since an increase in aO leads to a lower Q
∗(aO) (see (3.5)
and Appendix A 3.1), the monopolist will downsize the grid. If, conversely, a network
capacity undercutting Q∗(aO) constrains the dispatch of power, the demand for network
units will exceed its supply also in case of a slightly higher usage charge. Applying the
implicit function theorem to the grid company’s first-order condition to identify the
impact of a one-unit raise of aO on the network size then reveals an increase in capacity
to be optimal. For X∗O(aO) = Q
∗(aO) (i.e for Ω = 0) the optimal change in network
size cannot be determined as the derivative is not defined at the kink of the Q(aO, XO)-
function (see Section 3.3.1).
3.3.2.3 Comparisons
Based on the results from Sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2 we now compare the two types
of unbundling.
First, we draw on Results 1 and 2 which define the thresholds that determine when
the optimal size of a legally or an entirely separated network, respectively, satisfies the
duopolists’ total capacity demand. Together, the Results allow us to identify when
the optimal grid sizes under both regulatory regimes correspond to the generators’ un-
constrained aggregated Cournot outputs (and are therefore identical) when a uniform
usage charge a is set under both types of unbundling:
(a) Suppose Λ(a) ≥ 0; then, Ω(a) > 0. That is, whenever X∗L(a) = Q∗(a), then
X∗O(a) = Q
∗(a), too.
Note that Λ(a) = Ω(a)+ 1
2
· (1− t) ·P ′(Q∗(a)) · Q
∗(a)
2
< Ω(a) for every access fee: due
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to the drop-effect a legally unbundled grid company takes into account in contrast to
an entirely separated one, the marginal costs for providing the Q∗(a)-th network unit
are always higher for an upstream monopolist under Legal Unbundling.
Accordingly, with identical grid charges under Legal and Ownership Unbundling,
aL = aO, it is optimal for an entirely separated grid company to provide a capacity equal
to the sum of the generators’ unconstrained Cournot outputs whenever it is optimal to
do so for a legally unbundled monopolist. Λ(a) ≥ 0 implies that the legally unbundled
grid company’s marginal costs do not exceed its marginal revenues at XL = Q
∗(a);
then, the even lower marginal costs a grid company unbundled by ownership incurs if
it provides Q∗(a) will undercut the (identical) marginal revenues as well, and installing
a network that accommodates the entire downstream capacity demand maximizes the
entirely separated monopolist’s profits.
Results 1 and 2 furthermore enable us to determine when the optimal capacities
under both types of unbundling differ from the total amount of electricity the duopolists
would like to dispatch when an identical access fee a is licensed under both regulatory
regimes:
(b) Suppose Ω(a) ≤ 0; then, Λ(a) < 0. That is, whenever X∗O(a) < Q∗(a), then
X∗L(a) < Q
∗(a), too.
For a legally unbundled grid company it is hence optimal to constrain capacity below
Q∗(a) whenever the profit-maximizing network size of a monopolist separated by own-
ership is smaller than or equal to the generators’ aggregated unconstrained Cournot
outputs. In these cases, the marginal revenues the entirely separated grid company
earns from providing the Q∗(a)-th network unit undercut or just cover, respectively, its
marginal construction costs; and since in both cases the marginal costs a legally unbun-
dled monopolist incurs are even higher due to the drop-effect it allows for, maximizing
πv implies a capacity lower than Q
∗(a).
Whenever a capacity XL = Q
∗(a) is suboptimal for the legally unbundled grid
company, X∗L(a) and X
∗
O(a) differ in all but one case when a uniform fee a is set because
of the downstream marginal costs and revenues only the legally separated monopolist
takes into account:
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P (X∗O(a)) + P
′(X∗O(a)) ·X∗O(a)
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Assume πv to be strictly concave in XL. Then,
X∗L(a)

> X∗O(a) if Γ(a) > 0
= X∗O(a) if Γ(a) = 0
< X∗O(a) if Γ(a) < 0.
If the legally unbundled grid company installs a capacity equal to X∗O(a), the net-
work’s marginal revenues a and the marginal construction costs for providing the incre-
mental grid unit cancel out in the optimization problem the legally separated monopolist
has to solve whenever XL < Q
∗(a). If the affiliate’s marginal profits (including the drop-
effect) associated with the installation of the X∗O(a)-th grid unit (i.e. Γ(a)) are then
positive, expanding the network is optimal for the legally unbundled grid company.
For such a situation to occur, the demand for electricity has to be price elastic10: if




















where the term on the right-hand side of (3.13) is the price elasticity of demand as
defined in (3.1) at X∗O(a), multiplied by minus one. Consequently, to make inequality
(3.13) hold, the elasticity has to be smaller than minus one.
From (3.13), a price elastic demand also prevails when Γ(a) = 0. In this case, the
affiliate’s marginal profits from selling half an additional electricity unit and the drop-
effect add up to zero; the optimal capacity is then independent of the regulatory regime.
10See Section 3.3.1 for empirical examples of countries with an elastic long-run electricity demand.
Examples for countries with an inelastic long-run demand - a situation discussed at the end of this
section - can be found there as well.
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Consequently, the affiliate and thus also its identical competitor would like to expand
generation.
If installing a grid of size X∗O(a) finally has a negative overall effect on downstream
(and hence also on the legally unbundled utility’s total) profits, the legally separated
monopolist cuts back the size of the network below the entirely separated monopolist’s
optimal capacity to maximize its profits. This can happen in case of a (less) elastic, a
unit elastic or an inelastic electricity demand: consider (3.13) again; with an elasticity
only slightly smaller than minus one, the left-hand side of the inequality might exceed
its right-hand side. The inequality then no longer holds with a less-than, but a greater-
than sign and Γ(a) is negative. Correspondingly, the inequality sign turns with an
elasticity equal to minus one or higher.
3.3.2.4 Upstream Capacities and Downstream Generation
We now outline the relationship between the generators’ aggregated unconstrained
Cournot outputs and optimal grid sizes under Legal and Ownership Unbundling (see
Figure 3.3). The red curve depicts the downstream duopolists’ total Cournot equilib-
rium production for different access fees, neglecting whether the capacity the generators
need to dispatch their production is provided by the upstream monopolist or not. With
Q∗(a) being reduced by increasing grid charges (see (3.5) and Appendix A 3.1), the
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Figure 3.3: Total downstream capacity demand and optimal capacities under
Legal and Ownership Unbundling
graph is negatively sloped. The purple graph illustrates the profit-maximizing network
size of a legally unbundled grid company when network capacity constrains downstream
power production below Q∗(a), and the blue curve describes an entirely separated mo-
nopolist’s optimal grid size when generation is constrained. Both the purple and the
blue graph are upward-sloping, since higher usage charges call for network expansions
as long as the capacity is smaller than Q∗(a), as (3.9) and (3.11), respectively, show.
We know from (3.14) and (3.15) that the capacity that is provided when Γ(a) = 0
is lower than the total electricity amount the generators would like to dispatch when
the access fee that entails identical optimal grid sizes under both regulatory regimes is
set; accordingly, the point of intersection of the X∗L(a)- and the X
∗
O(a)-curve lies below




















so that the optimal capacity under Legal Unbundling is higher than the optimal grid
size under Ownership Unbundling in case of low access fees (i.e., left of the intersection),
whereas it is just the other way round in case of high charges (i.e., right of the intersec-
tion). When purchasing network units is cheap, the legally unbundled utility provides a
larger grid, since the affiliate’s downstream profits (including the drop-effect) outweigh
the profit setbacks or losses that arise in the upstream division when the network size
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exceeds the capacity that maximizes an entirely separated monopolist’s profits (i.e.,
X∗O(a)). When the grid access gets more expensive, the legally unbundled monopolist
refrains from installing a capacity equal to X∗O(a), since doing so would result in down-
stream profit reductions that could not be absorbed by the network’s income increases;
by providing X∗L(a), however, the network generates just enough excess profits to cover
the affiliated generator’s simultaneous losses. The dominating negative effect on the
affiliate’s profits that would occur if a capacity equal to X∗O(a) was provided originates
solely from the drop-effect the legally unbundled monopolist takes into account: as long



















suggesting unconstrained Cournot equilibrium outputs of the generators that, in
total, exceed the optimal network size of an entirely separated grid when access fees are
low. The small price for using the network does not allow for a cost-covering provision of
the last Q∗(a)−X∗O(a) units and hence prevents the monopolist separated by ownership
to satisfy the entire downstream demand. In case of higher charges (i.e., those that lead
to Ω(a) > 0), capacity is adapted to total generation (see Result 2).
Basically similar results can be observed for the relation between downstream ca-
pacity demand and the optimal grid size of a legally unbundled grid company. The first
















so that a cheap network access leads to a grid capacity smaller than the generators’
aggregated unconstrained Cournot outputs also under Legal Unbundling: here, the sum
of the fee and the affiliate’s marginal profits (including the drop-effect) does not suffice
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to cover the marginal construction costs for the last Q∗(a)−X∗L(a) units of the network
and the electricity dispatch is limited to X∗L(a). For high usage charges (resulting in
Λ(a) > 0), capacity is again determined by Q∗(a) (see Result 1).
3.3.3 Interim Summary
We can briefly summarize the results from Section 3.3 as follows:
• In case of low access fees (i.e., those that lead to Λ(aL) < 0 [Ω(aO) < 0]), down-
stream generation is constrained by the capacity the legally [entirely] separated
grid company provides. When usage charges are high (implying Λ(aL) ≥ 0
[Ω(aO) ≥ 0]), network construction is constrained by the low capacity demand
of downstream generators (see Result 1 [Result 2]).
• When generation is constrained by the grid and access fees are slightly raised,
capacity (and thus power production) is increased; when downstream capacity
demand constrains network construction, a fee increase reduces power production
(and thus the grid size) (see (3.9) [(3.11)]).
• With low [medium] access fees (i.e., those that result in Γ(a) > 0 [Γ(a) < 0]),
the capacity under Legal Unbundling is higher [lower] than under Ownership Un-
bundling. There exists one usage charge that implies identical profit-maximizing
capacities under both regulatory regimes (and Γ(a) = 0) when generation is con-
strained by the network size (see Result 3).
• The larger the network size (and the Γ(a)-value), the less price elastic is the
electricity demand (see the analysis of Result 3).
3.4 The Regulatory Authority
3.4.1 The Regulator’s Choice of the Access Charge
Being fully informed about the decisions the downstream generators and the (either
legally or entirely separated) upstream monopolist take when a certain network charge is
set, the authority licenses the access fee that ensures the achievement of the regulatory
74
3.4. THE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
objective in the best possible way in the second stage. This choice of the regulator
is analyzed and compared for both types of unbundling and the different potential
regulatory targets in the following; we draw on the order of objectives introduced in
Section 3.2 during their elucidation to structure the analysis. In this section, a∗∗L [a
∗∗
O ]
denotes the authority’s optimal choice for the usage charge when Legal [Ownership]
Unbundling is implemented; the capacity the legally [entirely] separated grid company













are positive [negative] as long as Λ(aL) and Ω(aO), respectively, are negative [pos-
itive]. For Λ(aL) = 0 and Ω(aO) = 0 (i.e., at the kink points of the Q(a,X)-functions),
we furthermore apply the right derviative here and in the following, assuming the de-
mand for network units (and hence the capacity provided) to be reduced whenever
the access fee is raised and X∗L(aL) and X
∗
O(aO), respectively, are equal to Q
∗(aL) and
Q∗(aO), respectively. To maximize the electricity dispatch for a given regulatory regime,
the agency hence has to license the access fee that lets the generators’ aggregated un-
constrained Cournot outputs and the optimal capacity coincide: with Λ(aL) = 0 and
Ω(aO) = 0, every change in aL and aO, respectively, reduces the power supply below
the maximum possible level. From our findings that Λ(a) < 0 whenever Ω(a) = 0
(see Section 3.3.2.3) and that ∂XL
∂aL
> 0 if Λ(a) < 0 we can then derive a∗∗L > a
∗∗
O :
an authority aiming at a maximum electricity dispatch licenses a higher grid charge




< 0 (see (3.5) and Appendix A 3.1), this furthermore implies
X∗∗L (a
∗∗




O ): with the optimal access fee being set in both regulatory en-
vironments, the capacity under Legal Unbundling is smaller than under Ownership
Unbundling.
Minimizing the power price: Since P ′(X) < 0, also this target requires the maxi-
miziation of the electricity dispatch. Licensing the grid charges that lead to Λ(aL) = 0
and Ω(aO) = 0, respectively, are hence again the optimal choices of the regulator. With
both the fees that are set under Legal and Ownership Unbundling and the resulting
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capacities being identical with those that are licensed and installed, respectively, when











also hold when the minimum price is sought.




P (Q)dQ− P (X(a)) ·X(a),
i.e., as the sum of the consumers’ willingness to pay for all electricity units supplied
minus the total expenditures incurred to buy them. Then,
∂CS(a)
∂a






Since, according to (3.9) and (3.11) (and due to the application of the right deriva-





are positive [negative] when Λ(aL)
and Ω(aO), respectively, take [non-]negative values, the derivative is only positive when
Λ(aL) < 0 and Ω(aO) < 0 hold. Increasing the access fee hence affects the consumer
surplus positively as long as the additional network units the monopolist is willing to
provide when the grid charge is raised are entirely purchased by the generators. Then,
the electricity dispatch grows, the price drops and consumers are better off. If, how-
ever, the fee is raised further, so that the network size is constrained by the decreasing
downstream demand, the power supply is reduced, the price increases and the consumer
surplus falls. Maximizing consumer surplus thus again means maximizing electricity dis-
patch; the optimal usage charges for both types of unbundling and the ensuing capacities
the monopolist installs are accordingly independent of which of the two objectives the











result if the agency strives for the highest possible consumer surplus.
For a regulatory authority solely acting in the consumers’ interest, we can hence
summarize our findings in
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Proposition 1: The access charge set by a consumer-oriented regulator under Legal
Unbundling will always exceed the fee licensed under Ownership Unbundling. An author-
ity striving for a high power supply, a low electricity price or a high consumer surplus
will always be better able to achieve its goal with an entirely separated monopolist.
3.4.1.2 Business-Oriented Objectives
Maximizing upstream profits: Upstream profits under either regulatory regime (de-
noted by πup in the following) are
πup(a) = a ·X(a)−G(X(a)),
and vary with the access fee by
∂πup(a)
∂a
= X(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0






The additional income the monopolist earns due to the higher usage charge for
inframarginal network units is reflected in X(a), which is always positive. The effect
the capacity change associated with a fee increase has on upstream profits, though, is
ambiguous and depends on the sign of Ω(a): the difference between the access charge
and the marginal construction costs (i.e., the term in square brackets) is either zero
or positive (if the raise in the usage charge induces changes in the network size not
only affecting the marginal grid unit). Accordingly, as long as a usage charge implies
Ω(a) < 0 (and thus ∂X
∂a
> 0, see (3.11)), a more expensive grid access always results in
higher upstream profits: the additional gains generated by the inframarginal units are
either not reduced (if the network is only expanded by a single unit, implying marginal
construction costs that are just covered by the increased fee) or even further raised (if
the incremental capacity is greater than one, therefore yielding positive marginal profits
itself).
If, however, Ω(a) ≥ 0 (and thus ∂X
∂a
< 0), there is just one single case in which the
capacity decrease induced by a higher fee does not diminish the additional income from
the inframarginal units: it occurs when Ω(a) = 0 and ∂X
∂a
= −1, i.e., when only the last
grid unit generating zero marginal profits is no longer provided after an increase in a.
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This exception aside, the smaller network always implies that previously profitable grid
units can no longer be sold: with Ω(a) = 0 and ∂X
∂a
< −1, the capacity reduction does
not only involve the last unit whose sales revenues just cover its construction costs, but
also (a) unit(s) that yield(s) positive marginal profits; with Ω(a) > 0, marginal revenues
exceed marginal costs for all units that are supplied prior to the fee raise.
While it is hence always optimal for a regulator striving for high upstream profits
to further increase the usage charge when Ω(a) < 0, it might be suboptimal to do so in
case of non-negative Ω-values: whenever the marginal losses from downsizing the grid
exceed the additional earnings generated by the inframarginal capacity, marking up the
fee will reduce πup. To determine the profit-maximizing charge we will therefore make
use of the facts that both the fee is a cost component the generators cover by the power
price and that its level is independent of this price (see Section 3.3), and then rearrange
(3.16) so as to be able to base our considerations on our findings on the price elasticity
of electricity demand (see Result 3 and its analysis).
First, let P−(X) denote the part of the gross market price for electricity P (X) that
























Furthermore, suppose (3.16) to be greater than zero, implying the marginal effect
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Inequality (3.19) holds as long as the electricity demand is inelastic or unit-elastic: in
these cases, the left-hand side is positive. That is, for medium-high a-s (those not much
higher than the fees yielding Ω(a) = 0), a marginal increase in the access charge leads to
higher upstream profits. The consumers’ minor reaction to price increases in this area
lets the additional income from inframarginal grid units outweigh the revenue losses
induced by the decrease in power consumption. A further raise in the usage fee then
leads to a further reduction in the network size, which, in turn, is associated with a more
and more elastic demand. In the end, an authority aiming at maximized grid profits will
choose the charge that entails an elasticity (smaller than minus one) exactly equating
the left- and the right-hand side of (3.19), corresponding to an identity of marginal
costs and marginal revenues of the fee increase. A precise identification of the usage
charge to be chosen is hence not possible within the scope of our model; nevertheless,
we can conclude that the optimal fees do not differ between the regulatory regimes,
a∗∗L = a
∗∗









on the downward-sloping part of the Q(a,X)-curves.
Maximizing downstream profits: The downstream generators’ overall profits (labeled
by πdown in the following) are






and a higher usage charge alters them by
∂πdown(a)
∂a







P (X(a)) + P ′(X(a)) ·X(a)
]











The higher costs for dispatching the inframarginal units always reduce the duopolists’
income by X(a). The effect of the marginal unit(s) on total downstream profits is pos-
itive [negative] whenever the sum of both marginal revenues and marginal costs that
are relevant for the generators’ production decision reduced by the drop-effect (i.e., the
term in the outer square brackets in (3.20)) is positive [negative] and ∂X
∂a
> 0 (i.e., when
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Λ(aL) < 0 and Ω(aO) < 0, see (3.9) and (3.11), respectively); if
∂X
∂a
< 0 (and Λ(aL) and
Ω(aO) are non-negative), πdown is increased [decreased] when units generating marginal
losses [profits] (implying a negative [positive] term in the outer square brackets in (3.20))
are no longer dispatched.
It is optimal for an authority aiming at the high overall downstream profits to choose
the access fee that leads to Γ(a) = 0. This holds independent of the type of unbundling










O ) when the
regulator strictly acts in the interest of the generators.
For a regulator taking decisions only in the industry’s interest, the results can be
summarized in
Proposition 2: The access charge set by a regulator pursuing business-oriented
objectives is identical under Legal and Ownership Unbundling. An authority aiming at
high upstream or downstream profits will always be able to reach its goal in the best
possible way under both types of vertical separation.
3.4.1.3 Government-Oriented Objectives
Maximizing revenues from electricity taxation: The overall tax yield is the product
of the rate and the tax base, which is obtained by multiplying the gross price per power
unit with the grid capacity:
TAX(a) = t · P (X(a)) ·X(a)
With the tax rate t > 0 being determined exogenously, the regulator’s only possiblity
to affect the level of tax revenues is by influencing the network size via the access charge
(which, of course, also alters the electicity price and hence the tax yield per unit). The
change in the tax receipts resulting from a marginal increase in a is
∂TAX(a)
∂a






The network size increases whenever Λ(aL) and Ω(aO), respectively, are smaller than
zero (see (3.9) and (3.11), respectively). But since the downstream duopolists do not
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take account of the overall price reduction additional grid capacity induces and consider
only how their own increase in generation by half a unit affects the price, the pre-tax
marginal revenues of the X(a)-th unit might also be zero or negative.
Result 3 and its analysis (especially the findings on a decreasing price elasticity of
demand in case of an increasing capacity), though, allow us to draw some conclusions
on the effects a raise in the access charge has on the income from electricity taxation: as
long as the fee results in non-negative Γ(a)-values (see (3.12)), the after- and thus also
the pre-tax revenues generated by additional network units have to be positive and the
tax yields increase, too. When the price for the grid usage is then further raised, the
(continuous) price elasticity of demand decreases more and more, until finally the fee
is reached where the network size is associated with a unit-elastic electricity demand.
At this point, the term in the square brackets in (3.21) becomes zero and the tax
revenues no longer increase. With any further mark-up on the grid charge, demand
becomes inelastic and income from taxation even drops again. To maximize revenues
from electricity taxation, the regulator accordingly has to choose the fee that results
in a capacity entailing an elasticity of exactly one. This is true independent of the
regulatory regime, so that X∗∗L (a
∗∗




O ). However, the access charge necessary












11 and thus a lower capacity under Legal Unbundling;
with a legally separated grid, the optimal fee hence has to be higher than with an
entirely separated one, a∗∗L > a
∗∗
O .
These considerations hold as long as Λ(aL) (see Result 1) and Ω(aO) (see Result 2),
respectively, are negative. As soon as the maxima of the Q(a,X)-curves are reached
and higher usage charges lead to a downsizing of the network under both types of
unbundling (i.e., when X∗L(aL) and X
∗
O(aO), respectively, are determined by Q
∗(a); see
Figure 3.3), tax yields initially grow again: the high capacities right of the maxima are,
as mentioned above, associated with an inelastic demand and hence a negative value of
the term in the square brackets in (3.21). Since ∂X
∂a
< 0 for high fees (see (3.9) and (3.11),
respectively), the income from electricity taxation consequently rises at the beginning.
However, with higher and higher usage charges, the grid size is more and more reduced;





O )) ·X∗∗O (a∗∗O ) disappears from the
Γ(a)-term defined in (3.12) and the mentioned term remains.
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this implies an increasing price elasticity until finally electricity demand is unit-elastic
again and the marginal effect of a fee increase on tax revenues is zero. Raising the
usage charge even further then would result in an elastic demand and hence decreasing
tax yields (as the term in the square brackets in (3.21) turns positive). The maximum
income from electricity taxation can accordingly also be realized with high access fees:
the optimal capacities X∗∗L (a
∗∗




O ) do not differ from those identified above for
negative values of Λ(aL) and Ω(aO), but the usage charge/capacity-combinations that
are realized now lie on the downward-sloping part of the Q(a,X)-curves; the fees under
both regulatory regimes are identical in this case, a∗∗L = a
∗∗
O .
For an agency focusing on the achievement of its government-oriented goal, we can
thus summarize our findings in
Proposition 3: The access charge set by a regulator striving for high revenues from
electricity taxation might be higher under Legal than under Ownership Unbundling; the
grid capacity, though, is not affected by the level of the usage fee and, independent of the
type of unbundling, always identical. An authority interested in high tax yields will thus
always be able to reach its target in the best possible way under both regulatory regimes.
3.4.2 The Optimal Regulatory Regime
Based on the results stated in Propositions 1 to 3 we can now derive the regulator’s
optimal first stage decision on the degree of vertical separation and formulate
Corollary 1: A regulator striving for a high power supply, a low electricity price
or a high consumer surplus will mandate Ownership Unbundling.
A network separated by ownership together with the optimal usage charge for this
regime, a∗∗O , results in a grid capacity exceeding the highest possible one under Legal
Unbundling, as has already been shown above. This allows authorities solely acting in
the consumers’ interest to better achieve its respective objective.
Furthermore, we get
Corollary 2: A regulator aiming at high upstream or downstream profits or high rev-
enues from electricity taxation is indifferent between Legal and Ownership Unbundling.
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That is, the degree of vertical separation becomes irrelevant for the authority as soon
as it focuses on business-oriented or government-oriented objectives: when the optimal
fees a∗∗L and a
∗∗
O are levied for the access to a legally and an entirely separated network,
respectively, the grid capacities installed under both types of unbundling are, as ana-
lyzed above, identical. Consequently, also the agency’s ability to reach its respective
goal does not depend on the regulatory regime.
3.4.3 Interpretation of the Results and Policy Implications
It is this irrelevance of the unbundling regime in cases of authorities that strive for
high industry profits or high electricity tax revenues that might also cause the adher-
ence of several EU member states to Legal Unbundling: when solely the competition-
enhancing effects of an entirely unbundled grid are important, the costs that arise from
a change from Legal to Ownership Unbundling are considered rather negligible; but as
achieving a business-oriented or government-oriented objective is equally possible for
the agency without restructuring the electricity sector, these costs might tip the scales
and prevent the realization of entirely separated grids.
With a regulator not focusing on consumer interests, different types of costs might
induce the preservation of only legally unbundled electricity utilities: first, the imple-
mentation of Ownership Unbundling is expected to result in a facilitation of regula-
tion (OECD, 2001; Mulder and Shestalova, 2006; European Commission, 2007a, 2007f,
2007g; Pollitt, 2008) due to the removal of the network’s interest in generation and
supply profits and the concomitant discriminatory actions (OECD, 2001; Mulder and
Shestalova, 2006; European Commission, 2007a, 2007e, 2007f, 2007g). Actually an
advantage, this might be rated negatively by an authority as soon as it is keen to pre-
serve or even increase its importance (Ogus, 2004, ch. 4.4) - which is, according to the
OECD/IEA (2001), virtually always the case (a behavior also in line with that expected
from self-serving bureaucrats avid for power described by Downs (1967, ch. IX), Niska-
nen (1968), Peters (1978, ch. 7), Rourke (1984, ch. 4) and Tullock et al. (2002, ch.
5)). With a lower regulatory compexity probably being associated with a decline in the
agency’s influence as well as staff and resource reductions, it is reasonable to assume
that the authority is interested in the ties between transmission and generation/supply
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to persist.
Furthermore, transaction costs emerging in the course of a statutory split-off of the
network division from an integrated utility because of, e.g., necessary contract renego-
tiations or in-house reorganizations (Mulder and Shestalova, 2006; Pollitt, 2008) might
affect the choice on the type of unbundling as well: although most likely not outweigh-
ing the concurrent consumer benefits (Pollitt, 2008), they might induce an authority
attaching importance only to industrial interests to avoid any structural changes.
Such a willingness to maintain the status quo of an industry-biased agency might
also originate from the higher cost of capital expected as a possible consequence of
Ownership Unbundling: either due to smaller firm sizes of the stand-alone divisions
after full separation (Pollitt, 2008) or since, at least with respect to entirely unbundled
generation and supply companies, high risks are no longer offset by a monopolist’s low
risk as in the case of vertical integration (Mulder and Shestalova, 2006). This would,
again, undesirably reduce the unbundled companies’ profits.
A regulator’s reluctance to entirely separate an already legally unbundled firm might
finally result from the higher risk of foreign takeovers a utility’s split parts are probably
exposed to (Pollitt, 2008). Most likely irrelevant to the authority, especially political
pressure might play a decisive role at this point: due to the paramount importance the
energy sector has for the production in industrialized countries (Schneider and Jäger,
2003; Domanico, 2007; Karan and Kazdağli, 2011) politicians are expected to clearly
favor domestic ownership for national electricity (and gas) companies (Domanico, 2007;
Belkin, 2008); to ensure the country’s security of supply (Barysch et al., 2007), but also
to curb the fear of layoffs (Ahearn, 2006) often linked to foreign takeovers and because
of lobbying suspected to take place by incumbent owners12 (Domanico, 2007).
The aspects regarding transaction costs, higher cost of capital and the desired
prevention of foreign takeovers might gain even further relevance in the regulatory
decision-making process when the legally separated electricity companies involved are
state-owned. In these cases, politicians might perceive utilities primarily as sources of
public revenue and might accordingly try to prevent regulations that reduce or even
12In line with this suspicion and our considerations, Wilks and Bartle (2002) argue that, instead of
trying to influence authorities directly, regulatees rather try to interfere with regulations by inciting
politicians to bias agency decisions in the affected companies’ favor.
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dry up this income flow in their own interest. That such political interferences might
indeed affect agency decisions becomes obvious when the ownership structure of trans-
mission firms in countries still adhering to Legal Unbundling is examined more closely:
in Bulgaria, the high-tension grid is a 100% subsidiary of a fully state-owned holding
company (European Commission, 2014c), and also in Hungary the network firm is con-
trolled (European Commission, 2014f) by a public (MVM, 2014) parent company. In
France, the government holds 84.49% of the group owning and operating the trans-
mission lines (EDF, 2014), while the Greek state’s share in the parent company fully
owning (European Commission, 2014g) the country’s high-tension network amounts to
51.12% (PPC, 2014). In Luxembourg, the state and the City of Luxembourg together
with various Luxembourgian local governments hold 24.41% of the grid company in
total, whereas 75.43% are owned by a holding (Creos, 2014); of this holding, in turn,
25.44% are owned by the state (being the largest shareholder), 10.01% by a public in-
vestment bank and 8.00% by the the City of Luxembourg (Enovos, 2014). The Cypriot
transmission grid, finally, is owned by a so-called ”semi-government company”; it is
headed by an authority consisting of appointees of the national Council of Ministers
and has to follow directives the government is allowed to issue when the general interest
of Cyprus is affected (EAC, 2014). Still equipped with such a considerable influence
on the electricity sector, politicians in these countries worrying about public revenue
might hence have been prone to abuse their persistent powers to inhibit any structural
changes that potentially threaten the treasury’s income.
After discussing several possibilities for why a business-oriented or government-
oriented agency might adhere to Legal Unbundling, we finally want to draw some in-
ferences on potential modifications in the regulator-regulatee and the regulator-state
relationship that might prompt such an agency to put its focus back on its genuine
responsibility, the protection and promotion of consumer interests. Throughout the
paper, we expect a regulatory authority neglecting this task to do so because of its
interest in either financial and occupational amenities provided by the regulatees or
additional, tax-funded appropriations. Successfully inducing a return of the regulator
to consumer-oriented objectives hence implies that, on the one hand, the often still pre-
vailing financial dependence of energy agencies on government funds has to be limited
as far as possible: resources the authority receives should rather entirely stem from
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regulated firms (as it is already the case in some, but by far not all EU member states;
sometimes not even a partial contribution by the companies exists) and, if this cannot
be guaranteed, government appropriations should at least not depend on the current
budgetary position of the state; a fixed amount provided regularly over a long-time
horizon together with the decoupling of the regulators’ salaries from civil servant pay
scales (that are normally affected by a country’s economic situation as well) might be
an appropriate solution. If, however, the financing of the authority by regulatees can
be established, it is important to consider that industry payments should be as inde-
pendent of the firms’ profits as possible; otherwise, a similar misguided incentive could
develop.
This eventually brings us to the necessary autonomy from regulated companies: to
avoid that an authority accepts bribes or bases its decisions on freely provided, but
biased information and acts in the interests of regulatees, the implementation of a
collusion-proof incentive scheme is indispensable, as Laffont and Tirole’s (1991) and
Agrell and Gautier’s (2010) findings suggest. Put another way, this means that a
higher remuneration of regulators and a better resource endowment of agencies is rec-
ommended. Measures to reduce the porosity of the revolving door as, e.g., the often
existing cooling-off periods previous to posttenure industry employments (Johannsen et
al., 2004; CEER, 2005), on the contrary, should be applied rather carfully: as already
mentioned, Salant (1995) and Che (1995) show that a more beneficial regulation might
be implemented with an open door.
3.5 Conclusion
By analyzing a multi-stage model of electricity market regulation that focuses on
agency decisions on network charges and the degree of vertical separation, our pa-
per provides a possible explanation for the adherence of some EU member states to
Legal Unbundling: with access fees set optimally under both Legal and Ownership Un-
bundling, electricity generation and consumer surplus are higher and power prices are
lower when the network is separated by ownership; a regulator acting to the benefit
of consumers will hence mandate Ownership Unbundling. As soon as an agency is in-
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terested in high industry profits or high revenues from electricity taxation, however,
neither type of unbundling allows for a better achievement of the regulatory objective;
an adherence to Legal Unbundling might then be induced by the regulator’s concern
to lose importance, transaction costs or the fear of foreign takeovers or higher capital
costs for the entirely separated activities.
These findings illustrate the importance of agency interests and incentives that can-
not be reconciled with the regulator’s formal mission. Although actually a well-known
issue (addressed in particular in the capture literature), authorities potentially focusing
on industry or government interests instead of on the benefits of end-users play virtu-
ally no role when, e.g., reasons for a delay or even a failure of (steps of) reform are
discussed; in the political process, regulators are rather uniformly treated as reputable
”advocates of consumers”. By clarifying the impact an authority pursuing objectives
deviating from its statutory task can have by means of an example from the area of
electricity regulation, this paper might therefore raise the awareness for the relevance
of properly designed agency incentives for the avoidance of unintended consequences of
reform.
Including both the incentives that ensure the authority’s focus on consumer well-
being and those that cause the regulator to neglect its formal mission into the theoretical
framework might also be an interesting possibility for future research. In this respect,
the model at hand is parsimonious: it does not contain any remuneration for regulatory
activities and also the assumed increase in government appropriations in the wake of
higher tax yields is not implemented. Likewise, model elements familiar from the capture
literature such as bribes or the regulator’s chances for posttenure employment in the
industry as well as the wages paid there are missing; we just suppose the agency to
benefit from high upstream or downstream profits when it puts its focus on the business-
oriented objectives.
Taking account of the different incomes the regulator earns depending on both the
goal pursued and the resulting regulation might provide additional insights to better
understand the reasons for the adherence of some EU member states to Legal Un-
bundling. Incorporating, e.g., the agency’s budget cuts probably associated with Own-
ership Unbundling or potential payments regulatees make to the authority to prevent
full separation into the model might allow for a possible explanation for why regulators
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prefer legally unbundled grids within the theoretical framework: whenever agencies act
in the interests of companies or the government and our results hint at their indifference
between the two types of unbundling, the monetary (dis)incentives the suggested model






If the downstream market is in equilibrium and the duopolists’ production is not
constrained by the network size, the set of the generators’ first order conditions
∂π1
∂q1
= (1− t) · [P (Q) + P ′(Q) · q1]− a− C ′(q1) = 0
∂π2
∂q2
= (1− t) · [P (Q) + P ′(Q) · q2]− a− C ′(q2) = 0
(3.22)
is fulfilled.
Linearization of (3.22) then yields
(1− t) · [2 · P ′(Q) + P ′′(Q) · q1]− C ′′(q1) (1− t) · [P ′(Q) + P ′′(Q) · q1]










and Cramer’s Rule can be applied to obtain the reactions of the power producers’
outputs q1 and q2, respectively, on changes of the access fee a (Simon and Blume, 1994,

















(1− t) · [2 · P ′(Q) + P ′′(Q) · q1]− C ′′(q1)− (1− t) · [P ′(Q) + P ′′(Q) · q2]
]
(3.24)








which has to be positive
for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium to be asymptotically stable (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991, ch. 1.2.5), and, second, q1 = q2 = q in this equilibrium. Equations (3.24) then
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Since Q = 2 · q, ∂Q
∗(a)
∂a
< 0 follows immediately from (3.25).
Appendix A 3.2:
First, note that the pagoda-shaped functions describing the actual total electricity
generation under Legal and Ownership Unbundling (compare Figure 3.3) imply that,
independent of the regulatory regime, every output level in the downstream market
can be realized by two different usage charges. Choosing the higher fee to reach a
given output then always means reducing the generators’ overall profits: compared to
the alternative with the cheaper grid access, the duopolists’ total revenues and total
generating cost are identical, while dispatching electricity becomes more expensive.
A usage charge resulting in Λ(aL) ≥ 0 and Ω(aO) ≥ 0, respectively, (inducing an
equilibrium on the downward-sloping Q∗(a)-curve) can hence never be optimal for an
authority striving for high total downstream profits.
Furthermore, recall from the analysis of Result 3 that, if Γ(a) > 0 [Γ(a) < 0],
the profits of the legally unbundled monopolist’s affiliate are raised when it increases
[decreases] its power production - a finding that holds analogously for the identical,
independent generator. Consequently, to maximize total downstream profits, the access
fee implying that neither an expansion nor a reduction of the duopolists’ outputs can
positively affect their profits has to be implemented: this is the case when marginal
revenues (including the drop-effect) equal marginal costs, or, put another way, when














Budgetary Interests and the Degree of Unbundling in Electricity
Markets - An Empirical Analysis for OECD Countries1
4.1 Introduction
The degree of liberalization that has been realized in the electricity sector up to
today varies considerably across countries (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). Induced by
an uneven pace of reform, empirical studies analyzing the reasons for policy changes offer
several explanations for its divergence: economic performances (Drazen and Easterly,
2001; Pitlik and Wirth, 2003; Pitlik, 2008), the countries’ levels of corruption (Emerson,
2006; van Koten and Ortman, 2008), or government ideologies (Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke,
2010).
We will elaborate on the related findings below, but advance another potential reason
first: data suggest a relationship between taxation and electricity market reform. This
is illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. To capture liberalization, we focus on
the intensity of unbundling in the electricity sector, i.e. the degree of vertical separation
between the industry’s natural monopolies (transmission and distribution networks) and
the potentially competitive stages of the value chain (generation, wholesale, and retail).
Although somewhat restrictive, the particular importance of splitting these activities for
a successful realization of fully competitive electricity markets (European Commission,
1This chapter was presented at the 9th EEM International Conference in Florence and the 31st
USAEE/IAEE North American Conference in Austin.
An earlier version of this chapter was published as ”Budgetary Interests and the Degree of Unbundling
in Electricity Markets - An Empirical Analysis for OECD Countries”, Conference Proceedings of the
9th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2012), Paper No. 133.
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Figure 4.1: Corporate income tax and vertical integration in electricity markets
2007a; European Union, 2009a; Glachant and Léfêque, 2009) justifies this choice. In
both scatterplots of Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the level of vertical separation is measured by
an OECD indicator (OECD, 2011a). It ranges from 0 to 6 and decreases with stricter
forms of unbundling2. The scope of taxation, in turn, is proxied by the rates of the
corporate income tax rate (Figure 4.1) and the VAT rate on electricity (Figure 4.2); we
thus cover two sources of public revenues that primarily affect one of the market sides
each.
Figure 4.2: Electricity VAT and vertical integration in electricity markets
2See Subection 4.2.1 for a detailed description.
92
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Data for 30 OECD countries3 and a 27-year period (1981-2007) are used to construct
the first scatterplot. The brighter an observation point in the diagrams, the fewer
identical observations it stands for; in case of less than five observations, the point is
aditionally depicted as hollow. The fitted regression line included in the first plot has
a positive slope, suggesting the level of unbundling to be lower in countries with higher
corporate income tax rates.
The second scatterplot that compares the electricity VAT rate with the degree of
vertical separation indicates an opposite relationship: for a sample comprising 19 OECD
countries4 and the period from 1975 to 2007, the fitted regression line rather hints at a
liberalization-enhancing effect of higher levels of taxation.
With a negative [positive] relationship between tax rate and vertical separation being
indicated by the graphs, our paper aims at testing whether these findings can stand
sound empirical examination: drawing on the data used to create the scatterplots, we
estimate the effect of a heavier taxation of corporate income and power consumption,
respectively, on the scope of a country’s electricity market reform by OLS. The outcomes
are in line with both Figures 4.1 and 4.2 and suggest that the differences in the tax
rates that have existed among OECD countries over the years could have triggered
notable deviations in their unbundling regimes. These inferences hold when various
combinations of controls are included in the regression to allow for other factors that
potentially affect liberalization; and also a change of the estimation model from OLS
to ordered logit, justifiable with the method used to calculate the vertical separation
index, does not challenge the relationship depicted in the scatterplots.
This paper provides a possible explanation for the yet latent but apparently robust
effect taxation seems to have on the structure of the power industry. In a nutshell, we
suggest ministry officials and authority members in charge of electricity regulation to
strive for high government appropriations for their institutions and therefore to refrain
from implementing [foster] unbundling measures that reduce [raise] the base of the
corporate income tax and the electricity VAT, respectively; with a smaller [higher]
3The countries are AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CHE, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, GRC,
HUN, ISL, IRL, ITA, JPN, KOR, LUX, MEX, NDL, NOR, NZL, POL, PRT, SVK, SWE, TUR and
USA.
4The countries included are AUS, AUT, CAN, CHE, DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA,
JPN, KOR, NDL, NOR, NZL, SVK and SWE. Compared to the sample used to construct the first
scatterplot, the number of countries is reduced due to data restrictions.
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tax base, tax yields are lower [higher], and thus also the funding for the ministry or
regulatory agency is likely to decrease [increase]. As, for a given reduction [increase] in
the tax base, the resulting decrease [increase] in tax revenues is higher, the higher the
tax rate is, we expect a relationship to exist between how heavily corporate income and
power consumption is taxed and the degree of vertical separation.
We discuss the different aspects of this potential explanation step by step. First,
we illustrate why we assume regulatory actors to aim for high financial means for their
institution. To this end, we split the period of electricity market regulation into two
parts, differentiating between the early years where state ministries were responsible for
industry oversight and the (ongoing) era of independent regulatory authorities. First
concentrating on the early years of reform, we draw on the theory of bureaucracy (Niska-
nen, 1968, 1975; Migué and Bélanger, 1974; see also Downs, 1967, ch. IX; Rourke, 1984,
ch. 4; Tullock et al., 2002, ch. 5) to substantiate our conjecture with respect to min-
istry employees: the theory claims that public officials strive to increase the power of
the institution they work for and especially their remuneration to maximize their utility.
To further corroborate our considerations, we present empirical studies indicating that an
interest of bureaucrats in high funding for their offices or ministries might indeed exist.
Then, we provide two possible explanations for why we expect also members of
regulatory authorities to aim for high government appropriations: on the one hand,
it might be possible that regulators neglect their agency’s official mission (Kay and
Vickers, 1990) and pursue objectives similar to those ascribed to bureaucrats (Noll,
1989; Train, 1991, ch. I.1). On the other hand, the high financial resources authorities
require to properly fulfill their mandate (OECD/IEA, 2001; Thatcher and Stone Sweet,
2002) might also induce regulators strictly focusing on their employers’ official tasks to
strive for budget increases. And as agencies are mainly publicly financed (OECD/IEA,
2001; CEER, 2005; Johannsen et al., 2005; Gilardi, 2008, ch. 8; Hanretty and Koop,
2009), any interest of a regulator in higher financial means induced by either of these
motives basically amounts to being an interest in higher government appropriations.
Next, we briefly outline the literature that suggests that ministry and agency em-
ployees aiming for high institutional budgets also aim for high state budgets (Downs,
1967, ch. IX; Hood et al., 1984; Bowling et al., 2004) as the sizes of both budgets are
interrelated (Blais and Dion, 1990; Wildavsky and Caiden, 2004, ch. 3) and discuss
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empirical studies supporting this view. Since it is reasonable to assume that the state
budget increases with increasing tax yields, this would likewise imply an interest of such
regulatory actors in high tax yields.
Based on these considerations, we finally provide a potential explanation for the
liberalization-hampering effect of high corporate income tax rates. With an increasing
unbundling intensity, the level of competition in the electricity industry is raised. This,
in turn, reduces the companies’ (previously anticompetitive) profits and thus the base of
the corporate income tax: the tax can basically be seen as a tax on capital costs (Myles,
1995, ch. 8.2.2) and the remuneration of (equity) capital is usually higher, the higher
the profits are. The loss in tax revenues that results from the tax base reduction, in
turn, increases with the tax rate, so that regulatory actors striving for high government
appropriations should especially refrain from implementing unbundling measures when
corporate income is heavily taxed; in this case, the negative relationship between tax
rate and the degree of unbundling our estimation results indicate would emerge.
The liberalization-enhancing effect of high electricity VAT rates our empirical find-
ings furthermore suggest would then imply the base of the VAT to increase with higher
levels of vertical separation. It can be shown, though, that this is only true when power
demand is price elastic, which is rarely the case in reality. However, with the erro-
neousness of our notion that regulatory actors aiming for high budgets affect vertical
separation or reverse causality being possible explanations for this contradiction, an ad-
ditional estimation hints at another potential reason: when the unbundling intensity is
regressed on both tax rates, the coefficient on the VAT rate becomes negligibly small and
loses statistical significance, suggesting both the estimates indicating a reform-fostering
effect to suffer from an omitted variable bias and ministry officials and regulators to
focus on corporate taxation when they take their decisions.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section describes the
data and the estimation approach applied to empirically test the relationship between
tax rates and unbundling level suggested by the scatterplots. Sections 4.3 and 4.4
report and discuss regression results and robustness checks. Section 4.5 then explains
why we expect ministry officials and authority member responsible for regulation to be
interested in high budgets for their institutions and and how this might induce an effect
of tax rates on vertical separation. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Data and Methods
4.2.1 Main Variables and Estimation Method
To capture the development of vertical separation in the electricity markets of dif-
ferent OECD countries, we draw on a sub-indicator of the ETCR (Energy, T ransport
and C ommunication Regulation) measure provided by the OECD (OECD, 2011a).
The ETCR indicator provides a summarizing index value for the overall effectiveness
of regulation in seven non-manufacturing sectors by assessing their level of competi-
tion. It is obtained in several steps (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006): At first, two to four
sub-indicators are calculated for the seven sectors (passenger air transport, telecom,
electricity, gas, post, rail, and road freight). The number of sub-indicators differs de-
pending on whether the issues covered by the five existing types (entry barriers, public
ownership, vertical integration, market structure, and price controls) are relevant for
the degree of competition in the respective sector or not. In case of an existing rele-
vance, various questions that capture the situation prevailing in the respective sector
with regard to the aspect the particular sub-indicator describes are answered on the
basis of a wide range of data sources. Then, values between 0 and 6 are assigned to
the answers, with higher values indicating less competitive environments. A weighted
average of all answer values is calculated to obtain the sub-indicator. The values of the
sub-indicators determined for a particular sector, in turn, are averaged in order to get
the indicator for this industry. Finally, the simple average of all sector indicators yields
the ETCR indicator which is available for 30 OECD countries and the period from 1975
to 2007.
Analyzing the relationship between taxation and the degree of separation in the
electricity sector, we focus on the vertical integration sub-indicator for exactly this
branch. Its value equals the average of the values assigned to the answers to the following
two questions (answer values in parentheses) (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006):
1) What is the degree of vertical separation between the transmission and generation
segments of the electricity industry?
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- Separate companies. (0)
- Accounting separation. (3)
- Integrated. (6)




Since the answer values are weighted equally, the sub-indicator increases in steps of
1.5 and can only take values 0, 1.5, 3, 4.5, and 6.
We apply the combined central and sub-central corporate income tax rate as well
as the rate of the VAT on electricity as main explanatory variables. The data on the
corporate income tax rate are taken from OECD (2011b) and cover, as already outlined
in the introduction, 30 OECD countries and the years from 1981 to 2007. The data on
the electricity VAT rate cover 19 OECD countries and the period from 1975 to 2007;
values were obtained from national tax authorities. Summary statistics for both tax
rates as well as for the vertical integration sub-indicator and all controls used in the
regressions can be found in Table 4.6 in the Appendix.
To test the relationship between the degree of unbundling and the rates of the
corporate income tax and the electricity VAT, respectively, we estimate the equation
viit = α + β · taxit + γ ·Xit + δ · cdumi + θ · ydumt + εit.
The dependent variable viit denotes the degree of vertical separation, measured
by the vertical integration sub-indicator value outlined above. Our main explanatory
variable is the tax rate taxit. Since we are interested in the influence of the corporate
income as well as the value added tax, we run different estimations and switch the
tax type each time. The vector Xit contains further variables that might affect the
intensity of unbundling; we describe these controls and substantiate their selection in
the following section. The country and year dummies cdumi and ydumt, respectively,
enable us to control for differences in country characteristics as well as for possible
shocks and trends over time. Finally, εit denotes the usual error term.
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4.2.2 Control Variables
To allow for the effects factors other than the rates of the corporate income tax
and the electricity VAT, respectively, might have on the level of vertical separation, we
include the following control variables in our regressions:
• First, we add a country’s total tax revenues as a control. As briefly outlined in the
introduction, we suspect regulators to take account of what effect their decisions
on the degree of unbundling have on tax yields, since they expect a shortfall in
the receipts to be reflected in budget cuts for their agency. Such cuts, in turn,
should carry rather little weight when high total tax revenues make high appropri-
ations likely anyhow, and be painful for the authority when low tax yields already
force the government to constrain the resources it allocates to public institutions.
Regulatory measures that reduce tax receipts should accordingly be facilitated
[hampered] by high [low] total tax revenues.
As soon as a change in regulation increases tax receipts, on the contrary, we ex-
pect the relationship between tax yields and the implementation of new rules to
be exactly opposite: with overall tax revenues being high, generating additional
tax payments via regulatory provisions should not be so urgent; available funds
already allow the state to allocate considerable resources to the agency. Low tax
yields, by contrast, should promote the modification of the rules: the financial
leeway gained through the new regulatory regime might induce the government
to increase the appropriations for the authority.
That is, we expect the coefficient on total tax revenues to be negative [positive]
when unbundling measures lead to lower [higher] tax receipts. All these consider-
ations make clear the influence of the type of unbundling on total tax revenues we
assume to exist; to avoid the obvious endogeneity problem, we therefore include
the control variable with a lag of one year (which reasonably implies that a state
institution’s funding depends on the country’s financial situation in the previous
period). Data are obtained from OECD (2010b).
• We furthermore control for a country’s overall government debt (data are taken
from OECD (2010b)). Since it is reasonable to assume that the funding for a
regulatory institution increases with a decreasing national indebtedness, we expect
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all conclusions drawn for the tax revenues to hold the other way round: regulatory
measures that lead to higher tax yields are probably implemented when debts
are high; the additional public revenues generated by the change in the rules
should result in higher appropriations for the (underfunded) agency. With a low
government debt, on the contrary, altering the regulatory framework to increase
tax receipts and thus the authority’s resources is most likely unnecessary; the
financial means allocated to the agency can be expected to be already high.
When regulatory provisions reduce tax revenues, a high indebtedness probably
prevents their implementation, as the already low funding of the authority would
otherwise be further reduced; high government appropriations in times of low
debt, by contrast, should facilitate such regulations.
Accordingly, we expect a negative [positive] estimate on total government debt
when a higher degree of vertical separation increases [lowers] tax receipts. To
avoid reverse causality issues, also this control is included in the regressions with
a lag of one period.
• Next, we extend the estimation to allow for the economic performance of a coun-
try in the previous year. In general, each economic reform creates a group of
gainers and a group of losers (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Krueger, 1993; Rodrik,
1996; Bean, 1998), and while those gaining usually support the policy change,
the market actors benefiting from the pre-reform situation are expected to often
fiercely oppose it (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Rodrik, 1996). The so-called ”crisis
hypothesis” therefore claims that a troubled economy is a prerequisite for reform:
the associated detriments will force politicians to implement corrective measures,
ensure the political support necessary for these changes (Drazen and Grilli, 1993;
Krueger, 1993; Rodrik, 1996; Drazen and Easterly, 2001) and can - in case of a
deep crisis which affects almost everybody - even reduce the resistance of benefi-
ciaries of the old status quo (Rodrik, 1996).
Theoretical (Drazen and Grilli, 1993) and empirical (Drazen and Easterly, 2001;
Pitlik and Wirth, 2003) findings support the hypothesis with respect to inflation
and identify considerable currency devaluations to be a trigger for reform. How-
ever, with respect to economic growth, empiricial results are less straightforward:
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Pitlik and Wirth (2003) show that a country’s liberalization efforts are only higher
in the wake of a deep crisis; after a medium growth crisis, on the contrary, the will-
ingness to reform is even weaker than in the aftermath of an upswing or a boom5.
Pitlik’s (2008) study reveals that the positive effect of an economic downturn on
the scope of liberalization predicted by the hypothesis can only be observed in
democracies or when a country’s political system includes a high number of veto
players; for autocratic regimes, his findings suggest reforms to be introduced only
after periods of growth (with results holding independently of the severity of the
crisis). And Drazen and Easterly’s (2001) and Pitlik’s (2007) results hint at a
liberalization-enhancing effect of economic downturns, but they (often) do not
reach statistical significance (particularly relevant in our case is that Pitlik (2007)
cannot identify any statistically significant impact of growth crises on the design
of regulatory regimes).
We decided to check for a possible effect of a country’s economic problems on lib-
eralization by including the growth rate of the real GDP (calculated on the basis
of real GDP data obtained from the World Bank (2011)) lagged by one year as a
control variable, thus neglecting the potentially existing relevance of the crisis’s
severity Pitlik and Wirth’s (2003) findings suggest. Based on the outlined results
(and since our OECD sample does not include any autocracies), we therefore
expect the coefficients on the growth rate to be positive (albeit not necessarily
statistically significant). With the inflation rates found to trigger reform being
exceptionally high6, we furthermore refrained from adding a control capturing
5Pitlik and Wirth (2003) define a medium and a deep growth crisis as follows: a value of 1 is
assigned to each year with a non-positive growth rate being higher than -1%; years with a rate equal
to or smaller than -1% recieve a value of 2. A five year period with a sum between 3 and 5 is then
classified as a medium growth crisis, a five year period with an overall value greater than 5 constitutes
a deep crisis. Pitlik and Wirth’s (2003) result that medium growth crises lead to lower reform efforts
than upswings and booms substantiates Bean’s (1998) conjecture that, unlike as claimed by the ”crisis
hypothesis”, changes are induced by good economic performances, as they facilitate the compensation
of beneficiaries of the status quo opposing reform.
6As in the case of growth (see footnote 5), Pitlik and Wirth (2003) distinguish between a medium
and a deep crisis also with respect to inflation, defining the two types as follows: a value of 1 is assigned
to each year with an inflation rate being higher than or equal to 10% and smaller than 40%, years with
an inflation rate equal to 40% or smaller than 100% receive a value of 2; finally, years in which the
inflation rate exceeded 100% get a value of 3. Then, a five year period with a sum between 2 and 10 is
classified as a medium inflation crisis, a five year period with a total value greater than 10 constitutes
a deep crisis. Drazen and Easterly (2001), splitting their sample into groups according to the sample
countries’ inflation rate, find effects of currency devaluation on reform to exist only for the groups with
a median annual inflation rate of 68% or of at least 100%, respectively (depending on whether they
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currency devaluation.
• In addition, we control for the energy intensity in the sample countries by including
the primary energy supply (measured in tonnes of oil equivalent) per GDP unit
as a proxy (OECD, 2010a). Since high needs of primary energy caused by, e.g.,
extreme weather conditions or energy-intensive industries strengthen the desire
for cheap electricity, we expect negative coefficients to occur.
• We also control for the level of corruption prevailing in the public sector. Ve-
nal bureaucrats in charge of regulation are expected to implement provisions or,
conversely, to refrain from their implementation (Tanzi, 1994; Ades and Di Tella,
1997a) to ensure persistent high profits for the (usually few) firms active in the
regulated industry. This malfeasance obviously reinforces existing market imper-
fections (Tanzi, 1994), since excessive earnings can only be generated in non-
competitive environments, but, above all, it allows corrupt officials to demand
high bribes for themselves (Tanzi, 1994; Ades and Di Tella, 1997a, 1997b, 1999):
companies benefiting from the suppression of competition possess both the finan-
cial means and the willingness to pay large kickbacks in order to preserve their
advantageous situation (Mauro, 1996; Ades and Di Tella, 1997a; Treisman, 2000).
Bureaucrats aiming at a share in the incumbents’ rents are therefore suspected
of keeping them as high as possible by shielding oligopolistic markets from new
entrants (Ades and Di Tella, 1997a; Treisman, 2000).
Both theoretical and empirical research hints at the existence of such a malfeasant
behavior by corrupt officials: Emerson’s (2006) model shows that it is optimal for
a venal civil servant regulating a market supplied by a Cournot oligopoly with a
competitive fringe to constrain the number of Cournot competitors; this allows
him to ask for higher bribes. Estimations included in the paper as well further-
more substantiate the conjectured competition-hampering effect of high levels of
corruption. Van Koten and Ortman (2008), analyzing the relationship between
corruption and the degree of transmission network unbundling in the electricity
sectors of the EU-15 and ten further member states that acceded to the EU in
2004, find venal public officials and politicians to be associated with less stringent
apply an accurate or a rough classification).
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separation levels in EU-15 states, but to higher ones in the ten accession states.
However, the authors suspect the converse results for the new member states to
be induced by fraudulent reports on their true unbundling situation especially in
the years before 2004, because a failure in implementing the stipulated degree of
separation would have jeopardized their accession to the EU. Since compared to
restructuring the whole electricity sector to meet EU requirements misreporting
was particularly easy to realize in very corrupt countries, it is conjectured that in
fact the correlation between the degree of unbundling and the CPI was the same
in EU-15 and accession states.
To allow for a potential effect of corruption on vertical separation, we include
the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International
(2012; see Lambsdorff (2006) for details) as a control variable; it ranges from 0 to
10 and increases as the perceived susceptibility to bribery in a country’s public
sector decreases. Based on the literature suggesting that more corrupt countries
tend to procrastinate on state interferences fostering competition, we therefore
expect a negative coefficient to occur.
• Our next control variable captures the government’s ideology. Right-wing politi-
cians are usually seen as advocates of only minimal state interventions who pro-
mote deregulation whenever possible and prefer the free market to rule. Left-wing
politicians, on the contrary, are expected to be rather interested in taming the
market and therefore in comprehensive regulatory measures (Benoit and Laver,
2006, ch. 6). This notion is substantiated by Pitlik’s (2007) and Potrafke’s (2010)
estimation results: both find the level of deregulation to be higher in countries
where right-wing governments are in power.
We check for the suggested liberalization-enhancing effect of right-wing cabinets
by adding Potrafke’s (2009) ideology index as a control. It takes values between 1
and 5 and increases as the share of seats left-wing parties hold in parliament and
government grows; consequently, a positive coefficient on the ideology measure is
likely to arise.
Apart from being an indicator of government ideology, the index might also be
seen as a proxy for the political orientation of those directly responsible for regu-
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lation. On the one hand, it happens quite often that after a change of government
leading positions in ministries are restaffed by civil servants that are close to cab-
inet members. In the period where electricity markets were regulated by ministry
officials, a congruence of government ideology and the political orientation of se-
nior civil servants hence most likely existed, implying the index to properly reflect
the ideology of the officials supervising the sector as well. On the other hand, the
workforce of today’s regulatory authorities is usually formed by representatives of
all relevant (political) parties (Thatcher, 2002b). If one now reasonably assumes
that the number of representatives increases in the parties’ strength, the political
views prevailing among agency members should be appropriately captured by an
ideology index that describes the distribution of seats in both government and
parliament.
• Finally, we take account of a potential EU membership effect. The European
Union has been very active and ambitious in the area of regulatory policy-making;
as a consequence, the resulting legislation member states are obliged to implement
frequently exceeds by far the exclusively national provisions both in terms of quan-
tity and quality (Majone, 1996b). This is also true for energy policy, where the
liberalization of European energy markets as well as the realization of a single
EU market is the major objective of the Commission: three legislative packages
for an internal EU gas and electricity market have therefore been adopted un-
til today which include as many electricity directives (European Communities,
1996; European Union, 2003, 2009a). They require, inter alia, the implementa-
tion of increasingly stronger forms of unbundling in the member states, suggesting
higher degrees of vertical seperation in EU compared to non-EU OECD countries
surveyed in our sample. Beyond that, research emphasizes the pressure Euro-
pean institutions have put on member states in the recent past to prompt them
to establish independent regulators and vest them with wide-ranging authorities
(Döhler, 2002; see European Union, 2003, 2009a for the legal provisions). Given
that such agencies are rated as a driving force for a profound liberalization pro-
cess (OECD/IEA, 2001), this requirement should further reinforce the presumably
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higher reform efforts in EU countries7.
The conjectured relationship is anything but uncontroversial, though: a compar-
ative study between the EU-15 except for Luxembourg and groups of 16 South
American and eight developed democratic countries, respectively, concludes that
in the electricity sector reliable evidence for a liberalization-enhancing effect of an
EU membership is lacking (Levi-Faur, 2004). It shows that the steps of reform
undertaken to promote competition in both wholesale and retail markets were
more comprehensive in the European Union than in South America; but at the
same time, it reveals that, compared to the economically more similar democratic
countries, the liberalization efforts of EU member states were lower with respect
to retail activities and only higher in wholesale markets.
To capture a potential effect of an EU membership in our regressions we add a
dummy control variable that is constructed on the basis of EU accession dates
(taken from European Union (2011)). Levi-Faur’s (2004) findings challenging the
liberalization-enhancing role of the EU notwithstanding and based on the non-
empirical literature discussed above, we expect stricter forms of unbundling to be
suggested by the estimation results for member states (i.e., a negative dummy
coefficient); however, it appears questionable whether the estimate can reach sta-
tistical significance.
4.3 Estimation Results: Corporate Income Tax
4.3.1 Basic Results
We start with analyzing the relationship between the corporate income tax rate and
vertical separation. Table 4.1 illustrates the regression results from OLS estimations.
Independent of the model specification, the tax rate coefficient shows a positive and
statistically highly significant sign; the conjecture of a liberalization-hampering effect
of high tax rates suggested by Figure 4.1 is thus further substantiated. If the bivariate
7The cooperation between regulators initiated by the Commission (Thatcher, 2002b) might even
amplify the conjectured effect: although his a sample of 16 European independent authorities does
not include electricity regulators, it does not seem erroneous to assume that Maggetti’s (2007) findings
suggesting a reduction of the regulatees’ competition-hampering interference in an agency’s day-to-day
operation when the authority is part of a network group also holds for energy markets.
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Table 4.1: OLS Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CITrate .1030∗∗∗ .0546∗∗∗ .0538∗∗∗ .0592∗∗∗ .0573∗∗∗ .0351∗∗∗ .0338∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
totaltaxrevt−1 -5.1e-09 -3.1e-09 -2.2e-09 -1.8e-09 1.3e-07 1.6e-07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
totalgovdebtt−1 4.3e-07∗∗∗ 4.2e-07∗∗∗ 4.1e-07∗∗∗ 4.0e-07∗∗∗ 3.8e-07∗∗∗ 3.5e-07∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPgrowtht−1 -.0304 -.0410∗ -.0481∗ -.0324 -.0217
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029)
energysupGDP -7.675∗∗∗ -6.568∗∗ -14.12∗∗∗ -12.71∗∗∗
(2.776) (3.172) (3.900) (3.969)






constant .2781 2.383∗∗∗ 2.526∗∗∗ 4.172∗∗∗ 4.464∗∗∗ 8.872∗∗∗ 8.303∗∗∗
(0.326) (0.593) (0.600) (0.889) (1.022) (1.033) (1.106)
country dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes
year dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 .2102 .7877 .7883 .7912 .7906 .8265 .8275
N 682 588 588 588 557 470 470
Note: Columns (1)-(7) show estimation results of standard linear OLS estimations. Dependent variable is the
vertical integration sub-indicator for the electricity sector as described in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
model reported in the first column is neglected at this point, the coefficient size lies
between 0.03 and 0.06; it reaches its minimum when all controls are included in the
regression (and the associated data restrictions moreover notably reduce the number
of observations). The most comprehensive estimation model thus suggests the vertical
integration index to grow by about 0.35 units when the corporate income tax rate is
increased by ten percentage points.
Apart from the tax rate also several control variables are statistically significant:
first, all coefficients on the lagged government debt reach significance at the 1% level and
hint at lower degrees of vertical separation in countries with high national deficits. Given
that estimation results at the same time suggest only limited liberalization efforts in
cases of higher corporate income tax rates, this is in line with our considerations briefly
outlined in the introduction and Section 4.2.2, respectively: an increase in unbundling
seems to reduce the tax base for and thus also the tax yields from corporate taxation;
this results in a hesitant attitude towards separation measures especially when existing
debts are already high. The size of the estimated effect, though, is virtually zero,
indicating that decisions on the implementation of unbundling measures are basically
taken independently of the level of indebtedness in the previous year.
The negative coefficient on the lagged GDP growth reaches statistical significance
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only in columns (4) and (5) and there also just at the 10% level. The estimates in these
cases rather challenge the ”crisis hypothesis”: they hint at stricter forms of unbundling
after a high GDP growth in the previous year, which could only be reconciled with
previous findings at least partially substantiating the hypothesis when the economic
downturns covered by our sample would be classified as what Pitlik and Wirth (2003)
call a ”medium crisis”; the U-shaped relationship between growth and the scope of re-
form they identify suggests that liberalization efforts in the wake of such minor economic
turbulences are lower than those following times without economic problems. However,
given that the size of the significant coefficients is rather small (to reduce the vertical
integration measure by half a unit, the growth rate has to increase by more than ten
percentage points) and, above all, statistical significance is entirely lost when further
controls are added in the last two columns, overall results seem to indicate that the
unbundling level in our sample countries is not affected by their growth performance.
Energy-intensive production processes, on the contrary, are suggested to foster re-
form significantly: the respective coefficients are all negative and - except in column
(5), where the estimate can only reach the 5% significance level - statistically highly
significant. The size of the effect is furthermore suggested to be considerable: the coef-
ficient provided by the most comprehensive regression model indicates that an increase
in the amount of primary energy required to produce 1000 US$ of GDP by 0.1 tonnes
of oil equivalent decreases the vertical integration measure by more than 1.25.
Estimation results likewise hint at higher degrees of unbundling in countries with
officials less susceptible to bribery: the coefficients on the corruption index are negative
and reach high statistical significance in columns (6) and (7). The significant estimates
indicate an integration index reduction of approximately 0.3 for each one-unit increase
in the CPI.
The conjectured relationship between government ideology and vertical separation
is substantiated by the regression outcome as well: as expected, the highly significant
control variables suggest lagging reforms in countries governed by left-wing parties.
The size of the estimates imply that a change from a right-wing to a left-wing cabinet
(leading to an ideology index increase from 1 to 5) ceteris paribus raises the unbundling
measure by about 0.85.
Finally, the results suggest than the lagged tax revenue and a country’s membership
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in the EU do not have an effect on the degree of unbundling as the respective coefficients
cannot reach statistical significance.
4.3.2 Robustness Checks
We check the robustness of our findings in four different ways: first, we change the
estimation method and use ordered logit regression instead of OLS. Then, we substitute
several control variables included in the basic estimation with alternative, but closely
related measures and re-run the OLS regression. Afterwards, both modifications are
combined and an ordered logit model with the new set of controls is estimated. Finally,
we re-estimate the most comprehensive basic regression and all robustness checks with
both the energy intensity proxy and the corruption index being lagged by one year
to ensure that our results do not suffer from endogeneity problems these two controls
might cause when they are not lagged.
4.3.2.1 Ordered Logit Regression
Calculated as the mean of the two answer values assigned according to the level
of separation between generation and transmission and within the electricity sector,
respectively, the vertical integration sub-indicator we employ as dependent variable re-
quires the scales of the two questions it is composed of to be cardinal. It might be
argued, though, that the assumption of cardinality inherent in the way the measure is
constructed is at least problematic: according to the literature discussing the effects of
unbundling (see, e.g., OECD, 2001; European Commission, 2007a; Pollitt, 2008), Own-
ership Unbundling, i.e. the complete separation of the monopolistic networks from elec-
tricity generation and retail, is essential to realize full competition in the non-network
activities; only this strict form of unbundling ensures that incentives of network monop-
olists to discriminate against independent rivals of the affiliated generators and retailers
are completely eliminated. That is, with reductions in the sub-indicator value supposed
to reflect respective increases in the level of electricity sector competition, regulations
requesting a separation of the grids by ownership should result in a considerably higher
decrease of the integration measure than other, less drastic interferences. This, how-
ever, is not the case: sub-indicator values imply that, e.g., regulatory provisions for a
107
CHAPTER 4. BUDGETARY INTERESTS AND THE DEGREE OF UNBUNDLING
completely vertically integrated industry that demand accounting separation between
generation and transmission and entail the coexistence of unbundled and integrated
companies (leading to a sub-indicator decrease from 6 to 3) would have the same effect
on competition as a subsequent reform step compelling ownership separation between
natural monopolies and all other stages of the value chain throughout the sector (re-
sulting in another 3-unit drop to 0). The calculation method of the sub-indicator
assuming cardinality notwithstanding, we therefore suggest an alternative and simpler
interpretation of changes in the integration measure value: they can be construed as
solely reflecting the completion of a liberalization step. With each of them reducing the
measure by 1.5, we get a simple ordinal scale, not rating the intensity of the different
regulatory interventions.
This allows us to test the robustness of our OLS results by estimating the effect
of higher tax rates on liberalization within the framework of an ordered logit model.
The ordered logit model can be applied in case of discrete ordinal dependent variables
that reflect a ranking of the possible outcomes, but do not allow for comparing the
differences between response categories (Wooldridge, 2002, ch. 15.10.1). The basis of
the approach is the latent regression
vi∗it = β ·Zit + ηit,
where Zit includes the tax rate taxit, the controls composing Xit in the OLS re-
gressions and country (cdumi) and year dummies (ydumt), but no constant; the error
term ηit is logistically distributed with distribution function Λ(ηit) =
1
1+e−ηit . With
a national electricity sector’s actual level of unbundling at a certain year, vi∗it, being
a latent variable, we can draw on the sub-indicator values viit ∈ {0, 1.5, 3, 4.5, 6} to
approximate the degree of separation. There exist five unknown cut points κj with
j = 1, ..., 5 and −∞ = κ0 < ... < κj−1 < κj < ... < κ5 =∞, so that




Pr(yit = viit|Zit) = Pr(κj−1 < y∗it ≤ κj|Zit) = Λ(κj −β ·Zit)−Λ(κj−1−β ·Zit).
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Table 4.2: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3)































country dummies yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes
R2 .7922
Pseudo−R2 .6456 .5850
N 470 438 438
Note: Columns (1) and (3) show estimation results of or-
dered logit regressions, column (2) those of a standard linear
OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the vertical integra-
tion sub-indicator for the electricity sector as described in Con-
way and Nicoletti (2006). Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
These are then used to estimate both the coefficients β and the threshold values
κj by the maximum likelihood method (Wooldridge, 2002, ch. 15.10.1; Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005, ch. 15.9.1).
The estimates of the ordered logit regression are reported in the first column of Table
4.2. However, positive [negative] coefficients solely illustrate that the probability of the
dependent variable to take on a value of 6 increases [decreases] and its likelihood to be 0
decreases [increases]; conclusions about the three intermediate scores or effect sizes, on
the contrary, cannot be drawn (Wooldridge, 2002, ch. 15.10.1). We can thus only state
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that the negative relationship between corporate income tax rate and unbundling level
suggested earlier by the OLS results is further corroborated by the ordered logit find-
ings for complete integration and full separation: the positive coefficient is statistically
significant at the 5% level.
Likewise, also the liberalization-enhancing effects of energy-intensive production pro-
cesses, low levels of corruption and right-wing governments suggested by the most com-
prehensive basic OLS regression (see column (7) of Table 4.1) are substantiated with
respect to the lowest and the highest intensity of unbundling: the coefficients on both
the energy intensity proxy and the corruption measure are negative, the estimate on the
ideology index is positive, and all three coefficients are statistically highly significant.
Unlike the OLS estimation, the ordered logit regression furthermore indicates a
higher [lower] probability for the electricity industry to be entirely unbundled [inte-
grated] in EU member states: the coefficient on the EU dummy is negative and reaches
statistical significance at the 5% level. Moreover, the ordered logit results suggest the
power sector to be more often fully separated [integrated] when tax revenues are low
[high] and government debt is high [low] (with the positive estimate on tax yields and
the negative one on debt being significant at the 1% and the 5% level, respectively),
which is at odds with our original considerations: as we assume the base of the corpo-
rate income tax to decrease with stricter forms of unbundling due to the positive tax
rate coefficient, opposite signs of the estimates would have been in line with our expec-
tations. A possible explanation might be as follows: regulatory decision makers focused
on high tax yields might rather apply both total tax revenues and government debt as
indicators of a country’s economic performance than the GDP growth rate (which is
why its coefficient is statistically insignificant); high tax yield would then indicate an
upswing or a boom, while high government debt would hint at a downturn or a de-
pression. With the energy sector rated as being essential for the economic development
of a country (Schneider and Jäger, 2003; Domanico, 2007; Karan and Kazdağli, 2011),
signs of an economic crisis (i.e., a high indebtedness) might then induce regulators to
foster competition by unbundling to reduce power prices, while high tax revenues might
prompt them to slow down reform.
To finally assess the quantitative relationship between corporate income tax rate
and unbundling level within the framework of the ordered logit model, we follow the
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Table 4.2A: Changes in Expected VI Subindicator Values
corporate income tax rate base level (CITrate)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
∆E(vi) .0171 .0169 .0165 .0158 .0150 .0140
Note: Table 4.2A reports changes in the conditional expected values of the ver-
tical integration sub-indicator for the electricity sector induced by a one percent-
age point increase in the corporate income tax rate, starting from the respective
base level CITrate. Conditional expected values are calculated by means of the
average predicted probabilities based on the ordered logit estimates reported in
column (1) of Table 4.2.
procedure described in Wooldridge (2002, ch. 15.10.1): given a predefined tax rate
CITrate, we first estimate the average predicted probabilities for each value the vertical
integration index can take. Based on these estimates, we then calculate the conditional




s · P (vi = s|CITrate,Z−),
with Z− comprising all controls included in Z apart from the tax rate.
After the same is done for a tax rate exceeding CITrate by one percentage point,
CITrate+, we compute the difference in the conditional expected values
∆E(vi) = E(vi|CITrate+,Z−)− E(vi|CITrate,Z−).
∆E(vi) is then comparable to the OLS coefficient on the corporate income tax rate
reported in the last column of Table 4.1.
Table 4.2A reports the ∆E(vi)-values for six different tax rate base levels that cover
the range of rates observed in our sample (see Table 4.6). All of them confirm the
liberalization-hampering effect of higher corporate income tax rates indicated by the
positive ordered logit estimate, but at the same time they hint at a more modest impact
than their OLS counterpart: decreasing with a higher CITrate, the figures are about
one half to three fifth lower than the OLS estimate, suggesting that a one percentage
point increase in the tax rate raises the conditional expected value of the unbundling
index by only 0.017 to 0.014 units.
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4.3.2.2 Alternative Controls
The modified set of controls we employ to further check the robustness of our results
is composed as follows: we replace the lagged total tax revenue as well as the lagged
total government debt with the lagged tax revenue and the lagged government debt as
percentages of GDP (data are obtained from OECD (2010b)). Furthermore, the lagged
GDP per capita growth rate (calculated on the basis of GDP per capita data provided
by World Bank (2011)) is used instead of the lagged GDP growth rate. The primary
energy supply per capita, an alternative measure of energy intensity (OECD, 2010a), is
substituted for the primary energy supply per GDP unit. Finally, we replace Potrafke’s
(2009) ideology index with Bjørnskov’s (2008) measure which ranges from -1 to 1 and
exhibits high values when right-wing parties dominate a parliament. It is obvious that
except for the coefficient on the Bjørnskov’s (2008) ideology index the expected signs
of the new controls correspond to those of their predecessors. The coefficient sign of
Bjørnskov’s (2008) measure, on the contrary, is expected to be negative, since in com-
parison to Potrafke’s (2009) measure the assignment of values to political orientations
is carried out exactly the other way round. Transparency International’s CPI as well
as the EU dummy are incorporated unchanged in the estimations.
Column (2) of Table 4.2 reports the results from the OLS regression that includes
all (modified) controls. Our main initial finding is again confirmed: as in Table 4.1,
the coefficient of the corporate income tax rate is both positive and statistically highly
significant and therefore indicative of a negative relationship between the level of cor-
porate taxation and the degree of unbundling. Its size is furthermore almost identical
to that of its counterpart in the most comprehensive basic regression (column (7) of
Table 4.1).
The positive relationship between high government debt and low degrees of vertical
separation already indicated by the basic results is also suggested when debt is mea-
sured as a proportion of the GDP. Contrary to its counterpart in the last column of
Table 4.1, however, the robustness check coefficient reaches significance only at the 10%
level. The size of the effect is rather minor, though: an increase in debts equal to ten
percent of a country’s GDP would raise the vertical integration index by less than 0.1.
The coefficient on energy supply per capita is only significant at the 10% level as well. It
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Table 4.2B: Changes in Expected VI Subindicator Values
corporate income tax rate base level (CITrate)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
∆E(vi) .0201 .0195 .0187 .0179 .0168 .0154
Note: Table 4.2B reports changes in the conditional expected values of the verti-
cal integration sub-indicator for the electricity sector induced by a one percent-
age point increase in the corporate income tax rate, starting from the respective
base level CITrate. Conditional expected values are calculated by means of the
average predicted probabilities based on the ordered logit estimates reported in
column (3) of Table 4.2.
shows the expected negative sign and confirms the positive relationship between reform
and a high energy intensity the comparable estimate in Table 4.1 already suggested.
According to its size, each additional ton of oil equivalent supplied per person reduces
the liberalization measure by approximately 0.4. The separation-enhancing effects of
a low degree of corruption is estimated to be lower than indicated before: compared
to the basic regression, the impact induced by a one-unit increase in the corruption
index is lowered to about two thirds; at the same time, the significance level is reduced
to 5%. Unlike the basic regression, the robustness check finally hints at higher levels
of unbundling in EU member states. The coefficient of the EU dummy is statistically
highly significant and suggests an EU membership to decrease the vertical integration
index by one unit.
4.3.2.3 Ordered Logit Regression with Alternative Controls
The estimates of the ordered logit regression including the modified set of control
variables are reported in the third column of Table 4.2. The results further substantiate
the liberalization-hampering effect of heavily taxed corporate incomes, indicating the
probability for full separation [integration] to decrease [increase] with higher corporate
income tax rates: the coefficient on the tax rate is positive and reaches statistical
significance at the 10% level. Moreover, the findings suggest a liberalization-enhancing
effect of low levels of corruption and an EU membership with regard to the lowest and
the highest degree of unbundling: the coefficients on both these controls are negative
and statistically significant at the 10% and the 5% level, respectively.
Table 4.2B finally depicts the differences in conditional expected values calculated
on the basis of the ordered logit model including the alternative controls. All ∆E(vi)-
values hint at lower levels of vertical separation in case of higher corporate income tax
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rates. As those in Table 4.2A, also the conditional expected values reported in Table
4.2B suggest the effect of a higher tax rate on the unbundling intensity to be lower than
their OLS counterpart in column (2) of Table 4.2: they range from about 0.02 to 0.015
and are hence one third to one half smaller than the OLS coefficient.
4.3.2.4 Lagged Controls
As a final robustness check, we re-estimate the regressions reported in the last col-
umn of Table 4.1 and all previous robustness checks with lagged proxies for energy
intensity and corruption.
One might argue that the higher intensity of competition in electricity generation
and supply that is expected to emerge in the course of increasing levels of unbundling
affects the energy consumption of companies and households: because of the lower power
prices prevailing in competitive markets, end-users might be less inclined to save energy.
Since such a behavior would, in turn, raise the values of our energy intensity measures,
an endogeneity problem would exist in all previous estimations. To ensure that we do
not base our later considerations on the relationship between corporate income tax rates
and vertical separation on biased results, we therefore lag the primary energy supply
per GDP unit and per capita, respectively, by one period and check whether this will
change the estimation results considerably.
We likewise lag the corruption index by one year to tackle another possible endo-
geneity problem: the public officials’ susceptability to bribery might be higher, the
higher the scope of regulatory interferences is (Tanzi, 1994; Mauro, 1996; Treisman,
2000). Due to the lack of competition usually prevailing in heavily regulated markets,
the firms active in these markets enjoy considerable monopoly or oligopoly rents. This,
in turn, might increase the bureaucrats’ inclination to demand kickbacks, as they are
aware of the regulated companies’ willingness to pay them in order to shield their prof-
itable environment against potential market entrants (Mauro, 1996; Ades and Di Tella,
1999).
Both theoretical and empirical findings provide some evidence for such a corruption-
enhancing effect of excessive industry profits: in Ades and Di Tella’s (1997a) model, the
share of venal civil servants in the bureaucracy increases with increasing rents of the
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bribing regulatees. And regressions reveal a higher susceptability to bribery in countries
where non-competitive profits exist due to either a market dominance of few firms (Ades
and Di Tella, 1999) or one of the following government interventions: a restriction of
foreign competition in general (Ades and Di Tella, 1997a, 1997b, 1999; Treisman, 2000)
or with respect to public procurement, a discriminatory taxation, subsidization (Ades
and Di Tella, 1997b) or regulatory interferences (Treisman, 2000); Ades and Di Tella’s
(1999) and Treisman’s (2000) findings, though, lack statistical significance in some cases.
Again, estimation results suggest a statistically significant liberalization-hampering
effect of high corporate income tax rates (see Tables 4.7 and 4.7A, respectively, in the
Appendix for detailed results). When the original [alternative] set of controls (with both
the energy intensity and the corruption proxies lagged by one year, though) is used, the
highly significant OLS coefficient on the tax rate takes a value of 0.0346 [0.0334] which
is virtually identical to the comparable estimate in column (7) of Table 4.1 [column (2)
of Table 4.2]. As its counterpart in column (1) [(3)] of Table 4.2, the positive ordered
logit coefficient on the corporate income is significant at the 5% [10%] level; the changes
in the conditional expected values of the vertical integration sub-indicator calculated
on the basis of the ordered logit estimate range from 0.0166 to 0.0141 [from 0.0215 to
0.0163] (with values decreasing in the tax rate) and are hence effectively identical to
the values reported in Table 4.2A [4.2B] as well.
4.4 Estimation Results: VAT on Electricity
4.4.1 Basic Results
We now examine whether the positive correlation between the taxation of power
consumption and unbundling intensity indicated in Figure 4.2 can be corroborated
by regression analysis. To identify the effect of electricity VAT rates on the level of
vertical separation we start again with running linear OLS estimations with different
combinations of control variables. We draw on all the controls already familiar from
the regressions reported in Table 4.1.
Table 4.3 provides the estimation results. As with corporate income taxes, the
regression output underpins the effect earlier implied by the scatterplot (Figure 4.2):
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
elecVATrate -.0962∗∗∗ -.0653∗∗∗ -.0632∗∗∗ -.0713∗∗∗ -.0639∗∗∗ -.0466∗∗∗ -.0439∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
totaltaxrevt−1 1.8e-07 1.2e-07 -9.9e-08 3.5e-07 4.2e-07 4.4e-07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
totalgovdebtt−1 3.9e-07∗∗∗ 3.7e-07∗∗∗ 4.2e-07∗∗∗ 3.8e-07∗∗∗ 5.2e-07∗∗∗ 5.2e-07∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPgrowtht−1 -.0316 -.0596∗ -.0356 -.0011 9.3e-04
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.037)
energysupGDP -9.755∗∗∗ -4.613 -15.98∗∗∗ -15.68∗∗∗
(3.680) (4.248) (5.047) (5.110)






constant 5.251∗∗∗ 4.197∗∗∗ 4.240∗∗∗ 6.677∗∗∗ 9.097∗∗∗ 10.72∗∗∗ 10.55∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.284) (0.300) (1.045) (1.099) (1.369) (1.437)
country dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes
year dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 .0991 .8343 .8348 .8381 .8406 .8561 .8562
N 491 381 381 381 361 327 327
Note: Columns (1)-(7) show estimation results of standard linear OLS estimations. Dependent variable is the
vertical integration sub-indicator for the electricity sector as described in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
higher electricity VAT rates are suggested to induce higher degrees of vertical separation.
All tax rate coefficients are negative and - with one exception in the last column where
only the 5% significance level is reached - statistically highly significant. Their values
range from about -0.04 to slightly below -0.07 when the bivariate model in the first
column is again neglected at this point. According to the estimate provided by the
most comprehensive model in column (7), a ten percentage point increase in the tax
rate reduces the integration index value by around 0.458.
Signs and significance levels of the control variables largely correspond to those in
Table 4.1: all coefficients on the lagged government debt are positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level, again indicating a persistence of vertical integration espe-
cially in more highly indebted countries. However, although substantiating our findings
from Section 4.3.1, the liberalization-hampering effect of budgetary deficits suggested
by the results in Table 4.3 is rather surprising: based on the negative coefficient of the
tax rate and the considerations outlined in the introduction and Section 4.2.2, we ex-
8The different effects the rates of the electricity VAT and the corporate income tax are suggested
to have on liberalization do not result from the different samples that are used for the estimations.
When the regressions depicted in the last column of Table 4.1 and Table 4.3, respectively, are re-run
applying the largest possible identical sample, findings again hint at a negative relationship between
corporate income tax rate and unbundling and a positive one between electricity VAT rate and vertical
separation. See columns (1) and (2), respectively, of Table 4.8 in the Appendix for detailed regression
results.
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pect an increasing degree of vertical separation to enlarge the tax base of the electricity
VAT. Regulators active in countries with high debts should hence promote unbundling
measures to increase tax yields and thus (the chance for higher) government appropri-
ations rather than defer them. Moreover, also our alternative explanation suggesting
regulators to perceive a high government debt as an indicator of an economic downturn
is at odds with the positive estimates on debt: as outlined in Section 4.3.2.1, we expect
ministry and agency employees to promote competition by increasing the unbundling
intensity when indebtedness is high, but again coefficients hint at the opposite. How-
ever, as in Table 4.1, the estimates suggest the size of the effect to be virtually zero,
again indicating that by the amount of the national debt in the previous year does not
affect the level of vertical separation in a notable way.
As in Table 4.1, the estimate on the lagged GDP growth rate reaches statistical
significance (at the 10% level) only when some controls are not included in the regression
yet. The only significant coefficient in column (4) again rather challenges the ”crisis
hypothesis” and indicates that an unusually high growth rate would be necessary to
change the unbundling measure in a notable way: an increase in the growth rate by ten
percentage points lowers the index value by about 0.6.
The coefficient of the lagged energy intensity is consistently negative and reaches
significance at the 1% level in all but the fifth column (where it becomes statistically
insignificant). The most comprehensive model specification hints at an impact of an
economy’s energy use that is even higher than that indicated in the last column of Table
4.1: an increase of 0.1 tonnes of oil equivalent in the amount of primary energy needed
to produce 1000 dollars of GDP reduces the integration index in the following year by
almost 1.6.
Unlike in Table 4.1, the corruption index is consistently statistically significant at
the 1% level; the sizes of the coefficients, however, do not deviate substantially from the
values their significant counterparts take in Section 4.3.1. According to the estimate in
the last column of Table 4.3, a one-unit increase in the corruption index decreases the
liberalization measure by slightly more than 0.35 units.
Compared to the results reported Section 4.3.1, the highly significant estimates of
the ideology effect rise. They imply that a change from a right-wing to a left-wing
government would lead to an integration index increase of above 1.1; this exceeds the
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Table 4.4: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3)





























country dummies yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes
R2 .8481
Pseudo−R2 .6731 .6678
N 327 287 287
Note: Columns (1) and (3) show estimation results of or-
dered logit regressions, column (2) those of a standard linear
OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the vertical integra-
tion sub-indicator for the electricity sector as described in Con-
way and Nicoletti (2006). Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
impact suggested by the estimation outcome depicted in Table 4.1 by more than 0.3.
Finally, the coefficients on the lagged tax revenue and EU membership are again
statistically insignificant.
4.4.2 Robustness Checks
We check the robustness of the results by repeating the procedure from Section
4.3.2: First, we re-run the most comprehensive basic OLS regression using ordered logit
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as estimation method. Then, we modify the controls for tax yields, debt, economic
performance, energy intensity and government ideology and estimate an OLS model.
Next, we run an ordered logit regression including the modified set of control variables.
Finally, we re-estimate the basic OLS regression that comprises all controls as well
as the three robustness checks described previously with the proxies for both energy
intensity and corruption being lagged by one year.
Column (1) of Table 4.4 depicts the results of the ordered logit estimation contain-
ing the initial control variables. As in Table 4.3, a liberalization-enhancing effect of
high electricity VAT rates is suggested: the coefficient on the tax rate is negative and
statistically highly significant, indicating the likelihood for full unbundling [integration]
to increase [decrease] with increasing tax rates. Substantiating the findings from the
basic regression, the highly significant coefficients on the energy intensity proxy and
the ideology index hint at higher reform efforts in countries with a high energy use and
with right-wing governments. Likewise, also the estimate on the corruption measure
(being significant at the 5% level) confirms the finding from Table 4.3 and indicates
higher level of unbundling in less corrupt countries. Finally, the positive and statis-
tically highly significant coefficient on tax yields suggests the probability for a fully
integrated [separated] power sector to be lower in case of high public revenues, which
is in line with our considerations: as the negative estimate on the tax rate makes us
expect that unbundling increases the base of the electricity VAT, regulators striving
for high appropriations should be prone to fully separate the networks; with tax yields
being already high, we expect the incentive to do so to be lower.
Finally, we compute differences in conditional expected values as outlined in Section
4.3.2 to quantify the unbundling index reduction induced by a one percentage point
increase in the VAT rate. Results for exemplary tax rate base levels relevant for our
sample are depicted in Table 4.4A. They range from approximately -0.039 to -0.055 and
confirm the positive relationship between the taxation of electricity consumption and
vertical separation suggested by all previous findings. Besides, it becomes apparent that,
unlike in the case of the corporate income tax rate, the marginal effects calculated on
the basis of the ordered logit outcome partly undercut (for lower base levels) and partly
exceed (for higher base levels) their OLS counterpart from the last column of Table 4.3.
This also results in considerably lower deviations of reported ∆E(vi)-values from the
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Table 4.4A: Changes in Expected VI Subindicator Values
electricity VAT rate base level (elecV ATrate)
5% 10% 15% 20%
∆E(vi) -.0394 -.0442 -.0500 -.0551
Note: Table 4.4A reports changes in the conditional expected values of the
vertical integration sub-indicator for the electricity sector induced by a one per-
centage point increase in the electricity VAT rate, starting from the respective
base level elecV ATrate. Conditional expected values are calculated by means of
the average predicted probabilities based on the ordered logit estimates reported
in column (1) of Table 4.4.
OLS estimate: they reach only about 25 percent of the size of the OLS coefficient at
the maximum.
The results of the OLS regression including the modified set of controls are reported
in column (2) of Table 4.4 and substantiate the main finding of all previous estima-
tions: again, the VAT rate coefficient implies a positive relationship between tax rate
and degree of unbundling. Beyond that, the significance level, the sign and virtually
also the size of the taxation estimate in column (1) and its counterpart in the most
comprehensive regression model outlined in Table 4.3 (column (7)) coincide.
The negative and statistically highly significant corruption coefficient in column
(2) corroborates the findings from the basic regression. Its size, however, implies a
stronger separation-enhancing effect of low levels of bribery than the estimate in the
last column of Table 4.3: a one-unit increase in Transparency International’s (2012)
measure is suggested to lower the vertical integration index by nearly 0.5. The impact
of a government’s ideology on the degree of liberalization might also be stronger than
indicated by the basic OLS regression: being significant at the 1% level, the coefficient of
the alternative ideology measure hints at a reduction of the integration index by nearly
1.5 whenever a left-wing government is replaced by a right-wing successor. Besides,
column (2) reveals a separation-enhancing effect of an EU membership, which is not
identified in Table 4.3. According to the estimate in Table 4.4 (which is, however, only
significant at the 10% level), being a member states decreases the liberalization index
value by more than 0.75.
The third column of Table 4.4 then shows the outcome of the ordered logit estimation
containing the alternative controls. The negative and statistically highly significant tax
rate coefficient corroborates the positive relationship between high electricity VAT rates
and vertical separation indicated by the regression results in both Table 4.3 and columns
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Table 4.4B: Changes in Expected VI Subindicator Values
electricity VAT rate base level (elecV ATrate)
5% 10% 15% 20%
∆E(vi) -.0378 -.0421 -.0475 -.0523
Note: Table 4.4B reports changes in the conditional expected values of the
vertical integration sub-indicator for the electricity sector induced by a one per-
centage point increase in the electricity VAT rate, starting from the respective
base level elecV ATrate. Conditional expected values are calculated by means of
the average predicted probabilities based on the ordered logit estimates reported
in column (3) of Table 4.4.
(1) and (2) of Table 4.4. Likewise, the liberalization-enhancing effect of low corruption
levels and right-wing governments are further substantiated: the corresponding ordered
logit estimates are negative and significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Differences in the conditional expected values of the vertical integration sub-indicator
calculated on the basis of the ordered logit regression including the modified set of con-
trols are reported in Table 4.4B. Further confirming all previous findings, the depicted
∆E(vi)-values suggest the degree of unbundling to rise when the electricity VAT rate
is increased by one percentage point; the effect is indicated to be higher, the higher the
tax rate before the increase is. The values lie between about -0.038 and -0.05, hinting
at a lower influence of taxation on vertical separation than their OLS counterpart when
the VAT rate is low and a higher one when power consumption is rather heavily taxed
(as it is also suggested by the results depicted in Table 4.4A); deviations from the OLS
estimate reported in column (2) of Table 4.3 amount to not more than 20 percent of
the OLS coefficient.
Finally, also the regressions including the lagged proxies for energy intensity and cor-
ruption suggest a liberalization-enhancing effect of high electricity VAT rates (see Tables
4.9 and 4.9A, respectively, in the Appendix for detailed results). The OLS estimation in-
cluding the (otherwise) original [alternative] set of controls provides a coefficient on
the tax rate of -0.0443 [-0.0480] that reaches statistical significance at the 5% level and
is virtually identical to its counterpart in column (7) of Table 4.3 [column (2) of Table
4.4]. As the comparable estimate in column (1) [(3)] of Table 4.4, the ordered logit coef-
ficient on the electricity VAT rate is negative and highly significant; the ∆E(vi)-values
of the vertical integration sub-indicator calculated on the basis of the ordered logit esti-
mate range from -0.0403 to -0.0541 [from -0.0411 to -0.0566] (with values decreasing in
the tax rate) and are thus almost identical to the values depicted in Table 4.4A [4.4B].
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4.5 The Role of Regulators
In sum, our findings thus hint at a liberalization-enhancing effect of low corporate
income tax rates and high VAT rates on electricity. As already outlined in the intro-
duction, we conjecture that the decision-makers responsible for both organization and
regulation of national electricity industries play an important role for these results. In
the following, we will explain this notion step by step: initially, we will elaborate on
why we assume those in charge of electricity market surveillance to strive for high state
appropriations for the institution they work for; we will distinguish at this point be-
tween regulatory arrangements before (see Section 4.5.1) and after 1990 (Section 4.5.2),
the year when the reform process in the power sector gathered momentum (Newbery,
2009). Subsequently, we will discuss why we furthermore expect an interest in high
state budgets to exist among those responsible for regulation (Section 4.5.3). We will
then draw on all these considerations to finally explain why we suspect that low corpo-
rate income tax rates (Section 4.5.4.1) and high electricity VAT rates (Section 4.5.4.2)
induce both officials from ministries monitoring the electricity market and members of
regulatory agencies to raise the level of unbundling.
4.5.1 The Pre-1990 Period: Regulation by Ministries
Before independent regulatory authorities were established in the course of energy
sector liberalization and gradually fulfilled more and more tasks in the regulation of elec-
tricity markets, primarily ministries influenced all relevant decisions in the regulatory
process (OECD/IEA, 2001). The monitoring of the power sector was hence conducted
by ministry officials that most likely did not only pursue their formal objective, the
supervision of the vertically integrated utilities active in all stages of the sector’s value
chain (generation, transmission, distribution and retail) at that time (Viscusi et al.,
2005, ch. 12; Newbery, 2009). Instead, the theory of bureaucracy - originally going
back to Niskanen (1968), revised by Migué and Bélanger (1974) and Niskanen (1975),
and topic of various other publications (see, e.g., Downs, 1967, ch. IX; Rourke, 1984,
ch. 4; Tullock et al., 2002, ch. 5) - suggests that they might likewise have aimed at
maximizing their ministry’s power and, above all, its budget. Theory explains the of-
ficials’ interest in a high funding for their employer as follows (Niskanen, 1968, 1975;
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Migué and Bélanger, 1974): with increasing financial means, a state institution gains
power and reputation within the political process and its workforce gets higher salaries
and additional perquisites; effects that, in turn, increase the civil servants’ utility. The
improvement in the officials’ (non-)monetary remuneration is assumed to primarily re-
sult from an (illegitimate) siphoning off of resources that is possible for three reasons:
the respective office is the only supplier of the output, i.e., the state does not have a
(competing) alternative to satisfy its demand for the good or service the institution
provides; the supply cannot be rewarded on a per unit basis, so that a fixed amount of
funds has to be appropriated; and superordinated politicians lack the information essen-
tial to assess whether the requested funding is necessary to realize the output provided
and therefore the possibility to prevent fraudulent use.
In power market regulation all these issues are prevalent: the industry is usually
monitored by one single institution; surveillance activities are an intangible ”output”
(Dunleavy, 1985) the regulatory body’s budget cannot be linked with; and specialist
knowledge is inevitable to be able to meet the challenges of electricity regulation. It thus
seem reasonable to assume that the regulatory actors before 1990 were, as suggested
by the theory of bureaucracy, at least partly interested in high appropriations for their
ministries.
This view is further supported by empirical research that provides some evidence
for the interest of bureaucrats in high budget appropriations and the associated merits:
various papers identify strong preferences for - often considerable - budget increases for
the own institution to exist among heads of American state (Bowling et al. 2004; Ryu
et al., 2007; ASAP, 2008) and Norwegian municipal (Jacobsen, 2006) agencies, higher-
level officials in Finish ministries (Venetoklis and Kiander, 2006) and bureaucrats in
Turkish local authorities (Bağdigen, 2003); the Norwegian senior bureaucrats were fur-
thermore found to favor an allocation of ample funds to internal administration, which
is interpreted as a potential expression of their striving for a high bureaucratic slack
(Jacobsen, 2006). Studies surverying the actual budget requests of American agencies
(which are, according to Ryu et al. (2007), significantly affected by the aforementioned
preferences) draw a similar picture: they reveal the demands for financial means to
substantially increase in most cases (Sharkansky, 1965, 1968; LeLoup and Moreland,
1978; Lauth, 1986; Thompson, 1987; Ryu et al., 2007; ASAP, 2008). And also Blais
123
CHAPTER 4. BUDGETARY INTERESTS AND THE DEGREE OF UNBUNDLING
and Dion (1990), discussing the results of several publications empirically analyzing the
bureaucracy model, conclude that the reviewed findings support the theory. They base
their view inter alia on Sigelman (1986), whose paper once more suggests preferences for
high appropriations to prevail in governing bodies of U.S. agencies; on Krueger (1988)
who finds the number of applicants for federal jobs to increase in America when the
public-private sector wage ratio increases; and on Grandjean (1981), whose results (al-
beit not entirely without contradictions) hint at higher wages for full-time, white-collar
officials in U.S. agencies with a steadily growing number of employees.
4.5.2 The After-1990 Period: Regulation by Independent Agen-
cies
With the beginning of national reform processes in the electricity sector around
1990, (purportedly) independent regulatory authorities (IRAs) were established (Gi-
lardi, 2008, ch. 6) to control the industry’s natural monopolies persisting in trans-
mission and distribution. Apart from their autonomy from regulatees, the authorities’
independence from the state (including a financial autonomy) is rated as being essential
for the IRAs’ functioning: the distance from politics is supposed to prevent government
interference in regulatory decisions (Smith, 1997). Nevertheless, we expect an interest
in high government appropriations to exist also among regulators. We will substan-
tiate this assumption by initially explaining why it is reasonable to assume that IRA
members do not differ from ministry officials in their striving for high budgets for the
institution they work for; then, we will discuss why this is equivalent to an interest in
a high funding provided by the state.
Two possible explanation exist for why agency employees might aim for high fi-
nancial resources for their employer. First, it might be possible that regulators pursue
personal objectives that deviate from the authority’s official task (Kay and Vickers,
1990) and are basically the same as the goals Niskanen (1968, 1975) ascribes to bureau-
crats (Noll, 1989; Train, 1991, ch. I.1). The extreme complexity prevailing in regula-
tory environments after liberalization necessitates experts to be employed in authorities
(Thatcher, 2002b). Such specialist working in state agencies, in turn, are expected to
be eager for realizing (also) personal ends and to be willing to both neglect their official
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mandate and to accept societal detriments just to promote their career or to benefit
their institution. Their self-serving behavior is conjectured to remain undetected as
neither politicians nor citizens possess the knowledge necessary to evaluate the experts’
activities and since their output is furthermore often intangible (Moe, 1989); both the
discretionary leeway and the (substantial) authority granted to the specialists in the
course of their work are then assumed to enable them to enforce the decisions that serve
their personal interests (Moe, 1990). Given this tarnished image of publicly employed
experts, expecting also electricity market regulators to strive for high financial means
for their agencies appears reasonable.
The second (and entirely different) possible reason for why a striving for high fi-
nancial resources might exist within IRAs are agency members aiming for an effective
regulation: on the one hand, the growing scientification of utility regulation requires
both the aforementioned recruitement of profound expert knowledge (Thatcher, 2002b)
and the incurrence of significant information costs (Agrell and Gautier, 2010) on the
part of the agency; on the other hand, the companies which energy authorities have
to supervise are equipped with considerable resources (Thatcher, 2002a) that can be
abused to impede the regulators’ work. To overcome all these problems and prop-
erly fulfil their tasks, IRAs thus need appropriate financial means (OECD/IEA, 2001;
Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002); in particular, since the agencies’ challenges to hire
specialists and to counter the regulatees’ financial superiority are obviously closely con-
nected: with expertise being demanded not only by authorities but also by regulated
firms (OECD/IEA, 2001), the possibility to pay higher salaries due to a higher bud-
get increases the agencies’ chances to get competent staff (Smith, 1997) by outdoing
the industry. Consequently, we expect an interest in a good budgetary position of
their authority also to exist among regulators when they exclusively pursue their public
mission.
We finally want to explain why striving for high financial resources (and salaries)
basically amounts to striving for high government appropriations for the agency. A first
hint is given by OECD/IEA (2001), revealing that an important source of the budgets
of independent authorities regulating OECD electricity markets is the public income
from general taxation. Several studies analyzing the financial dependency of regulators
from government provide further evidence.
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Hanretty and Koop (2009) survey 175 regulators from 88 countries (including 31
energy regulators) and find that according to their statutes the funding of more than
60 percent of the authorities comes either fully or partially from government.
On a scale from 0 to 1 (where 1 stands for full statutory independence from govern-
ment) 14 European electricity regulators reach an average financial and organisational
independence of slightly more than 0.75 (Gilardi, 2008, ch. 8). This suggests that a
certain budgetary dependence of the authorities on governments exists.
The survey results of Johannsen et al. (2005) are in line with these findings as
well. The study shows that eight out of 15 energy regulators get all or parts of their
funding from government. In addition, the government in four out of the 15 countries
is in charge of the authorities’ personnel policy and, inter alia, determines the level of
salaries in the course of this function.
Finally, also the CEER (2005) confirms a limited financial independence of European
energy IRAs: in eleven out of 27 countries surveyed the regulators are not financially
autonomous since their budget forms part of the state budget. In eight of the countries
the regulatees are not involved in the funding of the authority, implying that the state
alone has to provide the financial means required to ensure the regulator’s operations.
4.5.3 The Interest in a Large State Budget
We now explain why we expect officials employed in ministries and independent
authorities responsible for electricity market regulation to be interested also in a high
state budget when they favor high appropriations for their agency. The overall national
budget is often described as a ”pie”of which public agencies aim to get a slice as large as
possible (Peters, 1978, ch. 7; Bowling et al., 2004). Since an increase in the size of the
”pie” allows slices (i.e., the appropriations) for the single authorities to become larger as
well (Blais and Dion, 1990; Wildavsky and Caiden, 2004, ch. 3), ministry members and
regulators striving for additional resources for their institution should prefer a generous
state budget, too (Downs, 1967, ch. IX; Hood et al., 1984; Bowling et al., 2004).
Empirical findings are in line with these considerations. First, results hint at a
struggle for the ”pie” to indeed exist between agencies: Jacobsen (2006) shows that
the same authority heads that prefer additional means to be appropriated for their
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own agency virtually always oppose budget increases (and, in few cases, even favor
budget cuts) for Norwegian municipal agencies active in different remits. Venetoklis and
Kiander (2006) reveal that the Finnish senior officials that generally strive for higher
resources for departments and tasks attached to their ministry want the appropriations
for other ministries to decrease in numerous cases. And the interviews conducted by
Bağdigen (2003) convey the impression that Turkish bureaucrats try to outmaneuver
their colleagues to secure additional funds for the local authority they are employed by.
Second, given the results of Hood et al. (1984), the assumption that public officials
benefit from a larger overall ”pie” seems plausible as well: their findings provide some
evidence for payments and pay-related perks for officials in U.K. ministerial departments
to increase on both the aggregate and the per-capita level in cases of expansions of the
central government’s budget.
And finally, also the expectation that public employees favoring high appropriations
for their own institution want the state budget to be high, too, is supported by the
data: a survey in the American State Administrators Project (ASAP, 2008) finds that
almost three quarters of the officials included in the study endorse an increase in total
state expenditures, while Bowling et al. (2004) show that, depending on the year of the
period they analyze (1964-1998), about half to three quarters of the U.S. civil servants
surveyed would prefer both their agency and the state budget to be higher.
4.5.4 The Effect of Tax Rates on Regulatory Decisions
4.5.4.1 Corporate Income Tax
We now illustrate why we expect ministry officials and regulators who are interested
in both high government appropriations for their institutions and a high state budget to
particularly foster unbundling when corporate income tax rates are low. The basic idea
is as follows: the explanations in Section 4.5.3 suggest that the funding for the ministry
or agency in charge of regulation is higher (or, at least, is expected to be so by the
institution’s employees), the larger the state budget is. Furthermore, it seems reasonable
to assume that the state budget, in turn, is higher, the higher the tax yields are; with
high public revenues, also state expenditures are probably higher. Regulators aiming
for substantial financial means for the institution they work for should hence take their
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decisions in a way that raises overall tax revenues or, if this is impossible, that reduces
tax yields as little as possible. This most likely increases [prevents cuts in] the state
budget, accordingly raising the probability that the ministry or the agency, respectively,
receives higher [stable] government appropriations. As regulatory actors are unable to
affect the tax rate, increasing [maintaining] tax revenues implies broadening [lowering]
the tax base [as little as possible].
Let us compare the extreme cases of vertical connections in the electricity sector to
discuss these considerations with respect to the corporate income tax rate: in case of
full integration, the linkages between the natural monopoly (i.e., the grids) and gener-
ation, wholesale, and retail prevent any competition in the latter areas of the industry.
This generates monopolistic market structures also in the potentially competitive stages
of the value chain. With full separation, on the contrary, commercial interests of the
natural monopoly in generation, wholesale and retail companies no longer exist. Hence,
full competition arrives in this areas (OECD, 2001). Furthermore, microeconomic the-
ory shows that, compared to a competitive market, industry profits are higher when
demand is satisfied by a monopolist; the positive effect on profits that result from the
higher price a monopolistic firm charges dominates the negative effect the associated
output reduction entails (Katz and Rosen, 1998, ch. 13.2).
Fostering competition in generation, wholesale, and retail by implementing stricter
forms of unbundling hence reduces the base of the corporate income tax: designed as
a profit tax with payments to capital being treated as non-deductible expenses, the
corporate income tax can be seen as a tax on capital costs (Myles, 1995, ch. 8.2.2).
The remuneration of (equity) capital, in turn, is usually higher when profits are high,
so that ministry officials or regulators requiring vertically integrated electricity utilities
to separate their grids would eventually act against their own interests. Consequently,
we expect an incentive to refrain from realizing unbundling measures to exist among
regulatory actors and we furthermore expect it to be higher, the higher the corporate
income tax rate is9: as soon as competition-enhancing steps of reform reduce the tax
base by a certain amount, the loss in tax revenues and thus also the associated cuts in
the ministry’s or the authority’s budget increase in the tax rate. Officials and regulators
9With the electricity industry being a very capital-intensive sector, we reasonably assume the cor-
porate income tax not to distort factor input decisions and thus profit-maximizing outputs.
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that are more reluctant to foster vertical separation the more they benefit from high
payments to capital made in non-competitive environments might hence be a possi-
ble explanation for the negative relationship between corporate income tax rates and
unbundling intensity suggested by the estimation results.
With this conceivable explanation for the regression outcome put forth, we now
briefly want to discuss the problem of reverse causality. Since we apply OLS and
ordered logit regressions to estimate the effect of tax rates on the degree of unbundling,
we cannot rule out that our estimates are biased since the direction of effect runs
opposite and taxation is affected by the level of vertical separation. However, existing
literature discussing the determinants of the design of tax systems (see, e.g., Owens,
2006; James and Edwards, 2008; Brys et al., 2011; Bird and Wilkie, 2012) does not
identify the regulations implemented in a country’s electricity sector to be a relevant
factor at all, so we expect endogeneity caused by reverse causality not to be an issue in
our estimations.
4.5.4.2 VAT on Electricity
Given the previous considerations on the relationship between corporate income
tax rate and the degree of vertical separation, the estimation results from Section 4.4
should finally make us expect a positive effect of higher unbundling levels on electricity
VAT revenues: we assume regulators to refrain from implementing steps of reform when
liberalization decreases the base of a tax and high tax rates imply that the loss in state
revenue resulting from such a tax base reduction is considerable; if, conversely, high tax
rates foster the implementation of reform measures (as the regression outcome suggests
in the case of the electricity VAT), this should accordingly be induced by a raise in the
tax base. In this case, the additional tax yields after reform would be higher, the higher
the tax rate, and an authority interested in fiscal revenue would increasingly promote
unbundling the more heavily electricity consumption is taxed.
Whether increasing the level of vertical separation indeed raises the base of the
electricity VAT and thus the tax yields, though, is not clear: with a higher competition
in the power market, (pre-tax) prices drop and the electricity amount the consumers
purchase increases, so that the tax base is affected by two opposing effects (in addition,
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also levying a VAT itself creates both price and quantity effects (Stiglitz, 2000, ch. 18)).
In the following, we will therefore draw on empirical research on the price elasticity of
electricity demand to analyze whether the positive relationship between VAT rates
and unbundling suggested by our findings might, as conjectured, be induced by the
regulators’ higher incentives to benefit from a broad tax base that prevail when power
consumption is taxed more heavily. Let P (Q) denote the (decreasing) inverse aggregate
after-tax demand for power and t > 0 the VAT rate, so that
VAT(Q) = t · P (Q) ·Q
describes total electricity VAT revenues. To let an increase in the market equi-
librium quantity together with the associated reduction in the equilibrium price (or,




= t · [P (Q) + P ′(Q) ·Q] > 0 (4.1)
has to hold; the additional tax receipts generated by the marginal power unit have to
outweigh the loss in tax revenues that results from the price decrease for inframarginal






where the left-hand side is the price elasticity of electricity demand (Varian, 2010,
ch. 15.5), multiplied by minus one. Fostering competition by implementing stricter
rules on unbundling can hence only be optimal for a regulatory actor interested in high
revenues from taxing power consumption when electricity demand is price elastic; in
this case, the tax base increases when the equilibrium quantity is raised and also the
conjectured incentive to promote reform more strongly when the tax rate is high might
indeed exist.
Empirical findings suggest the power demand to be price elastic in some of the
countries of our sample to estimate the effect of electricity VAT rates on unbundling
(we discuss the results for long-run elasticities at this point, as reducing the degree of
130
4.5. THE ROLE OF REGULATORS
vertical integration in the power sector is a lengthy process): elasticity values smaller
than minus one are estimated for the Finnish (Madlener et al., 2011), the German
(Narayan et al., 2007) and the Japanense (Narayan et al., 2007; Madlener et al., 2011)
residental electricity demand. For several sample countries, though, empirical results
indicate the exact opposite: for Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Norway, South Korea (Madlener et al., 2011), Canada (Narayan et al., 2007), France,
the UK (Narayan et al., 2007; Madlener, 2011), Spain (Madlener et al., 2011; Blázquez
et al., 2012) and Italy (Narayan et al., 2007; Madlener et al., 2011; Dicembrino and
Trovato, 2013) household electricity demand is estimated to be inelastic; furthermore,
results suggest a price inelastic industrial power demand to exist in Italy (Dicembrino
and Trovato, 2013) and Germany (Madlener et al., 2011; in the food and tobacco, the
chemicals, the pulp and paper, the non-metallic minerals and the transport equipment
subsectors of manufacturing).
The possible explanation for the positive relationship between electricity VAT rates
and unbundling intensity we provide is hence at odds with most of the empirical findings
on the long-run price elasticity of power demand: with an inelastic demand, the lower
price power producers can charge in more competitive markets has a stronger effect on
the tax base than the associated increase in electricity demand, so that, overall, the
base of the electricity VAT decreases with stricter forms of unbundling. Tax revenue
reductions are then higher, the higher the tax rate is, so that, following our original
notion, higher VAT rates should increase the incentive for regulatory actors interested
in high appropriations for their institution to refrain from implementing (further) steps
of reform (just as in the case of the corporate income tax).
One might argue that the discrepancy between our regression results and our as-
sumption that avaricious officials and regulators determine the liberalization speed re-
sults from inconsistent estimates. The degree of unbundling might affect the rate of
the electricity VAT, implying that the coefficient on the VAT rate would be biased due
to reverse causality. As already outlined in the previous section, however, a country’s
regulatory regime in the power sector is not found to be a factor having an influence on
the design of the tax system by the relevant literature (see, e.g., Owens, 2006; James
and Edwards, 2008; Brys et al., 2011; Bird and Wilkie, 2012); we therefore expect the
estimates challenging our assumption not to be induced by reverse causality.
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Note: Estimation results of standard linear OLS esti-
mation; full estimation results can be found in column
(3) of Table 4.8 in the Appendix. Robust standard er-
rors in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level.
Another possible explanation for the unexpected positive relationship between elec-
tricity VAT rates and unbundling intensity might be that the estimates on the VAT
rate are inconsistent as they suffer from an omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2002,
chs. 4.1 and 4.3.1). The estimation results reported in Table 4.5 might indeed create
this impression (see column (3) in Table 4.8 in the Appendix for full results): while an
estimation based on the same sample and with the same controls, but not including
the corporate income tax rate as additional regressor provides a VAT rate estimate of
-0.0437 significant at the 5% level (see column (2) of Table 4.8), the findings in Table 4.5
raise doubts whether an effect of the electricity VAT rate on vertical separation exists
at all; the coefficient on the VAT rate is statistically insignificant and of negligible size
(-0.0076) when the rates of both the VAT and the corporate income tax are included in
the regression. The estimate on the corporate income tax rate, on the contrary, remains
virtually unaffected by an inclusion of the electricity VAT rate as additonal regressor
and drops only slightly from 0.0539 (see column (1) in Table 4.8) to 0.0520, with both
estimates being statistically highly significant.
The results from the regression comprising both tax rates as explanatory variables
hence indicate that officials and regulators striving for high ministry and agency bud-
gets, respectively, might base their regulatory decisions only on how further unbundling
measures affect the base of the corporate income tax; changes in the base of the elec-




Our paper provides a possible reason for diverging degrees of electricity market
liberalization that goes beyond the scope of common explanations: based on the (sub-
stantiated) assumption of regulatory decision makers striving for the highest possible
appropriations, we show that the linkage between the public budget and the regulator’s
funding existing in both past and present might influence a country’s reform efforts
in the power industry. Estimation results suggest that higher corporate income tax
rates are significantly related to lower levels of vertical separation implemented in the
sector. Since the increase in competition associated with higher unbundling intensities
reduces the base of the corporate income tax, the loss in tax revenues is higher, the
higher the tax rate is. Lower tax yields, in turn, lead to lower funding of ministries and
regulatory authorities, so we conjecture ministry officials and regulators to refrain from
implementing steps of reform especially when corporate income is heavily taxed: the
size of the budget cut that is to be expected increases in the tax rate.
This means that, in electricity markets, a clear delineation of the regulator’s bud-
getary or financial interests from its regulatory goals is vital to ensure the achievement
of these aims. As long as the authority’s budget and/or the salaries paid to its employ-
ees are indirectly affected by the sectoral tax payments that, in turn, depend on the
prevailing market structure, competition-hampering regulations such as an insufficient
degree of unbundling cannot be ruled out.
Empirical findings furthermore hint at a liberalization-enhancing effect of high elec-
tricity VAT rates. However, this result would only be in line with our notion that
ministry officials and regulators eager for high budgets affect vertical separation when
power demand is price elastic, which is a rather rare case in reality. Whether this out-
come fundamentally challenges our explanation for the relationship between taxation
and unbundling, or results from either reverse causality issues (which the literature on
the design of tax systems indicates not to exist) or omitted variable problems (which
an additional estimation indicates to exist) cannot be ascertained, though.
The partially contradictory findings rather reveal that this paper can only be seen as
a first step in the analysis of how the interest of regulators in high institutional budgets
might hamper or foster liberalization. Examining the potential effect of further taxes,
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broadening the sample (especially the smaller one we used in the VAT rate regressions
due to data restrictions) or identifying and applying appropriate instruments for the
tax rates to fully exclude possible endogeneity problems could be meaningful extensions




Table 4.6: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Main Variables
vi 682 4.137 2.214 0.00 6.00
CITrate 682 37.47 9.856 12.50 61.80
elecVATrate 491 12.82 7.384 0.00 25.00
Controls (Basic Regressions)
totaltaxrevt−1 588 1749723 1330000 771 186000000
totalgovdebtt−1 588 434829 984176 293.3 7284065
GDPgrowtht−1 588 2.818 2.367 -11.89 11.46
energysupGDP 588 .1890 .0623 .0900 .4500
TIcor 557 7.174 1.985 1.870 10.00
ideopotr 470 2.911 .8885 1 4
EUdum 470 .5830 .4936 0 1
Controls (Robustness Checks)
taxrevGDPt−1 588 35.52 8.203 14.35 52.23
govdebtGDPt−1 588 48.38 28.66 .8210 164.3
GDPcapgrowtht−1 588 2.200 2.340 -11.89 10.35
energysupcap 588 4.268 2.013 1.000 15.74
ideobjor 438 .2697 .3388 -.5167 1.000
energysupGDPt−1 469 .1860 .0623 .1000 .4000
TIcort−1 469 7.762 1.484 2.990 10.00
energysupcapt−1 437 4.333 1.824 1.000 11.40
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Table 4.7: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CITrate .0346∗∗∗ .0571∗∗ .0334∗∗∗ .0634∗





























EUdum -.2405 -1.284∗ -.9833∗∗∗ -1.521∗∗
(0.271) (0.766) (0.280) (0.723)
constant 8.674∗∗∗ 6.233∗∗∗
(1.092) (1.489)
country dummies yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes
R2 .8304 .7899
Pseudo−R2 .6463 .5825
N 469 469 437 437
Note: Columns (1) and (3) show estimation results of standard linear OLS es-
timations, columns (2) and (4) those of ordered logit regressions. Dependent
variable is the vertical integration sub-indicator for the electricity sector as de-
scribed in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 4.7A: Changes in Expected VI Subindicator Values
corporate income tax rate base level (CITrate)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
∆E(vi) (based on col. (2) of Tab. 8) .0166 .0165 .0162 .0157 .0150 .0141
∆E(vi) (based on col. (4) of Tab. 8) .0215 .0209 .0202 .0192 .0179 .0163
Note: Table 4.7A reports changes in the conditional expected values of the vertical integration sub-indicator for
the electricity sector induced by a one percentage point increase in the corporate income tax rate, starting from
the respective base level CITrate. Conditional expected values are calculated by means of the average predicted















GDPgrowtht−1 .0337 .0074 .0322
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
energysupGDP -16.33∗∗∗ -15.71∗∗∗ -16.57∗∗∗
(4.920) (5.091) (4.960)
TIcor -.4342∗∗∗ -.3580∗∗∗ -.4280∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.123) (0.117)
ideopotr .2724∗∗∗ .2830∗∗∗ .2711∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.079) (0.075)
EUdum -.1609 -.1679 -.1316
(0.371) (0.370) (0,385)
constant 8.469∗∗∗ 10.50∗∗∗ 8.617∗∗∗
(1.267) (1.432) (1.327)
country dummies yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes
R2 .8658 .8563 .8658
N 326 326 326
Note: Columns (1) to (3) show estimation results of standard
linear OLS estimations. Dependent variable is the vertical inte-
gration sub-indicator for the electricity sector as described in Con-
way and Nicoletti (2006). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***/** denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5% level.
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Table 4.9: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
elecVATrate -.0443∗∗ -.1855∗∗∗ -.0480∗∗ -.1951∗∗∗





















∗ -.9343∗∗ -.3245∗∗ -.9940∗





EUdum -.0729 -1.245 -.7433∗ -.8345
(0.371) (1.211) (0.419) (1.050)
constant 10.69∗∗∗ 5.902∗∗∗
(1.467) (2.054)
country dummies yes yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes yes
R2 .8558 .8411
Pseudo−R2 .6713 .6561
N 327 327 288 288
Note: Columns (1) and (3) show estimation results of standard linear OLS es-
timations, columns (2) and (4) those of ordered logit regressions. Dependent
variable is the vertical integration sub-indicator for the electricity sector as de-
scribed in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 4.9A: Changes in Expected VI Subindicator Values
electricity VAT rate base level (elecV ATrate)
5% 10% 15% 20%
∆E(vi) (based on col. (2) of Tab. 9) -.0403 -.0450 -.0501 -.0541
∆E(vi) (based on col. (4) of Tab. 9) -.0411 -.0467 -.0522 -.0566
Note: Table 4.9A reports changes in the conditional expected values of the vertical integration sub-
indicator for the electricity sector induced by a one percentage point increase in the electricity VAT
rate, starting from the respective base level elecV ATrate. Conditional expected values are calculated
by means of the average predicted probabilities based on the ordered logit estimates reported in column
(2) and column (4), respectively, of Table 4.9.
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ERÚ (2014): The Energy Regulatory Office, available online: http://www.eru.cz/
dias-read article.php?articleId=331, February 2014.
European Commission (2001): Communication from the Commission to the Coun-
144
REFERENCES
cil and the European Parliament - Completing the Internal Energy Market; Proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives
96/92/EC and 98/30/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Elec-
tricity and Natural Gas (2001/0077 (COD)); Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Conditions for Access to the Network for Cross-Border
Exchanges in Electricity (2001/0078 (COD)), COM(2001) 125 final, 13 March 2001,
Brussels.
European Commission (2004): Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives
2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on the Internal Market in Electricity and Natural Gas -
The Unbundling Regime, 16 January 2004, Brussels.
European Commission (2005): Commission Decision of 13/06/2005 Initiating an
Inquiry into the Gas and Electricity Sectors Pursuant to Article 17 of Council Reg-
ulation (EC) No 1/2003 - Cases COMP/B-1/39.172 (Electricity) and 39.173 (Gas),
Brussels.
European Commission (2006a): Mergers: Commission Opens In-Depth Investiga-
tion into Merger between Gaz de France and Suez Group, IP/06/802, 19 June 2006,
Brussels.
European Commission (2006b): Free Movement of Capital: Commission Opens In-
fringement Proceedings against Spain Regarding Law Amending Functions of Spanish
Electricity and Gas Regulator, IP/06/569, 3 May 2006, Brussels.
European Commission (2006c): Mergers: Commission Rules against Spanish En-
ergy Regulator’s Measures Concerning E.ON’s Bid for Endesa, IP/06/1265, 26 Septem-
ber 2006, Brussels.
European Commission (2006d): Mergers: Commission Decides that Spanish Mea-
sures in Proposed E.ON/Endesa Takeover Violate EC Law, IP/06/1853, 20 December
2006, Brussels.
European Commission (2006e): Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition by
E.ON of Endesa, IP/06/528, 25 April 2006, Brussels.
European Commission (2006f): Free Movement of Capital: Commission Calls on
Spain to Modify the Law Amending the Functions of the Spanish Electricity and Gas
Regulator, IP/06/1264, 26 September 2006, Brussels.
145
REFERENCES
European Commission (2006g): Green Paper - A European Strategy for Sustain-
able, Competitive and Secure Energy, COM(2006) 105 final, 8 March 2006, Brussels.
European Commission (2006h): Merger: The European Commission Adopted a
Statement of Objections Regarding the Merger Project between Suez and Gaz de
France, IP/06/1109, 19 August 2006, Brussels.
European Commission (2006i): Mergers: Commission Approves Merger of Gaz de
France and Suez, Subject to Conditions, IP/06/1558, 14 November 2006, Brussels.
European Commission (2006j): Mergers: Summary of the Remedies Offered by
GDF and Suez, MEMO/06/424, 14 November 2006, Brussels.
European Commission (2006k): Mergers: Commission Opens Infringement Proce-
dure against Spain for Not Lifting Unlawful Conditions Imposed by CNE on E.ON’s
Bid for Endesa, IP/06/1426, 18 October 2006, Brussels.
European Commission (2007a): DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry
- 10 January 2007, SEC(2006) 1724, Brussels.
European Commission (2007b): Mergers: Infringement Procedure against Spain
for Not Lifting Unlawful Conditions Imposed on E.ON’s Bid for Endesa, IP/07/116,
31 January 2007, Brussels.
European Commission (2007c): Mergers: Infringement Proceedings against Spain
for Not Lifting Unlawful Conditions Imposed on E.ON’s Bid for Endesa, IP/07/296,
7 March 2007, Brussels.
European Commission (2007d): Mergers: Commission Refers Spain to Court
for Not Lifting Unlawful Conditions Imposed on E.ON’s Bid for Endesa, IP/07/427,
28 March 2007, Brussels.
European Commission (2007e): Communication from the Commission - Inquiry
Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European Gas and Elec-
tricity Sectors (Final Report), COM(2006) 851 final, 10 January 2007, Brussels.
European Commission (2007f): Communication from the Commission to the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament - Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market,
146
REFERENCES
COM(2006) 841 final, 10 January 2007, Brussels.
European Commission (2007g): Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Council and the European Parliament - An Energy Policy for Europe, COM(2007)
1 final, 10 January 2007, Brussels.
European Commission (2008): Mergers: Commission Welcomes Court Judgment
on Spain’s Failure to Withdraw Illegal Conditions Imposed on E.ON/Endesa Merger,
MEMO/08/147, 6 March 2008, Brussels.
European Commission (2012): Commission Decision of 14.5.2012 on the Appli-
cation of Article 9(9) of Directive 2009/72/EC to Transmission System Operation in
Scotland, C(2012) 3284 final, 14 May 2012, Brussels.
European Commission (2013a): Commission Decision of 12.4.2013 Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and Article 10(6) of Directive 2009/72/EC
- Ireland - Eirgrid/ESB, C(2013) 2169 final, 12 April 2013, Brussels.
European Commission (2013b): Commission Decision of 12.4.2013 Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and Article 10(6) of Directive 2009/72/EC
- United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) - SONI/NIE, C(2013) 2170 final, 12 April 2013,
Brussels.
European Commission (2014a): Certification of TSOs - List of Notifications Re-
ceived, available online: ec.europa.eu/energy/gas electricity/interpretative notes/doc/
certification/2013 received notifications.xlsx, March 2014.
European Commission (2014b): Country report - Malta, available online: http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/gas electricity/doc/mt energy market 2011 en.pdf, March 2014.
European Commission (2014c): Country report - Bulgaria, available online: http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/gas electricity/doc/bg energy market 2011 en.pdf, March 2014.
European Commission (2014d): Country report - Cyprus, available online: http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/gas electricity/doc/cy energy market 2011 en.pdf, March 2014.
European Commission (2014e): Country report - Luxembourg, available online:




European Commission (2014f): Country report - Hungary, available online: http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/gas electricity/doc/hu energy market 2011 en.pdf, March 2014.
European Communities (1996): Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 19 December 1996 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal
Market in Electricity, Official Journal of the European Communities L27, 30 January
1997, 20-29.
European Communities (1998): Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 22 June 1998 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market
in Natural Gas, Official Journal of the European Communities L204, 21 January 1998,
1-12.
European Union (2003): Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 26 June 2003 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in
Electricity and Repealing Directive 96/92/EC, Official Journal of the European Union
L176, 15 July 2003, 37-55.
European Union (2009a): Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 13 July 2009 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Elec-
tricity and Repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, Official Journal of the European Union
L211, 14 August 2009, 55-93.
European Union (2009b): Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 July 2009 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in
Natural Gas and Repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, Official Journal of the European
Union L211, 14 August 2009, 94-136.
European Union (2011): Europe - Countries, available online: http://europa.eu/
about-eu/countries/index en.htm, March 2011.
Franzese, R. J. (2002): Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies, Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1991): Game Theory, Cambridge, MA, USA and
London, UK: MIT Press.
Gatsios, K. and Seabright, P. (1989): Regulation in the European Community,
148
REFERENCES
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 5(2), 37-60.
Geldhof, W. and Vandendriessche, F. (2008): European Electricity and Gas
Market Liberalisation. Background, Status, Developments, in: Delvaux, B., Hunt, M.
and Talus, K. (eds.): EU Energy Law and Policy Issues, ELRF Collection, 1st Edition,
Rixensart, Belgium: Euroconfidentiel, 33-55.
Gilardi, F. (2002): Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory
Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6),
873-893.
Gilardi, F. (2005a): The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17
Countries and 7 Sectors, Swiss Political Science Review, 11(4), 139-167.
Gilardi, F. (2005b): The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The
Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe, The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1), 84-101.
Gilardi, F. (2008): Delegation in the Regulatory State - Independent Regulatory
Agencies in Western Europe, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward
Elgar.
Gilardi, F. and Maggetti, M. (2011): The Independence of Regulatory Authori-
ties, in: Levi-Faur, D. (ed.), Handbook of the Politics of Regulation, Cheltenham, UK
and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 201-214.
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